Most political analysts concur that October 7, 2023 represents a pivotal moment in the trajectory of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, they diverge in their assessment of the dimensions of the change catalyzed by the 'Al-Aqsa Flood' operation. This is because political analyses are formulated while the battles are still raging, and even escalating, with their ultimate outcomes yet to be determined.
The current situation makes it difficult to provide an objective assessment of a year of war. Certainly, there are a number of confirmed changes that can be pointed out. For example, this war is the longest in history compared to all previous wars in the region, except for the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon, which lasted for three years. This war, as one of the hybrid wars that combines conventional and unconventional means, also proves that the use of modern technology for military purposes no longer has limits. Moreover, the number of Palestinian casualties over nearly twelve months of battles is the largest ever compared to all previous rounds of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
However, on the other hand, there are other changes that are still taking shape and have not yet crystallized or been completed, so they cannot be analyzed objectively. This includes attempts to redraw a new map for the Middle East. It is true that Israel is seeking to re-engineer the geographical borders, whether within historic Palestine or between it and Lebanon and Syria, through the use of settlement mechanisms, displacement, the establishment of buffer zones, and the expansion of existing ones. It is also true that former US President Donald Trump, the current candidate for the 2024 elections, gave Israel the green light to expand, saying that its area is no longer enough, which means understanding its need to expand at the expense of its neighbors. Nevertheless, the aforementioned plan has not yet been completed, and it still faces strong resistance.
Ultimately, whether the face of the Middle East will change or not, and the extent to which this change can go, depends on the directions of the ongoing battles and the possibility of creating new facts on the ground. In the context of this analytical caution, this article distinguishes between what has actually changed and what has not yet changed more than a year after 'Al-Aqsa Flood'.
Changing the Game
The rules that had previously controlled the Arab-Israeli conflict have been broken, along with a measure of control over it, which some have characterized as crossing red lines. Hamas did not merely respond with missiles to Israel's siege of Gaza, abuse of prisoners, and breach of the sanctity of the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Rather, the Qassam Brigades went further, invading Israeli land and attacking settlements while holding 250 hostages. This attack by Hamas was unique and unprecedented in its audacity, precision of planning, and direct effects.
Given the severity of the Hamas attack, it was predicted that Israel's reply would be exceptionally severe and unlike anything that had come before, and its intensity surpassed all expectations. However, some have exaggerated, claiming that Israel lured Hamas into the October 7 attack so that it could easily destroy the Palestinian cause. The pattern of escalation and counter-escalation has characterized the battles for the past twelve months.
Two primary factors contributed to this ongoing cycle of escalation. First, Israel set unattainable goals to end the war, most notably the complete eradication of Hamas. Eliminating Hamas leaders and cadres does not mean eliminating Hamas ideology or the Palestinian cause – and as a result, Israel continued to escalate. Second, Iran's allies gradually entered the war in support of the Palestinian resistance under the slogan of "unity of arenas," which constituted a form of escalation by expanding the scope of the conflict.
The 'Al-Aqsa Flood' operation and its aftermath were a test of the concept of "unity of arenas" more than any previous time, leading to a further intertwining and complication of regional issues. Hezbollah's immediate entry into the battle on the day following the operation linked the Gaza and southern Lebanon fronts. This evolution of the repercussions of this relation led to an open confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel, with some Israeli officials adding the release of Israeli prisoners held by Hamas to the conditions for a ceasefire in Lebanon, treating the developments on both fronts as a single set.
On the other hand, the Houthis' engagement with Israel in support of the Gaza front resulted in their missiles reaching Tel Aviv, necessitating Israel to attack several targets deep within Yemen one after another. Thus, two fronts separated by more than two thousand kilometers became linked.
As for the Syrian front, which has long been a battlefield for Israeli attacks, the entry of the 'Al-Aqsa Flood' operation into the Gaza support fronts created an unprecedented development in Israeli attacks. This was exemplified by the targeting of the Iranian consulate in Damascus for the first time. In other words, while the Iranian influence in Syria has been continuously targeted by Israel, the linking of the Syrian arena to the Palestinian arena has provided a new justification for Israel to escalate this targeting.
The Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus led Iran to be drawn into a direct military confrontation with Israel. In response, Iran carried out a controlled and limited missile attack against Israeli military targets in April 2024. Notably, Iran was initially keen to deny any connection to the attack or even knowledge of its timing, indicating its desire to avoid direct involvement. However, this position changed after the bombing of the consulate in Damascus and the killing of some senior commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in the Israeli raid.
Consequently, Israel escalated again with Iran by targeting Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the political bureau of the Hamas movement, while he was visiting Tehran to celebrate the inauguration of the new president of the Islamic Republic. Iran responded after a delay, with a stronger response in early October 2024, followed by an Israeli response to the Iranian retort on the 26th of the same month. Iran’s transition from fighting Israel by proxy through its allies to fighting it on its own behalf is one of the most important manifestations of the change that the region has witnessed since October 7.
