Armed confrontations between Houthis and forces loyal to ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh revealed the magnitude of disagreements between the two parties. The situation escalated to the point where each party mobilized its supporters in Sanaa on August 24. Houthi militias displayed their military power after Saleh and his supporters concluded their celebrations. They also detained a large number of Saleh’s supporters from the General People’s Congress. This reveals the deep fragments in the alliance between rebels in Yemen and the increased prospects for the dissolution of the Houthi-Saleh alliance.
Mutual Escalation
The alliance between Houthis and Saleh goes back to October 2012, when Saleh dispatched his uncle Sheikh Ali Maqsaa and a number of clerics from Sanhan to secretly visit Houthis militias. The two parties then held a series of meetings, which contributed to bridging the gap that occurred during Saleh’s reign. Their interests intersected despite their different political and intellectual orientations. Saleh wanted to avenge from those whom he believed caused his ouster from power, while Houthi militias wanted to achieve their aim of assuming power and spreading their beliefs and vision that governance must be restricted to the sons of Hassan and Hussein.
Although both parties managed to seize control of Sanaa, disputes between them recently increased. These disagreements could be summarized in the following:
1. Mistrust: Mistrust between the two parties began since Houthis managed to control Sanaa. Houthis announced forming the revolutionary committee to assume power. However, Saleh’s supporters rejected the move and the General People’s Congress sought to form a partnership government to improve power sharing. The Houthis agreed in principle, yet they held on to the revolutionary committee that is actually in control.
2. Exchanging accusations: Mistrust between the Houthis and Saleh led to exchanging accusations that each one has contacts with the coalition countries and the legitimate government. This was seen when the Houthis transferred some members of parliament and members of the General People’s Congress who live outside to trial on accusations of treason. The Houthis also accused Saleh of negotiating with some coalition member states to arrange future plans and be part of governance, if he abandons his alliance with them.
3. Media campaigns: Houthis’ and Saleh’s supporters increased their media campaigns accusing each other of treason and disloyalty. During one of his meetings with one of his party officials, Saleh described Houthi committees as “militias,” creating tension between the two parties. The chief of the so-called Houthi revolutionary committee Mohammed Ali al-Houthi called on Saleh to apologize for the description used.
4. The General People’s Congress’ criticism: Members and officials of the General People’s Congress voiced their discontent regarding the alliance with the Houthis. Their criticism of the Houthis, whether in the political council or the government, increased because they did not implement any decisions making state institutions inefficient and powerless. Meanwhile, revolutionary committees led by the Houthis controlled all state institutions and decision-making.
5. Mobilizing crowds: The crowds, which gathered following Saleh’s calls to celebrate the 35th anniversary of founding his party revealed the extent of the conflict between the two parties as they both sought to mobilize their supporters. As Saleh and his supporters marked the 35th anniversary, the Houthis mobilized their supporters on the four entrances, which further intensified the conflict. Meanwhile, Saleh did not frankly attack the Houthis during his address, since he is aware that they are militarily superior.
6. States of emergency: The Houthis repeatedly announced a state of emergency under the excuse that calls for mobilization threaten stability and that duty calls for “gatherings [to] be made on battlefronts, not in public squares.” The Houthis’ aims of the state of emergency are to suspend popular parties’ political activity, particularly the activity of Saleh’s party, limit protests demanding wages and strengthen their grip on power. Following the mobilization of supporters on August 24, Mohammed al-Houthi, chief of the so-called revolutionary committee, called for quickly “activating the state of emergency to fortify the internal front and cleanse the national ranks of all infiltrators,” in reference to the General People’s Congress.
7. Security domination: After Saleh mobilized his supporters, Houthis quickly appointed security commanders in several posts and sacked chiefs in support of Saleh and replaced them with Houthi members. This shows the group’s attempt to tighten control on the political scene and exclude Saleh’s supporters from all governmental sectors. The Houthi revolutionary committee is also looking into making decisions to restructure military and administrative posts and sovereign ministries, which are mostly occupied by figures loyal to Saleh. The decisions include ministerial changes and military appointments in whatever is left of the Republican Guards.
Several Motives
The alliance between the Houthis and Saleh was never of a strategic nature, it was rather based on mutual interests as imposed by circumstances after Saleh’s ouster. This made the alliance fragile and subject to cracking at any time considering the two parties’ contradictions and opposite long-term aims. The most important motives leading to this conflict are:
1. Historical enmity: The repercussions of the six wars, which erupted between Saleh’s supporters and the Houthis when Saleh, was still president still exist. The enmity between them, thus, led to mistrust as each party is cautious that the other party may turn against it. The Houthis did not forget that Saleh led the military operations, which killed the founder of their movement and leader Hussein Badreddine al-Houthi. This is why vengeful tendencies dominate their relations with Saleh.
