The Iraqi Kurdistan Region's independence has sparked fresh debate after moves made by various Kurdish groups recently. The 28 March, 2017 decision of the Kurdish-led provincial council of Iraq's Kirkuk Governorate to raise the Kurdish flag alongside the Iraqi flag drew severe criticism from Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi in the capital Baghdad and other Iraqi political forces as well as regional powers such as Turkey. Ankara described the move as inappropriate and threatened to take unilateral action to deal with the issue.
The move came amid a series of meetings held by Kurdish forces to discuss preparations for a referendum on independence from Iraq in autumn and setting up a political committee comprising figures from these forces to coordinate their efforts.
Post-ISIS Iraq
It can be said that Kurdish officials' increasing talk about the preparations cannot be dissociated from the ongoing debate, inside and outside the autonomous region, over the future of Iraq after the battles against ISIS, in northern Iraq and Mosul in particular, are settled. There, the Kurds seek to utilize the momentum of the anti-ISIS offensive in which the Kurdish Peshmerga military forces are playing a major role supported by international powers involved in the war on terrorism. Their goal is to add stature and significance to their bid for creating an independent state in northern Iraq.
This is why the Kurds recently sought to send across various messages to all involved stakeholders, including, for instance, that they would not withdraw from areas taken by the Peshmerga in Mosul, during armed confrontations with ISIS to drive out the group's militants from the city, while insisting on annexing Kirkuk city to Kurdistan region.
Although Prime Minister of Kurdistan Region Nechirvan Barzani, in statements made on April 5, 2017, emphasized that “Kirkuk is the city of Kurds, Turkmen, and Arabs. It is the city of all. This is a fact”. This indicates his agreement with a similar assertion made earlier by Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan, yet it perhaps represents a deliberate move from the Kurds to reduce repercussions of strong Turkish opposition to the independence of Kurdistan or the annexation of Kirkuk. This represents one of the most significant variables that are set to impact the Kurds' success in carrying out their initiative of an independence referendum.
Taking Advantage of an Ongoing War
This coincides with the obvious fact that the Kurds seek to reap political gains from their military participation in the war on ISIS through promoting the major role that their Peshmerga militia is playing in reducing the territory that ISIS seized in mid-2014. Another effort that the Kurds are keen on projecting is hosting a large number of people displaced from battle zones despite the associated economic burden .
In this regard, Barzani made a notable bid to minimize severe criticism drawn by the provincial council of Kirkuk to raise the Kurdistan flag. He noted that the Peshmerga fought under this flag to protect Kirkuk from ISIS' attacks, and that had it not been for these forces, there would have been neither Iraq’s flag nor that of Kurdistan in the city. "There would have been an ISIS’ flag there.", he stated.
Hence, it would be safe to say that Iraqi Kurds continue to rely on the interest that the involved parties in the war on ISIS still have in Peshmerga's role in northern Iraq. That is because, in their view, this role is pivotal and cannot be ignored while they seek to take advantage of this interest to hold the referendum in the coming period and overcome any moves and obstacles that can obstruct their bid to hold it on time.
Multiple Obstacles
Without a doubt, these efforts will run in several obstacles that include, but are not limited to reaction and opposition from Iraqi parties and neighboring countries, namely Turkey and Iran which seek to block the Kurds from capitalizing on regional developments to achieve their own goals. Other stakeholders that would reject the Kurdish bid include international powers that believe it would confuse their own calculations because the bid is related to other developments that are no less important, namely relations between the very Kurdish parties involved in the process.
These parties - i.e. the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) headed by former Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, the Kurdish Movement for Change (Gorran) headed by Nawshirwan Mustafa- were keen on holding regular meetings recently. These meetings were to send across messages to the involved parties inside and outside the country that the independence referendum and secession from Iraq provides a common ground for their agreement. However, this does not negate the fact that there is existing disagreement between these major parties, most significantly between the KDP and Gorran, that cannot be settled easily. This disagreement can even, inevitably, impact efforts being made by the involved parties to ensure the referendum will be held on time and overcoming the obstacles created by other forces against the referendum.
This crisis escalated between the two camps after the KDP accused Gorran of organizing protests in major cities including Sulaymaniyah over the deteriorating economic situation in some areas and attempting to expand the existing rift between Kurdistan region and Iraq's central government in Baghdad.
Moreover, disagreement over which institution should be responsible for approving the referendum will constitute one of the main obstacles that Kurdish political forces will have to deal with in the incoming period. This is mainly because Gorran insists Kurdistan’s parliament, which has been defunct for several months, should be tasked with approving and carrying out the process of the referendum. The KDP's position on this issue is still unknown.
On the other hand, the KDP voiced doubts about the consequences of notable harmony between the policies of the PUK and Gorran, especially after the two parties signed an agreement on May 17, 2016, stating that the Kurdistan Parliament will oversee the referendum. For the KDP, this agreement will not settle any outstanding disagreements but will instead perpetuate the same issues. It even accused the PUK of closely aligning with a party to the crisis, i.e. Gorran.
Based on the above, it can possibly be safe to say that the coming period will witness cross-cutting moves, from the involved Kurdish political forces and domestic and regional parties, that can play a prominent role in weighing the Kurds' ability to hold the referendum.
