On September 5, President Vladimir Putin signed into law a decree on “a humanitarian policy of the Russian Federation abroad” that formulates Russia’s soft power strategy in the form of a 117-point document.
The document running over 35 pages, outlines the principles of a policy for promoting Russian culture abroad. But it did not come as a surprise. In January this year, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a new unit tasked with shaping Moscow’s foreign strategy using soft-power tools, to promote Russian sciences, art, education, and sport. The document answers many questions pertaining to Russia’s foreign diplomacy, its self-perception as a nation-state, and its humanitarian values in international context. Much thought seems to have been invested in the document as it coincides with Russia’s special operation in the Ukraine and the ongoing change in global geopolitical conditions since the basic document drafted in 2016.
Promotion of Russia’s Culture
The document aims at improving Russia’s international image months after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war. It is seen as a form of soft power strategy that seeks to restore Russia’s former success which had culminated in hosting the FIFA World Cup in 2018. By 2020 Russia had risen to top 10 globally in tourism and attracting international students. But the operation in Ukraine damaged its image in Western rankings, dropping 19 percentage points in international favourability surveys. Recognising the impact the Ukraine war has had on its global image, Russia has set to renovate its soft power strategy through cultural and humanitarian programmes, which may be summarised as follows:
1. Reviving the “Russkiy mir” concept:
Making up the core tenet of Russia’s foreign soft power, “Russian world” has become a central motif in its foreign policy strategy. The doctrine was formulised by Russian conservative policy makers according to Western policy experts. It established the basis for Russia values in dealing with the world, and captures the Russian “traditional values”, aiming to preserve and promote them. As such, Russia presents itself as the defender of “morality”, “humanism” and “spirituality”.
2. Protecting Russian communities:
The document elucidates that living abroad for an extended period of time should not weaken one’s ties to their ‘homeland culture’. It also does not see a contradiction between Russians living abroad and their cultural and human duties towards their native country. The document throughout refers to Russian “compatriots” in various terms: Russian-speaking diasporas, Russian speakers, Russian expatriates, Russians residing in post-Soviet countries, among other descriptors. In more than one way, the document asserts a common link among various ethnic groups living under the Russian Federation, whether they be “Russkiye” people (those who share a common Russian ancestry) or other ethnic groups who speak Russian. The document celebrates the “harmonious coexistence” of the multinational people of the Federation.
One key aspect of the policy is the priority set to deepening bilateral cooperation with states in the “post-Soviet space”. Estimated at 25 million Russian speakers in those countries, Russia is invested in maintaining a sphere of influence in those regions, through culture and language preservation programmes. Seen as such, the new foreign policy paves the way for Russia to interfere against any local policies in those countries that may hinder those populations.
3. Preservation of Russian values:
A key task is to promote and defend the foundations of Russian “traditional values”, in particular Russian family values and Russian language. More significantly, Russian culture and language is described as an “instrument of soft power”. As described above, Russia takes its main language as a vital thread that links its multi-ethnic groups, hence prioritising its preservation of their culture and identity abroad.
The document goes to offer a detailed description of a unique “all-Russian” cultural identity. “The Russian Federation supports compatriots living abroad in exercising their rights in protecting and preserving their cultural identities,” the policy asserts. Facing an “aggressive impositions”, namely neoliberal ethos eroding the nuclear family values, the new policy notes the growing demand in the world for the preservation of “traditional values”. To maintain Russian harmony, the document outlines the need for “modern Russian societies” to be “united by a single cultural/ civilizational ‘code’,” which is centred in the preservation and development of Russian language, and the historical and cultural heritage of the entire multinational people of the Russian Federation. It outlines the mechanisms through which this goal could be achieved: by fortifying the Russian ‘code’ in areas of language, arts, education, sport, and the use of “heritage diplomacy”. These soft-power tools would enable Russia to strengthen its positive image in the world, the document maintains, but more importantly, to counter “attempts to falsify history”, downplay the role of the Soviet people in the Grate Victory, and the attempt to rewriting the history of the World War II to rob Russia of its historical role.
