The understandings reached in recent weeks between the United States and Russia have contributed to an expansion of the scope of ceasefire on different fronts in Syria. The level of these understandings would be escalated to include all Syria except for the combat zones of operations against ISIS in Raqqa in northeastern Syria and al-Nusra Front, now rebranded to become Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, in the Damascus suburb of al-Ghouta, in southwestern Syria.
Presumably, these understandings should increase the possibility of formalizing security arrangements. These arrangements include the shape and pattern of deployment and armament of involved forces in ceasefire zones that require switching from offensive to defensive tactics imposed by monitoring troops. However, the opposite appears to be happening where there are signs that Russia is pursuing diligent efforts to enhance its military capabilities in Syria, whether generally through expanding its naval and air bases or tactical operations on war fronts. This reveals that Russia does have a concrete future plan completely different from its previous approaches that sought to gradually reduce its military presence in Syria in parallel with the political developments in efforts being made to achieve a settlement to the crisis.
However, this does not negate that a different regional role for Russia will be tied to another variable that is no less important. This variable is related to the expansion of the US military presence in Syria due to the new policy being pursued by the US Administration of President Donald Trump to address political and field developments of this crisis.
Concurrent Measures
Russia is preparing for increasing its military presence in Syria through expanding, and enhancing the capabilities of its air and naval bases in Tartous, Lattakia and Hmeymim on the Syrian coast within the framework of agreements that were signed with the Bashar Assad regime earlier this year and were approved last month with immediate effect.
An analysis of the contents of these agreements reveals that Moscow is working towards establishing a long-term presence for itself in Syria that may, according to some views, last up to fifty years. However, contrary to what is stated in the agreements, the type and scale of armament at these military bases indicates that Russia’s aim is to scale up its defensive and offensive capabilities in combat zones while also tightening its military grip on Syria’s airspace.
Moreover, the new agreements, in the sections dealing with Russian naval presence, allow for Russian military deployments that exceed the requirements of local defense and are rather more suitable for regional defense. Moreover, the development of bases in Tartous may require up to five years, according to estimates by Russian experts. This means that the effort is not confined to an interim role for Russia in Syria, where Syria does not only constitute an arena for military operations but also a launching pad for Moscow’s various future role in the whole region.
However, it is noteworthy in this context that Russia’s enhancing of its military presence in Syria coincides with the growing rapprochement with the United States over Syria at this stage, which was reflected in their successive agreements about the expansion of ceasefire and establishment of a sequence of truce agreements, the last of which was signed for the cities of Homs and Idlib.
The continuance of these understandings will be among the key topics for talks the first round of which was held in Amman, Jordan during this month with the participation of nine armed Syrian opposition factions and in the presence of US Special Envoy for Syria, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Michael Ratney. Ten days before the first round, understandings reached between the US and Russia resulted in a ceasefire in the governorates of Daraa, Quneitra and Suwayda. The ceasefire agreement provided for the deployment of a contingent of Russian monitors to Daraa. However, there have been reports that the first batch of Russian monitors dispatched to the governorate were more like military troops, something evidenced by their armament and pattern of deployment. This means that Russia is possibly preparing to impose the understandings by military force and not only monitor the implementation of the understandings.
It is currently perceived that any understandings providing for a comprehensive ceasefire and imposing calm in the northern, southern and southeastern sectors, between the Syrian regime and the opposition factions under the sponsorship of the US and Russia, would represent strong support to the upcoming peace talks in both Astana and Geneva. Practically, there will only remain combat zones such as the Damascus suburb of al-Ghouta, where al-Nusra Front militants operate. The zone will be a key topic for upcoming US-Russia talks where a military approach to dealing with it will be discussed.
Long-term Goals
Based on the above, Moscow appears to be seeking to pursue a strategy to expand its future presence in the Syrian arena to counterweight U.S. presence at the U.S. outpost situated near the Syrian border town of al-Tanf, its bases in Raqqa and the al-Shaddadi district, south of al-Hasakah. This indicates an ongoing US-Russian arms race that is beyond the tactics of the current battles, even as an interim tactic is being pursued currently to implement the provisions of understandings the two powers reached using force.
For instance, Moscow made sure to demonstrate its new BMPT-72 tank support combat vehicle in the presence of Bashar Assad at Hmeymim military base. Designed to launch attacks in urban warfare, the multi-purpose vehicle is armed with two 30-mm 2A42 automatic cannons, four laser-guided Ataka-T anti-tank missile systems and one heavy coaxial machine gun with a remote reloading mechanism. It is capable of engaging with infantry vehicles, light armored vehicles, tanks and fortified firing positions. The high firepower of the vehicle indicates that Russia is enhancing its attack capabilities for engaging in crucial battles and that its potential working plan will not be confined to monitoring nor to an interim role in the foreseeable future.
Regarding naval bases, and according to an agreement sealed recently, Russia will will be allowed to double the number of warships in Syrian territorial waters. According to the TASS news agency, this expansion will allow for up to 11 warships, including nuclear-powered ones, to be docked together, which is double the current capacity of the Syrian military sea ports. If one of these ports can currently accommodate five naval vessels, the current deepening and expanding work means that Russia will increase the number of such bases in the post-civil war era, which shows that there is an anticipated regional role for this Russian presence in Syria that goes beyond domestic boundaries.
Possible Repercussions
The US-Russia understandings pose questions about the roles of other parties to be involved in future developments of the crisis, due, in particular, to implicit details that are likely to constitute significant future indicators. These include, for instance, what Michael Ratney referred to, during the Amman meeting, as an effective role for police forces in the future in Daraa Governorate. The role includes policing, maintaining security and establishing suitable conditions for the return of Syrian refugees from Jordan, where Washington would guarantee that the area would not be exposed to any bombardment or any type of offensives.
Of course, making security arrangements in coordination between Russia and the Syrian opposition factions- as reported by Jordanian newspapers about the Amman meeting, would reduce the role of sectarian militias in the future, especially if local administration councils are formed for these areas, a step that appears to be unwelcome by other powers such as Iran.
The US-Russia movements could support the possibilities of a shift for Moscow and Washington from sharing areas of influence to sharing areas of deployment and military armament, while also re-engineering the role and tasks of local partners on the ground and within their own areas of deployment. This would eventually suggest that the Syrian crisis is heading for several developments that would significantly impact its potential trajectories in the coming period.
