On May 6, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed the General Staff to prepare for non-strategic nuclear weapons exercises. The Russian defense ministry stated that these exercises would involve missile formations from the country's southern military district, as well as Russian air and naval forces. Moscow's defense and foreign affairs ministries announced that the maneuvers were a response to "provocative statements and threats" made by certain Western officials against Russia. However, an exact date for these maneuvers was not specified. Russian officials did mention that the drills would occur near the Ukrainian border. On May 7, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko ordered joint inspections of non-strategic tactical nuclear weapon carriers involving both Belarusian and Russian forces.
Moscow's Motives
Russia has repeatedly responded to concerns about the use of tactical nuclear weapons in light of several recent developments. Notably\;
1. European Nations threatening to deploy forces in Ukraine:
A. France: Moscow's reaction is likely a result of statements and threats made by French President Emmanuel Macron and French military leaders. In recent statements to the Economist, Macron stated that sending Western ground troops to Ukraine should no longer be "ruled out." The conditions for undertaking such a measure would be a Russian breach of Ukrainian defensive lines (i.e., a collapse of Ukraine's frontline defenses) and an official request from Kyiv. This is not the first time Macron has made such a statement, but it is the most precise. A few weeks earlier, he had hinted at the possibility of sending French troops to Odessa this year. French military experts have also speculated about the possibility of their national forces guarding the Ukrainian border with Belarus, allowing them to focus on the front lines. Furthermore, France could send experts to train these forces.
In a similar vein, French Army Chief Pierre Schill stated in Le Monde last March that the French military was prepared to deploy a division of 20,000 personnel to Ukraine within 30 days. It is important to highlight that France has nuclear weapons and does not need approval or launch codes from the United States to use them. Additionally, in April, France augmented its fleet with a nuclear attack submarine.
It is crucial to highlight that Macron initiated these statements at a time when U.S. aid to Kyiv was halted, leading to a significant deterioration on the Ukrainian front. Even with Washington's recent announcement of a new military aid package to Kyiv, French intentions remained unchanged. Macron's motives are multifaceted. His concerns encompass the possibility of a major Russian offensive occurring by the end of May or early June, along with the potential capture of the port of Odessa by Moscow. Additionally, Macron is striving to strengthen relations and cultivate trust with Eastern European countries that have long criticized France for neglecting their concerns. The president also aims to present Paris as a more reliable ally than a hesitant Germany, which has declined to provide Kyiv with long-range Taurus cruise missiles.
Conversely, the French military may face the challenge of engaging in a prolonged war with Russia. Even if deployed at a distance from the front lines, Moscow would perceive the presence of French troops in Ukraine as an indirect nuclear threat due to Paris's strong emphasis on securing its stationed forces. Additionally, most Western European armies are unprepared for this scenario, and there are concerns about France's repeated escalation initiatives.
B. United Kingdom: On May 2, British Foreign Secretary David Cameron made a statement regarding the use of British weapons by Ukraine. He emphasized that it is Kyiv's prerogative to decide how they utilize the weapons, including the possibility of using missiles against Russia. Russian analysts perceived this stance as a potential motivation for Moscow to respond strongly, particularly considering Ukraine's past use of British missiles.
C. Lithuania: In a recent interview with the Financial Times on May 8, Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Simonyte announced that her country has obtained parliamentary permission to deploy soldiers to Ukraine for a training mission. Simonyte expressed Lithuania's eagerness to assist Ukraine in strengthening its armed forces and ensuring their ability to be revitalized.
2. Entry of F-16 fighters into the war:
The American Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has reported that the Russian Foreign Ministry has consistently claimed that the planned delivery of American F-16 aircraft to Kyiv poses a threat to Russia's national security. Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Goncharenko stated on May 7 that the first of these US fighters could arrive in Ukraine as early as July.
In a statement on May 6, the Russian Foreign Ministry confirmed its expectation that multi-role F-16 aircraft will be deployed in the Ukrainian theater of operations. The Russians have repeatedly emphasized that these aircraft are dual-capable, with both nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities. The statement warned that the actions taken by Ukraine and Western countries are bringing the situation closer to a "critical mass" that could trigger an explosive chain reaction.
