أخبار المركز
  • أحمد عليبة يكتب: (هاجس الموصل: لماذا يخشى العراق من التصعيد الحالي في سوريا؟)
  • محمود قاسم يكتب: (الاستدارة السريعة: ملامح المشهد القادم من التحولات السياسية الدرامية في كوريا الجنوبية)
  • السيد صدقي عابدين يكتب: (الصدامات المقبلة: مستقبل العلاقة بين السلطتين التنفيذية والتشريعية في كوريا الجنوبية)
  • د. أمل عبدالله الهدابي تكتب: (اليوم الوطني الـ53 للإمارات.. الانطلاق للمستقبل بقوة الاتحاد)
  • معالي نبيل فهمي يكتب: (التحرك العربي ضد الفوضى في المنطقة.. ما العمل؟)

Why the Arab Gulf States Back a United China?

15 أغسطس، 2022


The Arab Gulf states take their political positions on crises based on a two-pronged rule. The first principle of this rule is that it is hard to allow politicians’ whims to take control of the interests of people; the second is the need for an overarching strategic insight comprising any decisions made by states with influence on international politics. Accordingly, we can understand the stance of Arab Gulf states on the crisis between Taiwan and China, further worsened after Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan. 

International responsibility

The Arab Gulf states surprised the world twice this year. The first time was when they chose not to side with the United States and western allies over the crisis in Ukraine. The crisis broke out after Russia was provoked by Nato's attempts to expand and include Ukraine despite an agreement with Washington in 1990 that stipulated that Nato would not expand further eastward to Russia’s border. Thus, the position taken by the Gulf states was clear and in compliance with international treaties, and that is why the UAE clearly stated that Russia has a right to guarantee its security.

The Gulf states, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia, held to their balanced position despite frequent attempts by the United States to bring about a change. It should be noted that the objective and logical position of not getting involved in the Ukrainian crisis provides these states with enough mobility to help find a solution to the crisis. 

The second time was when the UAE announced, on August 4, that it backs China’s sovereignty and unity and underlined the principle of respecting “a united China.” A diplomatically active country and a non-permanent member of the Security Council, the UAE even called for the implementation of United Nations resolutions and further expressed concern over escalation of provocations, which impact international stability, security and peace. 

The Gulf states’ position builds on objective foundations in the general determinants of their foreign policies, including on major powers and interactions within the world order. The general rule of these policies mandates the creation and promotion of partnerships with all states, setting their priorities based on their interests, while also taking into account the foundations and principles of international security and stability the most important of which is non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and respect for their sovereignty. Other principles include non-involvement in, and adopting “positive neutrality” on issues of non-Gulf states, which means avoiding taking sides with any party without objective  justification or away from international law rules. 

Within this context, the positions of the Gulf states on the US-China tensions over Taiwan came as true embodiments of those principles and governing rules. They can be considered as practical and a true embodiment of the concept of “international responsibility”, which some states ignore or fail to honor if it comes in conflict with their own policies or interests. The Gulf states, however, hold to this principle even if it is in conflict with their direct interests or entails political or economic burdens. This holds true in the crisis between China and Taiwan, which is a good example of unjustified hastiness by Washington, for example, to take a position that is not based on, or justified by a legal or objective foundation. 

Accordingly, the exaggerated escalation of the crisis in Ukraine into a full-fledged war should be viewed as a lesson on what moves and hasty decisions should be avoided while managing international relations. The world has already paid, and is still paying, a heavy price for the ongoing war and the resulting crises that hit food, energy and supply chains across the world. That is why triggering a new crisis with a major power such as China, without a clear reason, is the last thing that the world needs. 

vision for stability

The firm position taken by the Gulf states is to reject any wars because of their serious impact on development and regional and international stability. But because the world is not an ideal place and international relations are not managed based on ethical or even legal foundations, the Gulf states are aware and realistic enough to accept exceptions imposed by certain circumstances, as was the case during the 1991 war to liberate Kuwait, and later in the campaign to restore legitimacy in Yemen. These exceptions as such do help in restoring stability and protect the sovereignty of states. 

