Iran seeks to seize any opportunity to support keeping the July 14, 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or the nuclear deal) in place and strengthen it against any possible freezing or obstacles to its implementation in the coming period, especially because of the policy pursued by the US President Donald Trump. Only a few days after he accused Iran of violating the spirit of the agreement, Mr. Trump told the UN General Assembly on Tuesday September 19 that the Iran deal was one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into. 

Iran seeks to continue sending threats that it can resume its nuclear program if the US Administration took measures that, in Iran’s view, would block its implementation, as  Washington will decide in mid-October whether Iran has violated the deal. But despite its string of such threats, Iran continues to view the nuclear deal as an opportunity because it has enabled it to preserve its nuclear program while also receiving international sanctions relief and reducing its international isolation imposed on it since 2002. 

The government of President Hassan Rouhani is making diligent efforts to put strong pressure on the Trump Administration with one main goal in mind: decreasing the possibility of the United States’ withdrawal from the nuclear deal, an option that Trump and some senior members of his cabinet do not rule out.

With this main goal in mind, Iran wants to use the U.N. General Assembly  as an opportunity to promote its position on the nuclear deal and try to rally international support for it against US frequent threats of withdrawal from the pact. Iranian media reported that that in addition to delivery a speech before the U.N. General Assembly, the agenda of Rouhani’s visit  to New York included  meetings with senior foreign officials and political figures, leaders of US-based think tanks and media organizations as well as members of the Iranian community. 

Primary Issues

The nuclear deal will be the focus of Rouhani’s talks in New York where Iran is expected to seek to capitalize on support from the International Atomic Nuclear Agency (IAEA) for the deal and its emphasis, on September 11, that Iran has complied with the terms of the deal. Iran will push for keeping the pact intact as a bid to respond to US persistent accusations that it is violating the deal.

Moreover, the war on terrorism will be another main item on the agenda of Rouhani’s talks in New York, where Iran tries to capitalize on the liberation of Iraq’s Mosul City from ISIS, and the group’s diminishing influence in some areas in Syria, to promote its own role as a party to these developments. Iran’s claim, which is also based on its relations with parties involved in the war on ISIS in both Syria and Iraq, is refuted by the reality on the ground that it is policies pursued by Iran, coupled with other factors, that caused the spread of terrorist organizations in some countries in the Middle East. 

Counter-Move

Rouhani’s attempts to promote Iran’s policies towards the nuclear deal and the war on terrorism are facing no easy obstacles. The irony is that these obstacles are not only external. Iran suffers from internal obstacles, coupled with the United States’ continued pressures and accusations over Iranian violations of the nuclear deal and sponsoring terrorism.

In other words, figures with strong influence on decision makers in Tehran recently warned against Rouhani’s bid to set up backdoor communications with Washington despite the mutual escalation of tension between Iran and the United States. 

These views are perhaps expressed and conveyed through statements delivered by Rouhani himself before he arrived in New York to justify their positions. Rouhani said he was extending a metaphorical dinner invitation to the United States and used the analogy of a dinner party to describe how the two countries can benefit from the 2015 nuclear deal rather than quitting it. 

He used the metaphorical invitation to describe how the Americans are "sitting in another room" at the party, and said, “they can adopt a new path and come to the room where the dinner table is. That's alright in our opinion. If they change their bad temper they can enjoy the dinner table.”

The statement can, perhaps, explain why Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei deliberately made new threats against the United States before his participation in the UN General Assembly meeting in New York City. On September 17, Khamenei warned that Iran would react strongly to any “wrong move” by the United States on Tehran’s nuclear deal, and even described, once again, the United States as the “Great Satan”, the same slogan that some Iranian figures supporting openness  to the outside world wanted to exclude after secret talks were held in Washington paving the way for the nuclear deal. 

Although Khamenei's warnings are not new, they were deliberate and carefully timed to preempt any attempt by Rouhani’s team to reach understanding, or initiate communications with the US Administration that might not be acceptable for the Iranian top leadership. 

Moreover, the warnings reflect the Iranian leadership’s dissatisfaction with some Iranian officials who recently signaled that holding talks with US officials is still an option despite the widening disagreement between Tehran and Washington.

On July 18, 2017, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, in a conversation with the Council for Foreign Relations, said that there are no communications between him and US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, but added that this doesn’t mean that they can’t be, “because the possibilities for engagement with regard to the nuclear deal has always been open.”

In general, the context of developments indicate that  Iran’s escalation reflects an increasing concern among Iranian decision makers  over the possibility that the US Administration may take new measures that can block the implementation of the nuclear deal in the coming period, especially because the United States’ position on Iran’s compliance continues to be ambiguous, although it  will be clarified in mid-October. 

Undoubtedly, such a step can cause a rift inside decision making circles in Iran. One camp embraces the view that implementation of the nuclear agreement can continue should Washington quit it, because Iran is counting on European states and not the United States. Another camp believes that a US withdrawal from the agreement should be exploited to revive Iran’s nuclear program, especially because counting on the possibility that the agreement would not be impacted by United States’ withdrawal is not based on rational given the United State’s global influence. This influence can prevent Iran from making economic and technological gains that can offset concessions made by Iran for the nuclear deal. 

In conclusion, it can possibly be said that this conflict of viewpoints is likely to go on in the coming period in Iran, especially ahead of the US Administration’s announcement of its position on the nuclear deal in mid-October. Only then, each involved party’s options for dealing with developments of the issue will be clear.