Iraqi sources on September 11, 2022, revealed a deep rift in the political arena between the al-Siyada (sovereignty) Alliance, the most prominent political Sunni bloc in the parliament, and the Coordination Framework, which consists of Shiite factions and forces backed by Iran. As a result, the Council of Representatives (parliament) failed to hold a session scheduled on December 6. The development prompted the parliament's media office to issue a statement confirming that the session was adjourned until further notice. Still, it said nothing about the reasons for the move, nor did it clarify when the next session will be held.
What Prompted Escalation against al-Halbousi?
The recent developments in Iraq revealed disagreement between the speaker of the parliament, Mohammed al-Halbousi, and figures from the Coordination Framework. As a result, the Framework threatened to unseat al-Halbousi next year. This can be outlined as follows:
1. Disagreement about 'special appointment' within the government:
As the disagreement escalated, al-Halbousi and the first deputy speaker of the parliament Mohsen al-Mandalawi raised objections about the appointment of some figures by al-Halbousi without consulting with other political blocs. The positions in question are those of the director of the prime minister's office, the head of the presidential office, and the directors of offices of the parliament speaker and his first and second deputies. However, some of these employees were appointed by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and President Abdul Latif Rashid. The rift caused the postponement of the session, which was supposed to be held to vote on candidates for these particular positions.
2. The Coordination Framework breaking the deal:
The Taqaddum (progress) alliance recognized that the Coordination Framework is dragging its feet on implementing the terms of the political deal, especially regarding the Sunnis. These include the withdrawal of the Popular Mobilization Forces, or PMF, from areas liberated from ISIS and the dissolving of the accountability and justice commission. The development threatens to deepen the rift between the two blocs in the coming period.
It should be noted that the disagreement between the Framework and al-Halbousi dates back to the tenure of the former prime minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi when al-Halbousi criticized the Framework's militias for possession of illegal arms and foreign interference in Iraq's domestic affairs, in particular by Iran. Al-Halbousi's Alliance with the Sadrist Movement following the October 2021 elections prompted the Framework's leaders to target him and work on ousting him.
3. Raising the issue of Sunnis Disappearance:
Al-Halbousi, in an interview with a local TV channel, revealed that Iraqi citizens from eastern, western and central cities were killed by armed factions in the period from 2014 to 2016. He described them as the"slain victims" and not the "disappeared". This is the first official confession by an Iraqi official that between 18000 and 22000 Iraqis from the governorates of al-Anbar, Saladin, Diyala, Nineveh and Babel were executed by militias such as Kata'eb Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahlulhaq, Badr Organization, Kata'ib Sayed Al Shuhada', Kata'ib Sayed Al Shuhada', Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, Saraya Tali'a Al Khurasani, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and others. Angered by this criticism, these factions considered al-Halbousi's statements as an attempt to bolster his political and popular credit and even accused him of corruption and threatened to dig up issues they claimed he was involved in.
It should be noted that the issue of the Disappearance stood out among other issues raised during negotiations about forming the current government. Raising and resolving this issue was among the conditions laid by the al-Siyada (sovereignty) Alliance and the Taqaddum alliance led by al-Halbousi, for forming the government led by al-Sudani in agreement with the Running-the-State Coalition. No doubt, disagreement about this issue threatens to escalate the rift within the Alliance backing the government.
4. Disagreement with Sunnis in the Coordination Framework:
Recently, rifts surfaced between al-Halbousi and other Sunni political forces allied with the Coordination Framework. The Azm Alliance, which has ten seats in the parliament and is led by Muthanna al-Samerraie, sought to oust al-Halbousi and name a potential successor, a move indicating close coordination with the Framework alliance. Previously, the Azm alliance chose to join the Shiite Alliance following the October 2021 elections, while the Taqaddum alliance joined the Sadrist Movement.
The disagreement resurfaced between the two sides after al-Halnousi confirmed that governors from his party in al-Anbar and Nenivah governorates won the elections while the governor of Saladin, who is a member of Azm lost, which prompted the Council of Saladin, controlled by the governor, to issue a statement voicing support for the current government, and implicitly attacking al-Halbousi by noting that a single party, i.e. Taqaddum, which is led by al-Halbousi, is in control of the a fund created for the reconstruction of damaged areas since 2020.
Moreover, the al-Anbar Alliance, which consists of former members of the disbanded city council, lashed out at al-Halbousi on the grounds that he is taking advantage of the issue of the Disappearance to serve his own political agenda, failed to steer the legislature and is giving out special-grade jobs at his own discretion. This same stance was taken by the Framework bloc, angered by the issue of the disappeared, where these forces seek to damage al-Halbousi's popularity ahead of local elections scheduled for October 2023.
What is Perpetuating this Rift?
The following are dynamics that would perpetuate the rift which has recently escalated between al-Halbousi and the Framework.
1. Al-Halbousi's influence in Sunni governorates:
Al-Halbousi is in control of considerable investments in Sunni governorates and in al-Anbar in particular. By taking over the reconstruction fund in return for giving up the Ministry of Youth and Sports portfolio, al-Halbousi could use the fund to launch investments in Sunni governorates, reinforcing his popular base. Moreover, he leads a parliamentary majority that backed the renewal of confidence in him after the October 2022 elections. The parliament rejected his resignation in September, which means that not only Sunni representatives are behind him but also Kurds and Shiites. Even if all parties of the Framework withdraw their support to him, he will continue to have the support of a majority of Sunnis.
2. Divisions within the Framework around al-Halbousi's staying in power:
One camp of the Framework seeks to weaken al-Halbsousi and ally with his Sunni opponents to replace him with a speaker who is loyal to its agenda so as to secure control of the legislature and the executive and legislative branches of government. Leader of the State of Law Coalition Nouri al-Maliki is among those backing this approach.
The other camp within the Framework supports al-Halbousi's staying in office to avoid any new crises that would prevent the current government from functioning properly.
The divisions are further deepened by internal divisions within the State of Law Coalition and the Asa'ib Ahlulhaq led by Qais al-Khaza'li, who criticized al-Maliki for meeting with governors. However, he is not officially entitled to do so. Before that, al-Maliki warned the prime minister against appointing members of armed factions in sensitive security departments. The warning was sounded when Asa'ib Ahlulhaq asked for the heading of either the National Security Council or the Intelligence Service.
3. Concerns over the Sadist Movement's comeback:
Despite apparent disagreement between al-Hlbousi and the Coordination Framework and its Sunni allies, there is a general willingness within the ruling coalition, represented by the Running-the-State Coalition, to block the Sadrist Movement from taking advantage of a crisis such as attempts to oust al-Halbousi. The aim is to reiterate that the current government is illegitimate, that boycotting it was entirely justifiable and that it will take measures to exclude and unseat even its allies. That is why it would be better for the Framework to contain and not escalate its disagreement with al-Halbousi.
The conclusion is that the Framework and some allied Sunni forces are attacking al-Halbousi to achieve goals, such as placing pressures on him to sway him from raising issues already agreed on before the Framework violated the relevant agreements. These include the cases of forcibly disappeared persons in Sunni governorates. The Sunni forces allied with the Framework aim to damage al-Halbousi's popularity to win some seats either in the local elections in the governorates or in early parliamentary elections.
