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Implications of the establishment of the Macina Liberation Front in Mali

21 ديسمبر، 2016


A new type of terror organization which has begun to appear on the field in recent times: organizations that are formed based on an ethnic background with a base that does not appear easy and cross-border logistical facilities in some cases as a result of the spread of that ethnicity in neighboring countries.

The Macina Liberation Front in Mali represents a new style of terror organizations and the group has worked to exploit the fact that most of its elements draw from the Fulani ethnicity which is located in central Mali and represents approximately 9% of the population according to some estimates. The Front’s goal is to implement high-quality terror attacks and spread its influence, which was evident in their rushing to claim responsibility for the terror attack on the Madison Blue Hotel in the capital of Mali, Bamako, in November 2015, despite Al-Morabitoun announcing their responsibility for the same attack beforehand.

Notable Coordination:

But what is striking in this regard is that this front has not sought to compete with the major terrorist organizations present in West African; instead, they have established communication and enhanced coordination with some of these organizations in addition to participating in conducting various terror operations, such as the attack on a military base in Western Mali in July 2016 which resulted in the death of 17 soldiers and the wounding of 35 others. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb participated alongside the Front in the attack and their goal was to target any military reinforcements which may have helped the base, which Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb latter briefly gained control over.

New Features:

It can be said that this Front has utilized the ethnic background of the marginalized Fulani people, a tactic which does not conform to the traditional foundations on which terror organizations are established. These groups are typically first and foremost keen to expand the options available to them in order to recruit the largest possible number of sympathizers. But perhaps this new feature is the main factor that has enabled the movement to implement cross-border operations in light of the Fulani peoples’ spread across several countries of the region. Several estimations indicate that this ethnicity is made up of 18 million people located in countries such as Mauritania, Chad, Nigeria, Guinea Bissau, and Mali.

However, armed ethnic groups are not a new phenomenon: this type of organization has appeared in Mali before, such as the National Front for the Liberation of Azawad, but what distinguishes the Macena Liberation Front is that they have added a jihadist dimension to their activities and operations within Mali.

Continuous Recruitment:

The Macina Liberation Front, founded in 2015, has approximately 3,000 fighters according to several reports. Despite their lack of a link to any prevailing intellectual terrorist movements in the region, their ideas appear very close to those of Al-Qaeda, which explains their proclivity toward tangible cooperation with various Al-Qaeda-associated groups, such as the Khalid bin Al-Walid Battalion of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, also known as Ansar Dine.

According to various reports, Macena was founded as a movement that aims to protect the Fulanis who have suffered marginalizing and exclusionary policies not just in Mali but also in places such as Senegal, Niger, and Mauritania. The Front exploited the French military intervention in northern Mali in 2013 that forced Ansar Dine fighters to disperse by recruiting former fighters of Fulani origin. The group, to a certain degree, benefited from their organizational and military expertise in a manner that enabled them to implement several terrorist operations.

Various Implications:

The emergence of the Macena Liberation Front and the escalation in their activities could have several implications, the most prominent of which are as follows:

1. Threatening the security and interests of neighboring countries: The Front, according to several reports, aims to re-establish the “Fulani Empire,” which dates back to the 19th century, but by adopting the violent ideas of Al-Qaeda and attempting to recruit Fulani members in countries such as Senegal, Niger, and Mauritania in addition to Mali.

Without a doubt, the Front’s focus on the economic and social problems faced by the Fulani in these countries could support their efforts in this regard and thus push some Fulani to join the main front in Mali or adopt their policies by establishing a local Jihadist organization in a neighboring country, thus representing a threat to the security and interests of those countries.

2. Escalation of ethnic conflicts: Perhaps the expanding scope of terrorist operations undertaken by the Front will lead to an exacerbation of ethnic conflicts suffered by those countries in light of the ethnic nature which characterizes the group’s activities, and which could push other ethnicities to establish military wings for the goal of confronting the Front and curbing their influence.

3. Threatening Western interests: The Front is especially keen to target French forces present in northern Mali, considering them their second key enemy behind Malian troops. Many current Front fighters previously belonged to Ansar Dine, which French forces succeeded in expelling from northern Mali.

4. Formulating a grassroots Al-Qaeda network: Several reports indicate the possibility that the Front has joined a group led by Abubakar Shekau after having separated from Nigeria’s Boko Haram which pledged allegiance to ISIS in March 2015. Shekau was pushed out of Boko Haram after Abu Mosab Al-Bornawi became the movement’s new commander due to the breadth of differences between them, to the extent that the group was once more pushed to adopt the Al-Qaeda approach and abandoned the ISIS school of thought.

Of course, what supports this possibility is the Macena Front appearing closer to the Al-Qaeda school of thought which may transform them into an axis of communication between Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Shekau’s group in Nigeria, meaning that an Al-Qaeda network of communication has been established from North Africa to Nigeria.

In light of this perhaps it can be said that the Macena Liberation Front’s escalation will most likely lead to an exacerbation of the fragile security situation in Mali, especially as the nature of their activities escalates the severity of ethnic conflict. This will have implications for all countries of the region in addition to international forces involved in their conflicts who will coordinate further to fight the threats originating from this Front and other terrorist organizations before they can expand their activities and extend into neighboring countries which themselves have suffered from complex crises.