On another level, Gulf countries - except for the Kingdom of Bahrain - did not respond to the United States' call in December 2023 to form a maritime prosperity guard force to secure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea against Houthi attacks, which contrasts with the Gulf stance at the US-Islamic Gulf summit in Riyadh in May 2017, where they had agreed to form the "Strategic Middle East Alliance" to combat terrorism, including an indirect reference to Iranian threats.
This difference is due to the changing geopolitical landscape between 2017 and 2023. During this period, Gulf-Iranian relations have improved, and the Gulf states have adopted a more balanced policy in their relations with both Iran and the United States. Although Benjamin Netanyahu spoke at the United Nations General Assembly about two axes in the Middle East - one he called the "axis of evil" including Iran and its allies, and the other he called the "axis of blessing" including the Gulf states with Egypt and other countries - this Israeli perception was not reflected in the Gulf's practical alignment against Iran.
Remnants of the “Unipolar” International Order
To conclude, the unwavering US commitment to supporting Israel remains consistent regardless of the political party in power. In fact, the current Democratic administration has made unprecedented statements, such as President Joe Biden asserting that if Israel didn't exist, the US would have created it, and repeatedly affirming his Zionism despite not being Jewish. Additionally, Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Israel a few days after the 'Al-Aqsa Flood' operation, stating that he came to Israel as a Jew. In this context, where ideology intertwines with interests, and religion with foreign policy, the Biden administration has employed military, economic, diplomatic, and media tools to affirm Israel's right to self-defense against the terrorist threats it faces. Moreover, the administration has engaged in direct military involvement in the conflict.
The aftermath of the so-called Islamic Resistance in Iraq targeting Camp Victory on the Jordan-Syria border last January saw the US launch airstrikes on the positions of some factions of this resistance within Iraq. Additionally, the United States played a key role in moderating the conflicts that arose from the 'Al-Aqsa Flood' operation, as well as in the course of the war in Gaza itself. While the Biden administration gave Israel a free hand in dealing with both the Gaza and Lebanon files, it also played a crucial role in tempering Iran's military responses against Israel and vice versa. Furthermore, the US administration's language was unequivocal in affirming its full commitment to defending Israel if a war broke out with Iran.
Similarly, the ineffective positions of both Russia and China in influencing the course of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and its extensions to several Arab arenas, not to mention the Iranian arena, have been confirmed. The core of the Russian and Chinese stances was political and diplomatic support for the Palestinians and a call for adherence to international resolutions, creating a significant gap between these positions and the US stance. This can be explained in light of the complex calculations on which Moscow had to build its position.
Moscow exploited the explosion of the situation in Gaza to demonstrate the failure of US policy in the region, while also benefiting from the shift of international focus to the Middle East instead of Eastern Europe and the transfer of Western arms flows from Ukraine to Gaza - two contradictory considerations. The first indirectly leads to influencing Russian-Israeli relations, given Israel's benefit from the blatant US bias in its favor. Meanwhile, the second consideration influences Russia's relationship with the Hamas movement and, more importantly, Russia's relationship with Iran, as Russia has a network of complex interests with both Israel and Iran inside and outside Syria, and Tehran has played an important role in supplying Russia with drones for use in the Ukraine war.
As for China, despite its steadfast position on the Palestinian issue, it does not have a history of deep political engagement in the region, which restricts its movement. Additionally, China has good relations with both Israel and Iran, which is another constraint. Hence, the Gaza war has proven that the stage of true multipolarity at the apex of the international system has not yet been achieved, despite attempts to reduce American influence.
The last point relates to the persistent Palestinian divisions, despite the magnitude of the developments that have taken place in both Gaza and the West Bank. Immediately after the 'Al-Aqsa Flood' incident, President Mahmoud Abbas stated that Hamas' policies and actions do not represent the Palestinian people. Although he later amended his statement, he returned at the Arab summit held in Bahrain in May 2024 to accuse Hamas of providing Israel with more justifications to continue killing, destruction, and displacement. Such a stance naturally exacerbated the already-burning differences between Fatah and Hamas.
The Beijing Declaration, which emerged from a meeting of fourteen Palestinian factions, most notably Fatah and Hamas, did not succeed in achieving reconciliation on the ground. The divergence between the two parties' stances on the details of the post-war situation in Gaza remained a major obstacle to achieving any meaningful progress.
A year after the 'Al-Aqsa Flood', situations and interactions that had been stable for many years shifted, while others demonstrated their ability to withstand all winds of change. The complete picture, however, remains to be seen until the sound of cannons and the roar of planes die down and the war's consequences are felt by politicians.
