About a year and a half following the first Berlin conference on the Libyan crisis held in January 2020, the ‘Berlin 2’ conference was held on June 23, 2021 raising a number of questions. Some of the questions pertain to the future of this crisis and the outcome of such interactions, in light of the significant momentum accompanying the current internal and external developments. 

The post ‘Berlin 2"’conference interactions were shaped according to two tracks, one of which is optimistic about the possibility of building on the outcomes of the conference and adopting a settlement path in Libya, while the other is loaded with anticipation and uncertainty, particularly with the ongoing challenges and issues that may undermine any future developments.

Variable Contexts:

The “Berlin 2” conference was held within a different context from the first one due to the internal and external changes relevant to the Libyan crisis and its interactions, which can be depicted as follows: 

1- A different Libyan scene: The nature and limits of the Libyan representation in the ‘Berlin 2’ conference, are deemed one of the major transformations that are different from the ‘Berlin 1’ conference. After Libya was divided between two conflicting powers in ‘Berlin 1’, it now enjoys a full and unified membership represented in the Government of National Unity (GNU). This transformation was manifested in the Libyan government delegation’s adoption of an initiative aiming at restoring stability in Libya based on a vision that supports promoting the Libyan solution for the crisis. The philosophy of this initiative was based on adopting a system through which Libya would become a main base for future interactions relevant to the crisis. This was expressed by the Libyan Foreign Minister, Najla El-Mangoush, emphasizing that the initiative includes “the establishment of an international working group chaired by Libya to be held periodically at the level of Foreign Ministers”,[1] with the aim of supporting and advancing the Libyan vision for resolving the crisis.

2- A Growing US involvement: The transformation in the US stance towards Libya is among the influential factors in the ‘Berlin 2’ conference. Unlike the Trump administration, the direct involvement of the Biden administration seemed more evident, which reflects the current administration's directions and endeavors to enhance its diplomatic presence in settling the Libyan crisis. While Trump adopted a ‘leading from behind’ approach, giving Turkey the green light for its movements in Libya in order to balance the Russian role, Biden’s current policy is specific, and aims at supporting the transitional phase and completing the political process, calling for an end to foreign interference in Libya and the withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries. This was evident in the several movements and meetings of the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken. This escalating US role may give more momentum and guarantees which may help move the Libyan crisis to a more advanced and positive stage.

3- Alarming security Flow: The neighboring countries of Libya are witnessing a state of escalating security turmoil, particularly in the wake of the killing of Chadian President Idriss Déby in April 2021, in addition to the growing activity of terrorist organizations in the Sahel and Saharan countries, and the competition between Al-Qaeda and ISIS in this region. Thus, these conditions may greatly impact the overall security situation in Libya, hence the aspired political stability, especially that these groups are masters of exploiting gaps for expansion, which was evident through the ISIS operation that targeted a checkpoint in Sabha in Southern Libya on June 6.  These concerns were reflected in article 29 of the outputs of ‘Berlin 2’, which stressed the need to support Libya in securing its borders to control the movement of armed groups and other sources of threat.

4- An  indicating decline of militarization: The ‘Berlin 2’ conference was held amidst a decline in escalation and militarization through the success of the military track, following the two sides of the Libyan crisis signing a ceasefire agreement in October 2020, under the auspices of the UN, which advanced pacifying the conflict and moving to the political track. Conversely, the current decline in escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean is inseparable from the Libyan scene. This is especially since Turkey has taken the signing of the maritime agreement with the former Government of National Accord headed by Fayez al-Sarraj in November 2019, as a pathway to the Eastern Mediterranean and an attempt to impose a fait accompli to overcome its isolation . Accordingly, the internal pacification and the Eastern Mediterranean region are considered to be factors impacting the scene and contributing to setting the conditions of seeking a political settlement that enhances stability and pushes the crisis forward.

Outcomes and obstacles:

The ‘Berlin 2’ conference witnessed a remarkable development in the number of participants compared to the first one, as participation expanded from 12 countries and 4 international organizations to 17 countries and 4 organizations. Although representation in the first conference was at the level of presidents, while the second one was limited to the foreign ministers of the participating countries, the results of ‘Berlin 2’ have greatly enhanced momentum and anticipation. Accordingly, the key outputs of the ‘Berlin 2’ conference agenda and the challenges imposed by the Libyan situation on those outputs may be identified as follows:

1- The need to complete the political process: The ‘Berlin 2’ participants stressed the need for holding the elections as scheduled in December 2021. Although this issue was unanimously agreed upon by participants, there are several challenges that may impede access to elections, including the issue of consensus over the constitutional base and preparing for elections. While one party favors holding elections first, the other party gives priority to the constitution. Furthermore, the mechanism of selection through direct voting or through the House of Representatives has not yet been settled.

On the other hand, the need to create a secure environment prior to the elections remains a challenge, especially considering the difficulty of holding elections under the influence of the weapons owned by some armed factions. The third challenge is relevant to the lack of clarity regarding the mechanism for registering Libyan voters, whether at home or abroad, in addition to the people displaced due to the escalation of the conflict.

2- Dealing with mercenaries and foreign forces: This was a dominant file on the agenda of the “Berlin 2” conference being one of the most contentious issues that are likely to overwhelm the scene. According to the statements of Stephanie Williams, Former UN Envoy to Libya in February 2021, there are 20,000 mercenaries in Libya. Despite the agreement of the majority of participants regarding clearing the Libyan scene of mercenaries and foreign forces, several challenges remain, including the lack of a clear and specific mechanism for a gradual removal of these elements, according to a timetable. This means that the political process may take place in a poorly equipped security environment.

Turkish endeavors to undermine international efforts in this regard are evident in Ankara's reservation regarding Article 5 of the outcomes of the ‘Berlin 2’ conference, as Turkey seeks to stall the process and to enhance its presence by distinguishing between mercenaries and foreign forces. It claims that its presence comes within a legal framework set with the Al-Sarraj government, although these agreements were not within the powers of the GNA and were not approved by the Libyan Parliament. 

3- Calling for unified institutions and the promotion of reconciliation: The ‘Berlin 2’ conference agenda addressed the importance of unifying Libyan institutions and the need to support reconciliation between the factions. However, there are several obstacles facing this path, including the crisis of confidence amidst the various internal parties, not to mention the militias’ possession of weapons, and the state’s lack of monopoly on the tools of force. This impedes any attempts to unify institutions or accomplish comprehensive interests.

4- Managing resources and distributing economic proceeds: The agenda of the conference reflected the necessity of distributing resources equitably among Libyans, supporting the GNU in the provision of basic services and engaging in the reconstruction process. The economic file takes a secondary priority following dealing with mercenaries and holding elections, as tackling any economic gains may come in the wake of settling the crisis and resolving the conflict in Libya. This is consistent with the estimates of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), which concluded that the returns of peace and direct economic gains on Libya and the neighboring countries that may engage in reconstruction may reach about $162 billion until 2025.

The ‘Berlin 2’ conference has evidently become one of the main milestones  in addressing the Libyan crisis.  Despite the escalating diplomatic momentum and the consensus among most regional and international powers regarding resolving this crisis, restrictions and obstacles remain, primarily the permanent Turkish desire to impose a fait accompli and to enhance its presence in the scene. The extent of resolving the Libya situation remains linked to the upcoming interactions. The political dialogue forum, due to take place on June 28, may be able to overcome the issue of the constitutional base and to agree on clear mechanisms for completing the political track. However, the complication remains with respect to the removal of mercenaries and foreign forces as well as the unification of Libyan institutions.