On March 4, 2024, the Iranian Ministry of Interior announced that the turnout for the elections held on March 1 for the Consultative Assembly (the parliament, or the Majles), which has the prerogative draft and approve laws, and the Assembly of Experts, which is in charge of supervising, dismissing and electing the Supreme Leader, reached 41%. Approximately 52 million out of 61 million eligible voters participated in the elections, with invalid votes ranging from 5 to 8%.
According to the ministry, 245 out of 290 seats in the Consultative Assembly have been decided, while the remaining 45 seats will be contested in the second round scheduled for the end of April 2024. The candidates failed to secure the necessary percentage to enter parliament, while 88 members were elected to the Assembly of Experts.
Notable Implications
Interpreting the results of the Iranian elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts reveals several significant implications:
1. Decreased voter participation:
The latest election in Iran recorded the lowest turnout ever since the 1979 revolution. Although the turnout exceeded pre-election expectations, which predicted less than 30% participation, it still marked a historic low. Despite political and religious campaigns launched by the regime to encourage participation, with the supreme leader Ali Khamenei, on January 4, condemning election boycotts as hostile acts against Islam and Iran, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps stating that high turnout will thwart "enemies' evil wishes and plots against Iran.
On the other hand, the Guardian Council, a clerical vetting body responsible for overseeing all elections and screening candidates, approved the nomination of a large number of candidates (about 15,000) for the parliamentary elections. Considering that these elections are influenced by local, regional, and possibly tribal and familial preferences has increased voter turnout. The exception was the capital, Tehran, which witnessed the lowest turnout, estimated at around 24%, due to the dominance of political and partisan considerations.
Some sources indicate the Iranian regime's use of coercion tactics to force citizens to participate, such as threats of withholding salaries, jobs, or benefits.
2. Ascendancy of the fundamentalist-hardliners:
Conservative hardliners dominated the Iranian elections, with estimates suggesting that 200 out of 245 candidates from the conservative camp won seats. This outcome reflects the measures and policies adopted by the regime before the elections, where the Guardian Council and the Election Committee of the Iranian Ministry of Interior disqualified most candidates from the reformist, moderate, and independent camps, allowing only those deemed fully loyal to the regime to run. For instance, former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani was barred from running for the Assembly of Experts of the Leadership despite serving three consecutive terms on the influential body since 1999.
Moreover, despite the conservatives' dominance in the recent elections, new faces from the conservative camp emerged, indicating a younger generation of hardliners on the rise to replace the older generation, some of whom are over ninety years old. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the 97-year-old head of the Assembly of Experts and the Guardian Council, chose not to run for elections, emphasizing the regime's intent to inject new blood into the.
Supreme Leader Khamenei defended what the Iranian press described as "injecting new blood" into the political landscape, saying that the new legislators will be alongside experienced legislators who entered the parliament in previous terms. He said this is a very good composition characterized by creativity, renewal, and experience.
Perhaps the Iranian regime, through this step, aims to usher in a new generation that is more prepared for possible changes, including changing the current Supreme Leader in case of his incapacity or death.
3. Decline of traditional conservatives and moderates:
The elections witnessed a decline in the prospects of what is dubbed as "traditional conservatives," represented by figures like the outgoing speaker of the Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and former deputy Ali Motahari, the son of one of Iran's senior revolution ideologues, Ayatollah Morteza Motahari. Ghalibaf's People's Voice Coalition lost in the parliamentary elections, attributing the loss to the abstention of popular sectors supportive of reformists and moderates from voting. Although he recognized his diminished chances to win, Motahari participated in the elections to encourage voter participation, drawing criticism from both reformists and hardliners.
On the other hand, although Ghalibaf won in these elections, he ranked fourth in Tehran, behind more hardline candidates from the Endurance Front (also known as the Front of Islamic Revolution Stability, and Jebhe-ye Peydari), despite securing the first position in the same constituency in the 2020 elections. Additionally, Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani failed to retain his seat in the Assembly of Experts despite holding the position of the head of the Expediency Discernment Council and belonging to one of Iran's most prominent political families. His defeat was welcomed by the more hardline conservatives.
4. Withdrawal of reformists:
Unlike former presidents Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani, who chose to participate in the current elections, former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, representing the reformist faction, opted for the first time not to run, considering it the "only way" to send messages to the regime that the current policies and actions are unacceptable to the majority of the Iranian people. Prominent figures of this faction, like Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, also refrained from participation, with the latter, who has been under house arrest for 13 years, stating in September 2023 that "authorities are trying to replicate the current parliament" and "all paths to participation in the elections are closed." Reformist groups did not endorse any candidates in the elections, and no prominent reformist figures were known to have won any seats.