2. Ideological differences: Ideological disagreements between the Houthis and Saleh’s supporters led to opposing political orientations. On one hand, the Houthis are ideologically linked to Shiite components in Iraq, Lebanon and Iran. On the other hand, the General People’s Congress is based on non-religious concepts in terms of its political principles and ideology and its leaders are not linked to political Islam or religious sects.
3. Excluding Saleh’s supporters: The Houthi movement seeks to monopolize power and replace the General People’s Congress, which has been its partner in governance since they staged the coup, with its cadres. Saleh’s supporters viewed this as a violation of the two parties’ agreement regarding power sharing, especially that the revolutionary committee affiliated with the Houthis dominates power. The agreement between the two parties stipulates that they share power and rotate the presidency – every six months – of the political council. However, the political council has been under the control of Houthi militias ever since it was formed and the General People’s Congress has not been able to head it for three consecutive terms.
4. Infiltrating the congress: After controlling governance, the Houthis gained the support of many officials at the General People’s Congress and neutralized others. Some of the party members and officials - including figures who were close to Saleh when he was in power - even became members of the Houthi militias.
5. Disbanding the Republican Guards: The Houthi militias gradually disbanded the Republican Guards, which were in support of Saleh. They subjugated troops according to geographic bases and they no longer have a unified central command. These troops were subjugated to serve in the Houthis’ military fronts and Houthi-controlled provinces. Many of troop members and commanders rejected this and abandoned their military units, as they wait for developments to unfold.
6. Financial domination: Ever since they seized power, the Houthis collected the state’s resources from all sectors and exploited them for what it calls war efforts. Thus, Houthi supporters made use of the state institutions’ financial resources, while state employees were deprived of their wages. Most of these employees are members of the General People’s Congress. The Houthis’ domination over financial resources sparked the anger of the party’s high-ranking officials and Saleh’s supporters.
Extended Consequences
Rising tensions between the Houthis and Saleh increased chances that the alliance between them will crack, due to opposing interests and mounting pressures of the coalition in support of legitimacy. The most important consequences of this conflict between the Houthis and Saleh are:
1. The bloc of Saleh’s supporters: Saleh’s supporters aim to restore balance and organize their ranks, when confronting the Houthis. This means creating new fronts for the confrontation between the two. Meanwhile, the Houthis are keen to postpone finalizing the conflict with Saleh. This will push them to please Saleh’s supporters for the time being as they focus on confronting the mounting military pressures.
2. Deteriorating economic situation: The economic and financial situation has worsened in areas controlled by rebels as ever since the Central Bank was transferred to Aden, the Houthis stopped paying employees their wages. As a result, many Yemenis, who depend on their wages for a living, suffered and several employees were incapable of performing their jobs. Meanwhile, prices increased amid the weak purchasing power of the Yemeni riyal and its decrease against other currencies. Accordingly, popular tensions worsened towards the parties involved in the coup.
3. Strengthening the legitimacy front: The legitimacy front is expected to increase its pressures on different fronts in the field and exploit the conflict between the two coup parties. This was seen through increasing field operations in Midi and Taiz fronts in the past phase and in the legitimate forces’ control of posts, which were controlled by the Houthis.
Meanwhile, it is becoming clear for citizens in Yemen that the allies, i.e. Houthis and Saleh, seek to serve sectarian and partisan interests, which they put above national interests. This increases citizens’ support of the legitimacy front in this confrontation against rebels.
The Future of the Alliance
The Houthi-Saleh alliance can be categorized under the name “the alliance of the enemies,” as the harmony between them was dictated by special interests either to avenge from rivals, or to dominate over Yemen. The end of this temporary alliance has been expected, because it is not a strategic alliance that is guaranteed by national interest. It is rather a fragile alliance between figures and leaders, and not among popular bases. Therefore, there are three scenarios regarding the future of this alliance, and they are:
1. Maintaining the alliance: The first scenario is maintaining the alliance as it is, since there are temporary interests that push both parties to keep it until circumstances are appropriate to eliminate one another, either violently or peacefully. It is likely that the Houthis will eventually finalize the conflict in their interest.
2. Houthis’ domination: The Houthis may put Saleh under house arrest and prevent him from making any appearances, amid the imbalance of power in their favor. This means the Houthis will further infiltrate and dominate the political scene in areas they control.
3. Dissolution of the alliance: This scenario is represented in Saleh’s escape of exit from Sanaa towards an area that is not controlled by the Houthis and his announcement that he is no longer allied with the Houthis. He might further clarify that his alliance with the group was a strategic mistake that must be atoned. This reflects Saleh’s attempt to join the front of legitimacy and abandon the Houthis.
Finally, the temporary alliance, which is based on interests between the Houthis and Saleh, is likely to crack due to contradictory interests, mistrust, the historical enmity between them, different ideologies and conflict over power sharing and financial resources. This is all in addition to Saleh’s supporters’ rejection to maintain this alliance and their fear of the imbalance of power in favor of the Houthis.
