The collapse of the Assad regime marks a significant shift in Middle Eastern dynamics, hitting Iran where it matters most. For years, Syria served as Iran’s gateway to Lebanon, allowing it to bolster Hezbollah, challenge Israel, and expand its regional influence. With Assad gone, these critical links are severed, forcing Tehran to reassess its strategy. Iran now finds itself increasingly vulnerable, as other regional actors such as Turkey, Israel, and Gulf states are poised to exploit the Syrian vacuum. 

Potential Revival of the Maximum Pressure Campaign

Meanwhile, Washington may see this moment as an opportunity to revive the Maximum Pressure Campaign—a strategy aimed at paralyzing Iran’s economy and undermining its ability to operate in the region.[1] The return of such a campaign would be devastating for Tehran, further isolating it economically and diplomatically at a time when its resources are overburdened. However, it can also threaten regional stability more than ever before.

If sanctions are reimposed with full force, Iran’s economic troubles, already deepened by years of stagnation, would worsen dramatically. Inflation would surge, the currency would continue to collapse, and frustrations among the Iranian population could boil over. These pressures would likely empower hardliners, who would blame external aggression to justify more confrontational policies, including accelerating nuclear development. Iran’s response would likely play out on multiple fronts: doubling down on its influence in Iraq and Lebanon to compensate for the loss of Syria, and escalating proxy conflicts as a show of resilience. For the U.S. and its allies, while the Maximum Pressure Campaign might weaken Iran, it also risks significant blowback, including heightened instability across the region, more aggressive proxy actions, and closer cooperation between Iran, Russia, and China. In this post-Assad reality, both Iran and the U.S. face difficult choices that will shape the Middle East’s future trajectory.

Potential Consequences of Renewed Sanctions

Economic impact

The economic consequences for Iran under renewed maximum pressure will be massive. Iran’s oil exports, essential for its economy, would face even harsher restrictions. During the first Trump administration’s initial pressure campaign, oil sales dropped from over 2.5 million barrels per day to as low as 200,000. If a similar pattern were to unfold again, Iran’s fiscal deficit would expand, exacerbating already dire economic conditions. Beyond depressing oil sales, international financial sanctions would further isolate Iran from the global banking system, cutting off access to funds needed for both domestic priorities and foreign operations. In such a scenario, the government’s ability to finance subsidies, pensions, and public services would further erode, widening the gap between the state and its increasingly frustrated population.

Iran’s economic fragility has long been a point of contention within its borders.[2] Previous waves of sanctions have demonstrated their capacity to stir unrest, as seen during the protests of 2017-2018 and 2019, when rising fuel prices and inflation triggered demonstrations across the country. The return of maximum pressure could accelerate these conditions, putting the load on ordinary citizens’ shoulders. Inflation, already a persistent issue in Iran, would surge even higher as the rial depreciates under pressure. The currency’s collapse would erode the purchasing power of middle- and lower-income households, forcing many more Iranians into poverty. Social discontent, driven by economic desperation, could manifest in widespread protests, strikes, and labor unrest. The Iranian regime, accustomed to suppressing such movements, would likely respond with harsh crackdowns that further alienate segments of the population.

Political ramifications

The return of economic hardship would not occur in isolation. Tehran’s hardliners, who already dominate Iran’s political establishment, would see sanctions as both a threat and an opportunity.[3] Historically, external pressure has been framed as evidence of Western hostility, fueling nationalist sentiment that consolidates domestic support for more radical policies. Hardliners would likely champion economic self-sufficiency and resistance against perceived U.S. aggression. Such rhetoric, while aimed at boosting national morale, often coincides with more aggressive foreign and national security policies, which could include further advancements in Iran’s nuclear program, both as leverage in future negotiations and as a deterrent against military threats.

Regional response

At the regional level, Iran’s strategy would shift toward damage control and recalibration. Syria’s importance to Iran cannot be overstated; it has served as a critical land bridge for arms transfers to Hezbollah in Lebanon and a forward operating base for Iranian proxies to pressure Israel. The collapse of the Assad regime disrupts these routes, forcing Tehran to look elsewhere to maintain its influence. Iraq, already a significant arena for Iranian activity, would become an even greater focus. 

