On October 3, Turkey singed three Memorandum of Understandings (MOU) with Libyan outgoing Government of National Unity (GNU), headed by Abdulhamid Dbeibeh. The MoUs, covering areas of energy, media, and defence, were announced during a visit by a high-profile Turkish envoy to Tripoli that included Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, Defence Minister Hulusi Akar, Energy and Natural Minister Fatih Donmez, and Presidential Spokesperson Ibrahim Kalin. The latest agreements, most notably the undersea gas deal, come three years after the Maritime Boundary Treaty signed with the previous Government of National Accord (GNA).
Turkey’s Expansion
Minister Cavusoglu said the MoUs will facilitate Turkey-GNU cooperation in areas of energy and economy. But while specifics regarding the agreements were not announced, they generated an outcry from a wide range of Libyan factions, confirming reports that Turkey will be given exploration licence. Other reports have revealed that Turkish oil companies with Libyan partners will soon start exploring oil and gas-rich regions off the coasts of Libya.
Ankara is cementing its presence in western Libya. Beyond the new energy agreements, reports published by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights have claimed Turkey is sending mercenary troops to west Libya. Ankara also has resumed its strategic airlift operations to the region to protect its interests in the region, the report has claimed.
Rejection
International and Libyan reactions to the agreements have been negative. Egypt and Greece rejected the deals and said they would dispute any exploration in the Mediterranean. Egyptian Minister Sameh Shoukry said in a presser that “the outgoing GNU in Tripoli does not have the authority to strike any international deals or MoUs” and called on “the international community and the United Nations to take a firm and clear stance to protect the legitimacy requirements in Libya”. Similarly, the foreign ministry of Greece reaffirmed its sovereignty over regional maritime, where Ankra is expected to carry explorations, saying it intended to defend its rights “with all legal means, in full respect of the international law of the sea,” through the European Union (EU) or NATO. Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias, said while visiting Cairo on October 9 that his country is looking with Egypt at all options to protect the integrity of their territories, stressing that the agreement violates Greece’s sovereignty.
The EU, through its European Commission, has referred to the agreements as illegal, holding that the agreements were “illegal” and a “violation of the sovereign rights of third States, which does not comply with Law of the Sea and has no legal consequences for third States.” The EU also has demanded Ankara more clarity in terms of their provisions.
In Libya, the agreements have been condemned widely across the Libyan political spectrum. Speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives, Aguila Saleh, sent official letters to the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, and to the Arab League, explaining that the Dbeibeh government’s mandate had constitutionally ended in accordance with the terms of the political agreement, and had failed to carry out its duties and tasks specified in the road map issued by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) issued in December 2020. Several Members of Parliament issued statements condemning the agreements. Fathi Bashagha, leader of the Libyan government, affirmed his rejection of signing the agreements, saying in a statement that his government would begin direct consultations with “national, regional and international partners, to respond appropriately to these abuses that threaten security and peace in Libya in particular and the region in general.” In similar fashion, Libya’s Presidential Council said in a statement that any agreement requires consultation with the Council. More than third of the Libyan High Council of State members announced their objection, as well.
Ankara’s Interests
The MoUs have revealed Turkey’s increased interest in Libya, especially in energy. We may outline five key drivers to Turkey’s strategy in Libya:
1. Taking advantage of Bashagha-Dbeibeh rift:
Ankara is exploiting the mounting pressure faced by Dbeibeh’s government to score concessions that would protect its interests in Libya. The objections put forth by minister of oil and gas, Mohammed Aoun, were revealing of those agenda pushed by Ankara. Minister Aoun accused Dbeibeh’s government of inking the agreement, while he was travelling, having the minister of economy, Mohammed Al-Huweij, sign the agreements in his absence.
2. Securing energy supplies:
Amid turmoil in global energy market and skyrocketing prices, Ankara is looking to secure its share of oil and gas supplies.
3. Utilising European energy crisis:
Ankara wants to position itself as an energy supplier to crisis-ridden Europe owing to the ongoing war in Ukraine. Energy prospects in Libya offer Turkey the means to leverage energy in its rather tensioned relations with Europe.
