Despite US determination on the strict application of its sanctions on Iran, it has granted a waiver for the development of Iran’s Chabahar port, in which both India and Afghanistan participate. In addition, it granted waivers for eight Iranian oil-importing countries from sanctions, temporarily, until they find other alternatives.
The move, announced by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, on November 7, seems to be closely related to Washington’s assessment of its relations with Asian powers, particularly India and China, as well as the future of political and security arrangements in Afghanistan. However, this move could send mixed signals that might ultimately affect Iran’s stance on sanctions.
Multiple Reasons
The waiver granted by Washington for the development of Chabahar port can be attributed to several reasons, the most important of which are the following:
1- Finding other alternatives: That decision may stem form the US president Donald Trump willing to offer numerous incentives for India to find other oil exporters instead of Iran. Although India is one of the eight countries exempted from the Iran sanctions, this waiver may not be forever, since the administration is intent on achieving its most important goal of cutting Iranian oil exports to zero.
2- Crowding out China: Through that waiver, the US administration is perhaps seeking to bolster India’s position as a leading economic rival to China. There are indications that the two countries are in a bid to leverage their economic influence in the Central Asian regions, where India is seeking to exploit Iran’s Chabahar port to gain access to those areas without passing through Pakistani territory, while China is trying to use Pakistan’s Gwadar port to achieve the same goal.
3- Propping up Afghanistan: Washington believes that the continued development of this port could help support stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, because the port is expected to secure part of its goods and medicines needs and will help India gain access to its markets. These objectives take on added importance for Washington, which is now seeking to continue its efforts to reach a political settlement to the Afghan crisis. The port development project has gained special attention from the US administration because it involves the construction of railways through which goods, that will not be affected by the sanctions, will be transported to Afghanistan
4- Turning up the heat on Pakistan: This waiver seems inseparable from the current strained relations between the US and Pakistan. The former may seek to exploit this measure to exert pressure on the latter, particularly that the development of the port contributes to diminishing the importance of Pakistan’s strategic location versus India, which viewed the Pakistani territory as the main corridor for access to Central Asia.
Mixed Messages
Such moves, however, send mixed signals to Tehran, that Washington has not succeeded in achieving the objectives of its sanctions. Many analysts in Tehran believe that the waivers granted by the US administration for eight countries from sanctions for Iranian oil imports, as well as the waiver for the development of the Chabahar port, indicate that Washington believes that bringing Iran’s oil exports to zero could have significant repercussions.What is striking here is that these measures have also prompted Iran to send mixed messages, which may reflect the widening divergence within the Tehran over the mechanisms for dealing with US sanctions.
Iran’s First Vice-President Eshaq Jahangiri called, on November 6, 2018, for providing the Iranian people with a clear picture of the sanctions’ impacts, since such repercussions, which began to bite even before the second batch of sanctions come into effect, cannot not be concealed.
Conversely, Rouhani himself was keen to downplay the impact of the sanctions, citing, on November 11, that “It has now become clear that America cannot cut Iran’s oil exports to zero”. The government has begun to promote the idea that since the beginning of this year (which starts in accordance with the lunar calendar on March 21 of each year), it has been prepared for sanctions, when it has set a lower price for oil in the public budget, which contributed to reducing their impacts on the economy, according to the Iranian point of view.
Thus, it can be argued that the Iranian government aims to contain the internal criticism over the worsening of various economic and social crises, as well as to assuage the fears over the economic pressures that Iran will face in the coming period against the backdrop of the new sanctions, concerns that may affect its handling of the repercussions of those sanctions.
Intransigence
The recent US moves may push Iran to stick to its hardline stances in various contentious issues. It will not hesitate to conduct more ballistic missile tests and will continue to lend support to the loyal regimes and organizations in the Middle East region, albeit that this support will most likely be affected by the reduction of Iranian oil exports under the new sanctions.
Therefore, analysts in Tehran began to point out that the current pressures on Iran may not be that strong as to compel it to change its policy, which has angered many regional and international powers concerned with the region’s crises. In other words, they believe that Iran will be able to cope with the current sanctions and pressures.
Those analysts may try to promote that Iran can withstand the fallout from those sanctions until the end of the first presidential term of President Donald Trump in 2020, where a new administration may come to power in Washington, that may adopt a different policy which they hope would correspond to Tehran’s interests and hardline policy.
However, such opinions have come under internal criticisms, with counter-views arguing that Iran cannot count on the prospect of a change in the US administration two years from now. And that the current circumstances in the region, along with the new realities ensuing from Iran’s internal crises, give an added importance to a change in the current policy towards reducing tension with the outside world, which is imposing enormous pressures that Iran may not be able to withstand in the medium and long term.
In conclusion, the mounting pressures and the far-reaching repercussions will significantly determine the possible trajectories of the current escalation between Iran and the US, against the backdrop of the new batch of US sanctions.
