أخبار المركز
  • مركز "المستقبل" يصدر العدد الثاني من مجلة "اتجاهات آسيوية"
  • أ. د. نيفين مسعد تكتب: (عام على "طوفان الأقصى".. ما تغيّر وما لم يتغيّر)
  • د. إبراهيم فوزي يكتب: (بين موسكو والغرب: مستقبل جورجيا بعد فوز الحزب الحاكم في الانتخابات البرلمانية)
  • د. أيمن سمير يكتب: (هندسة الرد: عشر رسائل للهجوم الإسرائيلي على إيران)
  • أ. د. حمدي عبدالرحمن يكتب: (من المال إلى القوة الناعمة: الاتجاهات الجديدة للسياسة الصينية تجاه إفريقيا)

Test of Popularity

Will the Islamists or Modernists win the Moroccan elections?

04 أكتوبر، 2016


The parliamentary elections in Morocco on October 7 will witness 6,992 candidates competing for 395 seats in the country’s House of Representatives. It is the second election to the lower house since protests rocked the country in 2011, prompting King Mohammed VI to draft a new constitution that neutralized the protest movement and gave more powers to the elected government.

The elections represent a test for the popularity of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) and its ability to preserve the support that it acquired in the 2011 elections, which enabled the party to lead the Moroccan government for five years. The experience of governing was not easy for the PJD; the government faced several crises that almost toppled it, notably when the Independence Party withdrew from the coalition in July 2013.

The latest electoral test follows local elections in September 2015, the results of which gave some indication of the direction the parliamentary polls may take. The competition was most intense between the PJD and the opposition Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), a centrist group close to the royal palace. The role of other parties is expected to be limited to filling seats in the next coalition government that the winning party will form in the House of Representatives.

Fragile Coalitions

The current election campaign has been characterized by an absence of powerful alliances of major parties that have postponed taking decisions regarding the formation of coalitions until after the election results. That is unlike the 2011 elections, when a broad coalition of eight parties, the Coalition for Democracy or the Group of Eight (G8), formed before the polls.

The G8 was made up of eight parties with a range of ideological and political outlooks: the PAM, the National Rally of Independents, the Popular Movement, the Constitutional Union Party, the Party of Renaissance and Virtue, the Labour Party, the Socialist Party and the Green Left Party. The coalition disintegrated after the election results were announced, resulting in its loss.

But in the current elections, there were no such influential coalitions prior to voting. The most important alliance announced during party meetings and statements to the press is between the PJD and the Party of Progress and Socialism. But these are only statements of intent and do not relate to the elections themselves but rather to what comes after announcing the results. The leaders of the two parties have said they agreed to continue their coalition whether in government - if they win a majority - or in opposition, in the case that the PJD is not ranked first in the polls.

There is another electoral coalition between two small parties, the Covenant Party and the Party for Renewal and Justice, which presented a joint list. However, that coalition will not have any noticeable impact on the results of the elections, nor will it affect the political scene, due to the weak electoral base of the two parties. On the other hand, the two big parties, the PJD and the PAM, have repeatedly ruled out going into coalition together to form the next government. That notwithstanding, everything is possible, meaning that the next coalition will form around one of those two poles.

Struggle of the major parties

The competition in this election is limited to three parties namely, the PJD, the PAM, and the Independence Party. The PJD is striving to turn the poll into a referendum on the current government, and launched its campaign with a series of popular gatherings in the major cities. It aspires to renew confidence to hold responsibility for the next administration. There have been predictions that the party will hold on to its current position, as it still retains a large electoral base that may mean it can repeat its success of 2011.

PAM, founded primarily to counter the Islamists, is working for an electoral victory by being an alternative to the PJD. Despite the fact that the state has bet on the PAM as a way of attaining a political balance and curb the PJD to stop it broadening the gap between itself and the other parties, it is still possible that the state’s need for social stability will at this stage necessitate not pushing the PAM to the top of the House of Representatives and leadership of the next government.

The Independence Party, which is hoping to lead the next government, has little chance of coming first in the elections, as its electoral base has somewhat retreated and it has undergone internal disruptions since its general conference in Summer 2012. But it is likely to be able to take part in the next government and obtain important ministerial posts, especially in light of what appears to be a rapprochement between it and the PJD in recent months.