4. Worrying over an increased UK presence:
A recent visit by British warship HMS Albion to Libya’s Abu Sitta port prompted concern by Ankara over a potential role for the UK in Libya. The visit, which is the first in more than 8 years, has been seen to facilitate defence cooperation between Libya and the UK. Soon after, however, Turkey and Libya announced military drills near the Libyan coast and a visit by a Turkish top delegation to Tripoli.
5. Strengthening presence in Libya:
As Libya’s political landscape shifts amid an expected visit by UN Special Representative Abdoulaye Bathil, Turkey seems to have intensified its efforts to strengthening its long-term presence in Libya. The recently signed MoUs offer a key steppingstone to a strategic presence in the country, regardless of any future governments replacing Dbeibeh’s.
Indications
The Turkey–Dbeibeh could be read through three important dynamics across the region, outlined as follows:
1. Turkey’s support of Dbeibeh:
The agreements reveal a fundamental shift in Turkey’s policy on Libya. Leaving behind its neutral approach to dealing with the ongoing conflict as it previously maintained a balanced relation and mediated between Libyan rivals, Ankara finally has opted to side with Dbeibeh’s government.
2. Betting on Libya’s west:
Despite recent efforts to re-establish relations with Libya’s eastern region, having hosted Aguila Saleh last month, by signing deals with Dbeibeh’s government Turkey now shifts its interests to western Libya, which may hinder Ankara’s relations with the easter region.
3. Increasing Greece-Turkey tensions:
Recently, Greece deployed US-donated armoured military vehicles to Lesbos and Samos islands, much to Turkey’s protest. Turkey has long accused Greece of militarising the Eastern Aegean islands in contravention of international agreements signed after World Wars I and II. Thus, Ankara’s latest moves in western Libya may be linked to ongoing tensions with Greece more than being tied to what is happening in Libya.
Possible Repercussions
Having outlined the latest developments in Libya, we may map out three key outcomes of Turkey’s deals with Dbeibah’s government:
1. Cementing rivalry and regional polarity:
Amid wide condemnation of the agreements, especially by US and EU, Ankara faces mounting challenges in the Middle East. It is expected that the new formed alliance with Dbeibah would position Ankara at the forefront of a regional polarity against a regional bloc that supports Bashagha’s government.
The agreements, moreover, are expected to complicate Turkey-Egypt relations, despite some progress seen in recent months. Analysts believe Ankara still is keen on strengthening its relations with Egypt, though expect these agreements to slow the dialogue between the two countries. Turkey so far has only been critical of Greece and the EU in response to their objections over the agreements, while maintaining an anodyne stance towards Egypt.
Yet, analysts warn of the negative implications of the worsening tensions between Greece and Turkey, both members of the NATO. The current polarisation of NATO, with the US and the EU, including Greece, on the one end, and Turkey on the other, have worsened over recent months. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s announced Ankara was deploying drones in Turkish Cyprus, in response to Washington’s move to lift arms sales embargo over Cyprus, a decision deemed necessary as tensions grow in the Aegean Sea.
2. Deepening Libya’s division:
Analysts believe the recently signed agreements would cause rifts among Libyan factions to worsen and dialogue to break down, especially as a large size of the Libyan political actors reject their lawfulness.
3. Increased cooperation among state members of the East Mediterranean Gas Company (EMG):
Wider regional refusal of the Turkey-Dbeibah deal, analysts expect EMG state members to bolster their cooperation aiming at restricting Turkey’s activity in the region. Collectively, EMG members would orchestrate their position in the face of Turkey’s increased activity in the Mediterranean.
We may conclude that Libya’s situation is worsening and becoming more complicated. Amid deeper polarisation and turbulent rivalry, regional states, including Turkey, look to secure their economic and political interests, driving blocs and alliances that entangle Libyan political factions to emerge. Regional tension, thus, is intensifying, in and around Libya, and the peace process in Libya seems to have hit a grave roadblock.