5. Increase in "blank ballot" percentage:
Some Iranian political forces resorted to what is called "negative voting," "blank ballot," or "protest voting," which means participating in the elections but not voting for any of the candidates. These forces are primarily from the "moderate camp," represented by President Rouhani. This camp saw the option of the "blank ballot" as a way to exit the realm of boycott, a choice adopted by the reformist camp, allowing it to send messages to the regime and its leaders by rejecting the policy of excluding and marginalizing political forces not deemed completely loyal. Notably, the percentage of invalid votes in the recent elections ranged from 5 to 8%, a relatively high percentage.
6. Fragmentation of the conservative camp:
Although they dominated the Iranian elections, the fundamentalists were on more than one list, the most prominent being the Council for the Coalition of the Forces of the Islamic Revolution (CCFII, or SHANA), the Endurance Front (Jebhe-ye Peydari), and the Unity Assembly (Shoraye Vahdat).
The results of the elections might deepen a hidden conflict between supporters of the outgoing speaker of the parliament, Qalibaf, and the Endurance Front, represented by its Secretary-General Sadeq Mahsouli. This conflict broke out after Ibrahim Raisi won the presidential elections in August 2021 and handed out more ministerial portfolios to the members of Jebhe-ye Peydari than to Qalibaf's close allies. Supporters of this front also seek to oust Qalibaf from his post as parliament speaker, especially after its supporters topped the results of the elections in Tehran, with Mahmoud Nabavian being the first winner, along with others like Hamid Resa'el who seeks to succeed Qalibaf as parliament speaker.
Upcoming Impacts
Based on the above, it is possible to predict potential internal and external impacts of the current Iranian elections as follows:
1. Further domestic hardline policies:
The Iranian regime is likely to grow more hardline toward the domestic front, especially given the satisfactory, if not unexpected, voter turnout in the recent elections and the fact that the election results yielded more compliant bodies, i.e., the parliament and the Assembly of Experts. This hardline approach may include intensified exclusion of reformist and moderate movements, especially with their reduced chances of winning the elections.
Additionally, this might involve passing laws that impose more social restrictions on Iranians, further widening the gap between the regime and the public and potentially leading to an explosion of discontent, especially with the looming possibility of resolving the most prominent issue domestically, which is the succession of Khamenei, in case of his incapacity or death. This dilemma may open the door to conflicts between the fundamentals, who are pushing for the selection of Mojtaba Khamenei, the current supreme leader's son, and the "deep state," which is pushing for the current President, Ibrahim Raisi, to become the next supreme leader, which means a repeat of the scenario of Khamenei's rise to the most powerful seat in the country when his predecessor Khomeini died in 1989.
2. Nuclear negotiations continue to stall:
Although the Iranian parliament plays a role, albeit a limited one, in the nuclear negotiations and Tehran's nuclear program. Ali Larijani, the former speaker of the parliament who chaired the legislative body from 2008 to 2020, played a role in reaching the nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), with the world powers in 2005.
This stands in contrast to the role played by the current speaker of the parliament, Qalibaf, in escalating Iran's nuclear activities by enacting the Strategic Action Plan Law to Lift Sanctions and Protect Iranian Nation's Interests, which gradually relieves Iran of its obligations under the 2015 nuclear deal, to further develops its nuclear program, approaching the threshold of a nuclear weapon capability. Consequently, in the upcoming period, Iran is likely to further escalate its nuclear program, thereby continuing to hinder nuclear negotiations and possibly escalating tensions with the United States, especially at a time when there is growing speculation about the possibility of the return of former US President Donald Trump, the architect of maximum pressure on Iran, to the White House again in if he wins the November elections.
3. Adoption of more aggressive regional policies:
The elections in Iran come at a delicate juncture for the region, especially after the conflict broke out in Gaza on October 7, 2023, between Israel and the Palestinian factions led by Hamas. Iran exploits this situation to gain leverage by increasing pressure on Israel and the United States through its proxies operating across the region, in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, within the context of a conflict ongoing in this region, one of its most important arenas. It is possible that the consolidation of fundamentalists' control over Iran's parliament and Assembly of Experts may lead them to adopt more aggressive policies in dealing with regional issues. This is intertwined with the Iranian Navy's announcement on March 6 that it took delivery of 42 new and updated weapons and watercraft in Bandar Abbas, overlooking the Arabian Gulf. This can be interpreted within the context of the current conflicts over maritime routes in the region between Iran and its ally, the Houthis, on one side and the United States and Israel on the other.
In conclusion, it was expected that the current Iranian elections would result in the dominance of fundamentalists, who, however, are not likely to work on achieving the goals sought by the Iranian regime. These results might fuel popular resentment over the regime's policies, which could lead to an imminent explosion domestically, especially in light of a possible resolution of the most prominent domestic issue, which is the succession of Khamenei, in case of his incapacity or death. This dilemma may open the door to conflicts between the fundamentalist camp, pushing for the selection of Mojtaba Khamenei, the current leader's son, and the "deep state," pushing for the current President, Ibrahim Raisi, to become the next leader, a repeat of the scenario of Khamenei's succession after the death of his predecessor, Khomeini in 1989.