While Iraq would seek to avoid being drawn into the crossfire between the U.S. and Iran,[4] its reliance on Iranian-backed militias for internal security might limit its ability to distance itself from Tehran. Deep economic linkage, Iran’s political and militia influence, and shared Shia identity constrain Iraq’s ability to fully sever ties with Tehran eveb as Iraq tries to strengthen its relations with Arab states to diversify its alliances.

With the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen potentially avoiding broader confrontation with Israel and the United States, Iran might escalate proxy conflicts elsewhere. Tehran may encourage limited Houthi actions against Saudi Arabia or the UAE if desperate.[5] While avoiding direct confrontation with Israel, Iran could resort to cyberattacks or covert operations to disrupt Israeli security and maintain its deterrence. Simultaneously, Tehran would also likely expand alliances with Russia and China to counterbalance regional losses. 

The fall of Assad also opens new fault lines between Iran and other regional powers, most notably Turkey. Ankara, having played a significant role in Syria’s conflict, will seek to expand its influence in the post-Assad environment. This puts it on a potential collision course with Tehran. Turkey’s ambitions could undercut Iran’s efforts to retain any semblance of influence in Syria, further complicating Tehran’s regional strategy.[6] At the same time, Iran’s relationship with Russia, a former key ally in Syria, may be tested. While Moscow and Tehran have cooperated in supporting Assad, their long-term interests diverge, particularly in a post-conflict scenario where Russia seeks broader geopolitical influence at Iran’s expense.

Challenges for the U.S. and Its Allies

For Washington, reviving the Maximum Pressure Campaign presents a double-edged sword. Iran's weakened position post-Assad offers an opportunity to apply significant pressure, potentially forcing Tehran into concessions. By tightening sanctions and isolating Iran economically, the U.S. could aim to limit Iran's ability to fund proxies and expand its nuclear program.

However, the geopolitical landscape has shifted since the original implementation of maximum pressure. Iran has strengthened its economic and military ties with both China and Russia, who could offer Tehran critical lifelines to bypass sanctions. Beijing, in particular, remains a major buyer of Iranian oil, providing Tehran with vital revenue despite U.S. restrictions. Reviving maximum pressure would likely drive Iran closer to these powers, undermining Washington's efforts to isolate Tehran.

Moreover, a unilateral approach to sanctions risks alienating European allies, who are wary of the destabilizing consequences of economic warfare. The domestic fallout in Iran could also carry unintended consequences for U.S. interests. While sanctions are designed to pressure governments, ordinary citizens often bear the brunt of economic hardship. Past instances have shown that this can fuel anti-American sentiment rather than opposition to the regime. Additionally, hardline factions within the Iranian government are adept at using external pressure to delegitimize reformist voices, consolidating their hold on power. In such a scenario, the likelihood of meaningful negotiations diminishes as Tehran adopts a more defiant posture both domestically and abroad.

A Critical Juncture

Ultimately, the collapse of the Assad regime and the potential return of the Maximum Pressure Campaign place Iran at a critical juncture. The loss of Syria represents not just a strategic setback but a broader challenge to Tehran’s regional ambitions. Faced with mounting economic pressures and an increasingly hostile regional environment, Iran will have limited options for recourse. Its response will likely involve a mix of economic adaptation, domestic repression, and proxy escalation, all of which carry significant risks for the region. For the U.S. and its allies, the decision to revive maximum pressure must account for these complexities, balancing the need to contain Iran with the broader goal of regional stability. In this evolving post-Assad reality, the stakes are higher than ever, and missteps could have far-reaching consequences for the future of the Middle East.

[1] Financial Times, “Trump Team Aims to Bankrupt Iran with New 'Maximum Pressure’”

[2] New York Post, “Energy crisis has Iran on the brink — and hands Trump a historic opportunity”

[3] Modern Diplomacy, “Trump 2.0: A Return to “Maximum Pressure” against Iran?”

[4] L’Orient Today, “In Iraq, Assad regime’s fall could limit Iranian militias' influence”

[5] Associated Press, “Collapse of Syria’s Assad is a blow to Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’”

[6] Reuters, “Turkey aiming for maritime agreement with Syria, transport minister says”