Based on that, in their perception of the China-Taiwan crisis, the Gulf states believe that attempts to provoke Beijing and manipulate international understandings are in complete violation of the sovereignty of a unified China. This violation would spark new international conflicts at a time when all states must be working to maintain global stability. The Gulf states’ position is in harmony with the general trend in Asia and Europe where nobody is excited to  trigger new wars and crises across the world. Rather everybody wants to recognize the importance of cooperation between all states against current challenges instead of initiating new conflicts. 

It should be noted that China’s response to Pelosi’s visit was intense and that it used warnings and used firm and emphatic language. China’s rhetoric sent messages to the United States and Taiwan’s leaders that call for understanding and respecting the sovereignty of states. China is a major power that will not accept being taken for granted as if it were a small state, and it is easy for observers to infer the implications of Beijing’s reaction to Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan as well as its warning that if a new crisis erupts nobody can minimize the resulting risks or even assess its consequences for the world order. 

Despite the fact that the Taiwan visit was made by a US political official belonging to the House of Representatives and not to the US government i.e. does not represent the official position of the White House, China’s counter-moves went beyond political objections that are firm and poignant. Beijing immediately launched military drills to express its extreme anger against Pelosi’s visit. The drill, on the other hand, sends across the message that China is prepared to use military power to practically emphasize the principle of  a “united China.”

It should also be noted that, in the past, Beijing kept declaring this position on several occasions, and did the same immediately after the United States announced that Pelosi is planning a visit to Taiwan. This raises questions about the goals that Washington wants to achieve from what can be considered deliberate and intentional provocation of China by this visit.

Realistic policy

The strength of relations between the Gulf and the United States suggested that they may take sides with Washington or at least keep silent on the recent international crises. That is because it is widely believed that Gulf Arab states relate their political positions to the United States or that these positions are in favor of US policies. But the ongoing global crises in Taiwan and Ukraine pushed the Gulf states to give up their traditional reservations and declare their positions outloud, which was viewed by observers as a new and remarkable shift in the policies of these states, as well as an implementation of their frequent announcements that their foreign policies seek to promote security and development. In practice, this means working to promote global stability, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states as well as to ensure common interests and mutual benefit based on cooperation and international understanding. 

Based on this view, China’s foreign policy agrees with the Gulf states’ view. This agreement took clear shape over the past decade thanks to Beijing’s understanding of the Gulf states’ policies based on the principle of preserving the sovereignty of other states and abstaining from interference in their internal affairs under unreal slogans.

The Gulf states became fully convinced that it is absolutely intolerable and impermissible to violate the sovereignty of other states. This conviction took shape during the Arab Spring when the Gulf states sensed that the Americans, and the Democrats in particular, have intentions to invest in the chaos to create a strategic climate that serves Washington’s interests in the short term. At that time, voices in the Gulf states called upon the United States to review its policy on backing chaos-mongers in some states under the slogan of defending political freedom. The lessons derived from history are prove that disasters are caused by violation of the sovereignty of states: Iraq was hit first, then the states overwhelmed by the Arab Spring were plunged into chaos and pushed to the verge of collapse, such as Syria and Libya, although the dominant situation in those countries, albeit not perfect, was capable of preserving security and stability, the two pillars of development.  

Based on that, the Gulf states’ view of the Taiwan crisis was not born out of spur-of-the-moment calculations. Rather it was based on a vision for the future and an outlook for whatever crises and risks that can be preempted and interacted with through providing a realistic and candid explanation to whoever moves intentionally or unintentionally towards posing threats to global stability. 

Positions taken by the Gulf states on these crises and developments reflect neither a backslide on a keen interest in maintaining good relations with the United States, nor a desire in bickering with the major power. Rather, it is a realistic policy that is not affected by, nor is in conflict with an existing friendship. In fact, it embodies objective and principles foundations viewed by the Gulf states as requirements for global security and stability, which is part of their own security and stability.