Iraqi political forces and government representatives, at a meeting on September 5, agreed on six recommendations, which include the creation of a technical team to shape views and perceptions and reconcile different views to pave the way for early elections. The meeting was held as part of the second round of the national dialogue, held despite the Sadrist Movement’s rejection of the dialogue.
The first round, held on August 17, was attended by leaders of the Shiite Coordination Framework, leaders from other political forces as well as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Iraq Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert.
The Setting of the Meeting
The call for resuming the national dialogue sessions was made by Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi amid the following recent political and security developments.
1. Clashes at the Green Zone:
Violent clashes broke out in the Green Zone in Baghdad between hundreds of members of the Sadrist Movement and those of the Popular Mobilization Forces, or PMF, a militia loyal to the Co-ordination Framework. Thirty people were killed in the clashes, which erupted following a surprising announcement on August 30 by powerful Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr that he was withdrawing from political life and closing his offices of the movement offices.
Moreover, other clashes broke out between the Sadrists and members of the Popular Mobilization Forces in Baghdad, Basra, Maysan, Kufa and Babylon. To spare the country from sliding into infighting among Shiite, powerful Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr broke silence and held a press conference in Al-Hannana district in Najaf, to call his followers to end the sit-in and withdraw from the Parliament. The call was welcomed by a majority of the forces of the Coordination Framework, Prime Minister al-Kadhimi as well as President Barham Saleh who called for early elections, echoing a similar call from al-Sadr.
2. Direct intervention by Shia Maraji:
Reuters reported that it spoke with nearly 20 officials from the Iraqi government, al-Sadr's movement and rival Shia factions, and revealed that Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani sent a message to al-Sadr that if he will not stop the violence then al-Sistani would be forced to release a statement calling for a stopping of fighting – this would have made Sadr look weak, and as if he'd caused bloodshed in Iraq.
On the other side, Hussein al-Nouri, a representative of al-Sistani, led a high-level delegation from the Najaf Hawza, or seminary, which is headed by al-Sistani, to offer condolences on the death of al-Sadr followers during the protests. The visit indicates al-Sistani’s implicit backing for the Sadrists.
3. Renewed call for disbanding armed factions:
The statement made in Al-Hannana by al-Sadr following the Green Zone clashes, and by his spokesman Saleh Mohammed al-Iraqi, known as Minister al-Sadr, following clashes in Basra, reiterate the Sadrist Movement’s insistence on dissolving militias, forcing them out of the Green Zone and putting an end to their control of border crossings. Moreover, there were calls for Prime Minister al-Kadhimi to replace the chief of the PMF Faleh al-Fayyadh, because he is politicized and incapable of leading the militia. This reveals further that al-Sadr’s insistence on weakening the Iran-allied PMF after wooing some its factions to dissuade them from entering into armed confrontations with the Sadrists. That is why, al-Sadr’s use of harsh rhetoric against them reflects a return to his policy aimed at weakening them inside Iraq, which is in line with his rejection of, and attempts to undermine Iran’s influence on Baghdad.
4. Supreme Court’s second adjournment of its ruling:
Iraq’s federal Supreme Court adjourned its ruling on a lawsuit to dissolve the parliament on the basis that constitutional deadlines for appointing a new president and prime minister were missed. The ruling was adjourned to September 7. While ruling by the court in favor of dissolving the parliament would resolve the political crisis, its rejection of the lawsuit will mean negotiations should be held over how to run the country in the period preceding early elections.
Prospects of the National Dialogue
Although there are real chances for making a successful national dialogue to exit the current crisis, it is facing potential obstacles that can be outlined as follows:
1. Al-Halbousi’s initiative in tune with al-Sadr’s demands:
Speaker of the parliament, Mohammed al-Halbousi announced an initiative for exiting the political stalemate that came in tune with the Sadrist Movement’s demands. Al-Halbousi urged for setting a date for the early parliamentary and provincial elections by the end of the current year, and electing a president and forming a trustworthy and fully-fledged government as well as re-interpreting Article 76 of the constitution, which deals with the bloc that will form a new government. Additionally, the law on the general federal budget should be approved and the law parliamentary elections and the legislation on the will have to be amended in accordance of Article 92 of the constitution.
2. A Call for early elections:
Iraq’s political leaders, at the second session of the national dialogue, held on September 5, called on al-Kadhimi to form a technical team to work on maturing views and ideas and bringing views closer to pave the way for early elections. They also renewed the call for the Sadrist Movement to take part in the technical and political meetings to discuss all pending issues and try to find solutions.
3. Al-Sadr’s ambiguous position:
Although al-Kadhimi’s calls to, and talks with a majority of political forces were welcomed by a majority of the involved parties, al-Sadr’s boycott of the dialogue can prevent its success. That is because all political forces recognize that without the Sadrists it is not possible to make any moves in the future. But al-Sadr might well change his mind and participate in the dialogue if and when his demand for early elections is met.
4. Rift inside the coordination framework:
The bloc is still divided into two camps. While taking to the parliament to form a new government is backed by one camp, it is rejected by the other on the basis that it provokes the Sadrists and may trigger escalation on the streets once again. The leaders of the Framework endeavored to avoid confrontations. At a September 2 meeting, attended by a majority of its senior leaders including Hadi al-Ameri, Faleh al-Fayyadh, Ammar al-Hakim, Haidar al-Abadi and Qaid al-Khazaali, they agreed on putting off discussions on the crisis until after the Shiite Arba'een Pilgrimage to the city of Karbala, on September 17, is over. The aim of the agreement, reached thanks to Iran’s influence on the bloc, is to put temporary de-escalation in place.
Potential Developments
The following two developments may take place in the coming period.
1. Return of the resigned Sadrist representatives:
An Iraqi lawyer filed a lawsuit at the Supreme Court to appeal against the parliament speaker’s approval of the resignation of the Sadrist bloc representatives. The first hearing was scheduled for September 28. The lawyer believes that the speaker was in violation of Article 12 of bylaw of the parliament as it states that resignations should be considered by the parliament and put to the vote for approval, which al-Halbousi granted without consulting with the parliament.
Although the resigned Sadrist representatives denied any connection with the lawyer, if the court accepts his appeal and rules for rescinding their resignations and orders their return, the move will enable al-Sadr to calf or early elections even if the Supreme Court dismisses his appeal in which he demanded the parliament be dissolved because it missed out on the constitutional deadlines for appointing a new president and prime minister.
2. Resurgence of popular protests:
Iraqi cities, and especially those with Shia-majority, may see a resurgence of protests against Iran’s influence on Baghdad and Iran-allied politicians. The potential development can push Iraqi governorates into tensions once again, especially if, according to a security source citing officers at the interior ministry and the National Security Council, activists from the Sadrist Movement and the Tishreen Movements are assassinated when they renew their demands of bringing down influential Shiite parties allied with Iran.
In conclusion, Iraqi political forces are awaiting the federal Supreme Court, to rule for dissolving the parliament or dismiss the lawsuit. If the lawsuit is dismissed, al-Sadr will still have the option to send back his representatives to the parliament if the court approves the appeal against their resignation. Although the political crises continue in Iraq, it became clear that going to early elections is the only choice available now, even though the mechanisms required to hold such elections have not yet taken shape.