Regarding Centrist parties, they include the Popular Movement Party, the National Rally of Independents and the Progress and Socialism Party. Despite the fact that they agree on a joint strategy to strengthen their political positions to win influential ministerial posts in a future government, they differ in terms of the structure of the coalitions they are proposing.

If the Progress and Socialism Party resort to supporting the PJD and oppose the strategy of the PAM, then both the smaller parties, which are taking part in the current government, would prefer to leave the door open to all options according to the election results reveal. It is entirely possible that they will take part in the next government, regardless of the outcome of the elections; i.e. whether the PJD or the PAM becomes the largest party and is charged with forming a new administration. In terms of policy, however, both parties are closer to the PAM.

Symbolic participation by Salafists

Salafists’ integration into Moroccan political scene has stirred debate and political controversy in the weeks running up to the election. But this controversy does not reflect the size of their participation in the elections, which is very small. Although one of the country's most prominent Salafists is in the list of the Independence Party in the city of Fez, he is unlikely to win a seat as he is second on the electoral list of a party that saw its popularity plummet at local elections in 2015. The PJD tried to put forward a Salafist preacher in Morocco, Hammad al-Kabbaj, but local authorities rejected his candidacy. Apart from them, no prominent Salafist is likely to win a single seat in the House of Representatives.

Despite the fact that the Party of Renaissance and Virtue put forward 20 Salafist candidates, some of whom come first on local party lists, their chances of reaching parliament are extremely limited due to the party’s small electoral base. Furthermore, the limited number of Salafists who are taking part in the elections and the fact that they are standing for various parties, none of whom have much popularity, and therefore their limited chances of winning seats, means that the debate about the Salafists’ participation in - or insertion into - Moroccan political life has been somewhat exaggerated. A few prominent members of this community have taken part, but the next House of Representatives will probably not include a single well-known Salafist face.

Therefore, it appears that the parties who open their arms to the Salafist community are first and foremost trying to benefit from the votes of the community and those who sympathize with it, rather than giving it real representation in the next House of Representatives. With the exception of Al-Kabbaj, whose candidacy was rejected by local authorities and who may well have won, given his popularity in his constituency, the other Salafist candidates have almost no chance of winning seats as they do not top their party lists or because they are representing small parties.

The third option

A group of Moroccan leftists set up a Coalition in 2014 named the Federation of the Democratic Left, consisting of three parties: the Socialist Democratic Vanguard Party, the National Congress Party, and the United Socialist Party. The Federation came about in its most recent manifestation after years of discussions about the framework of the Democratic Left Alliance, which was formed in 2007 to strengthen the ranks of the left in the political scene.

The left presents itself in these elections as a third option, meaning it is different from the Islamists in the PJD but also distinct from the PAM. Despite using slogans that differ from those of other political parties, and enjoying the support of a significant number of the educated elite, especially those on the left, the Federation has not yet been able to turn into a mass movement, and it has little electoral strength. It is, therefore, unlikely to make significant headway in the elections. There are several reasons for the party's weakness, most importantly is its lack of unity, the absence of a charismatic leader and its inability so far to reach out to voters who form the electoral “treasury” of the major parties, a fact that significantly limits its ambitions.

Coalitions after the elections

Several indicators, especially the results of the local elections of September 2015 and opinion polls taken in recent months, indicate that the PJD will come first in these elections, giving it a second term in government. Concerning possible coalitions, the closest parties to the PJD at this point are parties already in government, notably the Party of Progress and Socialism and the Popular Movement Party. The PJD will seek to bring the Independence Party into its new coalition, especially given the significant rapprochement between the two parties following the local elections. To guarantee the continuity of its government for the next five years, it is also possible that the PJD will preserve its alliance with the National Rally of Independents, which joined the government after the Independence Party withdrew in July 2013.

The hardest calculation the PJD faces is to reconcile its desire to broaden its coalition so the government cannot be brought down by the withdrawal of a single party, as what happened with the Independence Party with its ambition. And on the other hand, to strengthen its position in the new government by taking over as many important ministries as possible. However, broadening the Coalition so it includes five parties or more would require the PJD to give up individual ministerial posts to its partners.