In addition to the military exercises involving tactical nuclear weapons, Russia has taken several successive steps concerning these weapons. The most notable steps are as follows:
1. Transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus:
In May 2023, Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko announced that Moscow had started transferring tactical nuclear weapons to his country, in line with President Putin's announcement two months prior. Putin also mentioned that ten aircraft and a special storage facility were being prepared in Belarus for the purpose of storing tactical nuclear weapons.
2. Withdrawal from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT):
On October 10, 2023, Russia withdrew from the CTBT, which represents another setback for nuclear arms control. This decision came after Moscow's suspension of its participation in the New START Treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) in February 2023.
3. Moscow’s concerns about the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant:
Moscow has expressed occasional concerns about the safety of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant. The issue of nuclear threat has been frequently discussed in Russian media, with particular emphasis on statements made by Dmitry Medvedev, the Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council.
A Potential Option
Given the current developments, including the military support and readiness of Western powers to deploy forces in Ukraine, Russia is considering the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons. According to the revised 2020 strategic nuclear doctrine, Moscow may conduct a preemptive first strike.
A report by the Financial Times in February 2024, citing Russian military documents leaked to Western powers, reveals that Russia's threshold for using tactical nuclear weapons is lower than what they have publicly admitted. The leaked documents, comprising 29 military files created between 2008 and 2014, discuss the principles guiding the use of nuclear weapons. The report indicates that triggers for a potential nuclear response range from enemy incursion into Russian territory to more specific provocations. These provocations even include the destruction of 20% of Russia's strategic ballistic missile submarines, which, in itself, would not pose a threat to the Russian state's existence.
Another report by the French newspaper Le Figaro reveals that the major Russian military exercises, known as Zapad (West), have included training for the use of tactical nuclear weapons since 1999. This scenario has been integrated into all major annual Russian military exercises since 2013. Additionally, Russia has made significant advancements in its technological and industrial capabilities over the past two decades, resulting in the development of weapons such as the short-range ballistic missiles Iskander-M and its air-launched version Kinzhal, both of which are capable of carrying tactical nuclear warheads.
Future Scenarios
President Putin's decision to conduct tactical nuclear exercises is part of a broader campaign to exert control over Western decision-makers and shape public opinion in a way that aligns with Russian interests. This campaign has been largely successful in the past. Although Western support has helped Ukraine resist Russian aggression and inflict significant losses on Russia, it has been slow and has imposed numerous restrictions on the use of weapons.
There is no strong indication of Russia's desire for a nuclear confrontation, nor is there any evidence that it is necessary. Similarly, there is no sign that U.S. President Joe Biden wants the situation to escalate in an election year. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz also seems hesitant to abandon his cautious approach and prefers a return to the pre-2022 world. However, French President Emmanuel Macron's behavior is less predictable. In summary, unless the Ukrainian front collapses, there is no reason to expect a change in the behavior of the key players.
It is expected that Moscow will make limited progress in Ukraine this year, making the potential collapse of the Ukrainian front difficult to predict. However, the West cannot afford the consequences of a resounding defeat, which would affect its credibility and deterrence capability. Additionally, the West cannot afford the implications of Russia controlling the Black Sea. However, Western leaders sometimes issue statements that are either unrealistic or provocative to Russia. An example of this is the recurring European rhetoric suggesting that Russia is a sick country, an economic dwarf, and that even its victory will not prevent its decline.
The influence of electoral considerations on leaders' actions is difficult to predict. For example, can Biden blame the Republicans in Congress for Ukraine's loss? How will Macron interpret the situation, and can he get involved in Ukraine despite objections from his allies? Further, we cannot discount the possibility of significant social crises in Europe, particularly as Russia aims to exacerbate divisions within the continent through clever media campaigns.
The Russian military's exact position is unclear. Although it has made progress, it has not yet managed to penetrate the Ukrainian front. It is also uncertain whether Moscow is inclined to settle the conflict this year or wait for the outcome of the U.S. elections. What is certain is that Russia has the capacity to prolong the war for the next two or three years, while Ukraine's ability to withstand it remains uncertain.
