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Is Taliban Expanding its Influence in Afghanistan?

27 أبريل، 2017


The Afghan Taliban movement has resorted once again to carrying out high-profile terrorist attacks, the most recent of which hit a military base near the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif on April 21, 2017. The targeted base was home to the Afghan National Army's 209th Corps, which is responsible for providing security to most of northern Afghanistan. The attack on the base left around 134 dead, a heavy toll that forced Defence Minister Abdullah Habibi, and Army Chief of Staff Qadam Shah Shahim to resign.

It can be said that this escalation emanated from several recent developments in Afghanistan, most significantly frequent defections inside the Taliban and ISIS' continuous attacks. These attacks aim to perpetuate the group's influence inside Afghanistan, as well as escalating confrontations with the government forces. 

Increasing Activity

What was significant is that the Taliban, which was quick to claim responsibility for the attack saying it was carried out in retaliation for the killing of some of its senior commanders recently, carried out another attack on April 24, on Camp Chapman, a US-operated base in Afghanistan's Khost province.  Four Afghan security guards were killed and eight others were injured. Several views linked this attack to the April 13 US strike on an ISIS camp in the Nangarhar Province. 

Taliban’s recent attacks appear to be carried out as part of the movement’s bid to expand its influence on the ground by seizing new territory. In one such attack, on August 26, 2016, Taliban fighters overran Jani Khel, a district in the eastern province of Paktia, which sits at an intersection linking eight districts and which connects Paktia with neighbouring Khost province and Pakistan, threatening strategically important road routes to Pakistan. Later on October 3, 2016, Taliban fighters staged an assault seizing control of strategically important areas in the northern province of Kunduz and the southern province of Helmand. 

Taliban assaults had already raised fears that the Afghan government could lose control of more areas to the insurgent movement. The US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, in July 2016, reported that approximately 65.6 percent of the country’s districts are under Afghan government control or influence as of May 28, 2016. This signals a decrease from the 70.5 percent reported as of January 29, 2016, and that of the 407 districts within the 34 provinces, 268 district were under government control or influence, whereas 36 districts (8.8 percent) within 15 provinces were under insurgent control or influence, and 104 districts (25.6 percent) were “at risk.” 

Multiple Goals

Obviously, through such assaults, the Taliban movement seeks to achieve multiple goals of which the following stand out:

1- Sticking to Priorities, where the Taliban seeks to send across the message that it will not back down on its prioritized goals, on top of which is fighting the Afghan government and expelling foreign forces from the country. This bid can significantly help the movement maintain its organizational structure while curbing defections within its ranks. That is, defectors accuse the movement of giving up its goals, which had already prompted a large number of its fighters to defect to ISIS and more specifically to IS Khurasan, the provincial division of ISIS designated for the nations of Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, because they were on a quest for a more extreme alternative. What stood out is that the latest attack occurred shortly after around 200 Taliban elements declared that they were joining the peace process in the northern province of Balkh, where they carried out continuous attacks on security forces in the Koh e Alburz Mountains. 

2- Weakening government forces, where the Taliban seeks to prove and project that Afghan security forces are unable to protect one of its most important bases. The attack was conducted by a small group of Taliban attackers disguised as soldiers and managed to enter the Afghan National Army's 209th Corps, which is supposed to be a heavily protected military installation. The April 21 attack created significant resentment in the country and drew no easy pressure on government forces.

3- Strengthening bargaining chips at potential negotiations. That is, the Taliban believes stepping up/ escalating its attacks can force the government into negotiations, where the movement seeks to take advantage of increasing international calls for bilateral talks. International powers pursued this approach, and Russia, in particular, on April 2017, asserted that the Mazar-e-Sharif attack on April 21 indicates the need for launching direct talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban as soon as possible. Russia even declared that it was ready to contribute to advancing the process of national reconciliation in Afghanistan by hosting a dialogue between the two parties in Moscow. 

What stands out within this context is that Russian statements came immediately after Moscow rejected statements by Commander of US Forces in Europe, General Curtis Scaparrotti. General Scaparotti, who is also NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, accused Russia of arming the Taliban in fighting against US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, and stated that he noticed a growing Russian influence on Afghan Taliban insurgents. "I've seen the influence of Russia of late, increased influence in terms of association and perhaps even supply to the Taliban," Scaparrotti said.

This means that Moscow attempts to assert that it is pursuing an unbiased policy towards Afghanistan and that it supports any efforts that would lead to achieving security and political stability in Afghanistan. 

4- Expanding influence, where the Taliban, obviously, started to focus its attention on expanding to the north towards the city of Mazar-e-Sharif, home to elements that do not oppose the Taliban and even include some who already joined ISIS, which has become the arch-rival of insurgent movement in Afghanistan.

5- Demonstrating the seriousness of threats, where the recent attacks indicate that the Taliban’s April 2016 threats of escalating attacks in spring are serious. This proves that the insurgent movement is able to cripple any multilateral efforts to back the Afghan government. The bid would also bolster its efforts to force the government into new negotiations. 

6- Competing with ISIS. The Taliban carried out the recent attacks to prove its ability to compete with ISIS, which is carrying out its own high-profile attacks. The most recent of which hit a military hospital in Kabul killing at least 48 people on March 8, 2017. 

Without a doubt, the Taliban's significant recent escalation of attacks can block the Afghan government’s efforts to establish and perpetuate security and political stability across Afghanistan. This is especially given that this escalation coincided with ISIS’ keen interest in carrying out high-profile attacks -that draw special attention from some international powers- to force the Afghan government into upgrading its security cooperation with regional and international powers involved in the war on terrorism, both inside and outside Afghanistan.