Russia’s mission, the document maintains, is to promote its culture abroad. The policy proposes a series of activities to draw international interest to Russian culture: “Russian Seasons”, “cross years” of Russia with other states, Russian anniversaries and memorable dates, days of Russian culture, and mutual trips of cultural figures. Also, the document captures the importance of world literary heritage, through participation in international book fairs and forums, and offering support to foreign libraries offering Russian publications to their readers.
4. Attracting international students:
The policy has put emphasis on building recognition of Russian research and education in the international education space. As a key aspect of Russian soft power, the state would give particular attention to building an international network of projects to attract student from Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and others). These initiatives aim at promoting international youth cooperation in areas of cultur, science, and sport.
What’s New in the 2022 Policy?
The new policy modifies its 2016 predecessor version in three notable ways, summarised as follows:
1. Shifting foreign relations priorities:
The document stressed on the importance of building bilateral relations with SCO, CIS, BRICS, and Slavic countries, as well as focusing on Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which announced their separation from Georgia ahead of the 2008 Russian operation. The document also mandates a need to protect and promote Russian culture in Luhansk, Donetsk, Donbas, and other Baltic regions.
The policy also has highlighted the importance of Russia’s influence on European culture and art. It notes the importance of creating a ‘cultural balance’ between Russia and the West and the potential culture has in improving their relations. Across Asia, Russia should bridge its relations with Central Asian countries and invest in promoting cultural image in Japan.
A point of departure from the 2016 policy is new policy’s focus on humanitarian relations. It specifies key partners not mentioned previously, namely Algeria, Egypt, Israel, UAE, Saudi, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, Palestine, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Chile.
Looking at Europe, Russia’s foreign policy seems to be shifting. The new document drops the ‘Eurasian integration process’ which was heavily mentioned in the 2016 version. Further, the new document does not express interest strengthening ties with Ukraine contrary to its previous draft. The new document also drew on existing narrative of resistance to what the document described as the Euro-Atlantic ‘containment policy, manifested in the geopolitical expansion of NATO closer to Russia. Finally, in contrast to the 2016 document, the new policy has dropped any reference to the promotion of ‘global security and stability’.
2. Changing narrative:
The change in Russia’s foreign policy narrative, therefore, indicates a shift in Russia’s world view and strategy. The term soft power was used only twice through the document, but the implications are important. The first instance the term is used is when describing the importance of harnessing the power of the media and modern technologies to promote the Russian language and culture. But the new document did not make any reference to not-for-profit organisations, civil society, while making use of terms such as “parliamentary” and “humanitarian diplomacy”. Without the participation of NGOs or civil society groups, promoting and attracting international students and education partnerships may be difficult to achieve.
Another notable omission is the reference to international relations and public policy centres, casting doubt over the role of such institutions in implementing the objectives of the new policy. And nothing has been said in the new policy about its target audience – besides various and multi-ethnic groups the policy promises to protect. By comparison, the 2016 document clearly outlined the role of civil society in achieving the policy’s goals.
3. A multi-polar world:
Russia through its new humanitarian policy has asserted its growing role in contributing to international cooperation, development, and sustainability, for a new, multi-polar world order. It looks to utilise globalisation to form “new centres of power” while resisting its eroding effects on cultural identity of countries and peoples. Russia would spearhead the decentralisation of international politics, shifting its strategy to the Asia-Pacific region, counterbalancing the political and economic influence of the Atlantic-European West.
The multi-polar narrative reflects that of the 2016 document. Russia continues to shape policies that aspire to build a ‘just and sustainable world order’ that promotes the role of the UN above all other states, implying Russia’s ambition to limit the sanctions regimes to be applicable under UN Charter only.
To conclude, Russia’s efforts to change the existing unipolar system are well under way. It is using all its foreign policy leverage to reshape its political and economic relations, building new geopolitical partnerships in the region. Recognising the importance of soft power, Russia is utilising identity, culture, and international relations to resist prevalent world order and build a new one that fits its world view. The success of Russia’s new foreign strategy, however, depends on its ability to forge strong alliances, and the ability of its economy to survive the Western sanctions regimes imposed following the war in Ukraine.
