Ahmad Hosseini, spokesperson of the Defense Department in Iran's Defense Ministry, announced on December 31 that the Iranian rocket Simorgh failed to put three research satellites into orbit, on account of its inability to reach the required speed, which exceeds 7600 meters per second. Simorgh's speed did not exceed 7350 meters per second. This announcement was made only one day after the Defense Ministry's spokesperson said that the launch was successful.
Preliminary Observations
A number of observations can be made regarding Iran's latest space endeavor, such as the following:
1. The failure of previous attempts:
Most of Iran's previous attempts to conquer space were unsuccessful. Tehran made five attempts to put a satellite into orbit around the earth, four of which were failed attempts. Its attempt in January 2019 did not bear fruit, nor did its attempt in February 2020. As for the fourth unsuccessful attempt, it took place in June 2021.
Estimates attribute this failure to the Simorgh rocket system which, according to these estimates, is most probably faulty, as the system has repeatedly failed to launch the rocket and put its payload into orbit.
In this respect, the sole successful Iranian attempt took place in April 2020, when the IRGC succeeded in putting the satellite Noor-1 into orbit. The satellite, however, was of no use as far as intelligence purposes are concerned.
2. Covering the failures:
Initially, Iran's Defense Ministry announced that the launch attempt was successful. It is noticeable that the announcement was vague; it did not clearly state whether the rocket was to orbit the earth, nor did it specify whether the launch site was the Imam Khomeini Space Center, from which civil space operations are usually conducted, or Shahroud, the main launch site of other military operations. This lack of precision indicates that the Iranians had desired to hide the failure, but as they realized that the USA would uncover it, they eventually resolved to admit it.
Several Purposes
The timing of Iran's latest failed space launch is particularly sensitive, as Tehran had initially sought to make use of this new attempt so as to achieve a number of objectives, such as the following:
1. Reinforcing Iran's position in the nuclear talks:
The launch took place three days after the commencement of the eighth round of the nuclear talks in Vienna. Iran is seeking to reinforce its position in the talks through a policy of escalation; not only did it accelerate uranium enrichment to 60% levels and deny IAEA access to the videos produced by surveillance cameras in nuclear facilities, but it also proceeded with developing its rocket program, amid USA accusations that Tehran intends to use its civil program to send satellites into space as a cover for owning the technical expertise required for putting a nuclear warhead on top of a long-range ballistic missile.
It is noteworthy that the technology used in building such three-stage rockets as Simorgh is similar to the technology used in building intercontinental ballistic missiles. It is also worth mentioning that according to UN resolution 2231 (2015), Iran must cease activities pertaining to developing such missiles.
Iran's latest launch attempt concurred with a significant increase in the pressure put on Iran by all the international powers involved in the nuclear talks. China and Russia have both come to join the USA and Europe in putting pressure on Tehran after they realized how it kept stalling throughout the seventh round of the nuclear talks with the aim of undermining all that was agreed upon in the previous six rounds. According to Iranian media, Russia and China forced Tehran to give up some of its extreme demands during the talks, explaining that the eighth round of the talks will be based on the draft which was reached in the previous six rounds with the government of the former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani.
In response to these diplomatic pressures, Iran is seeking to reinforce its negotiating position, especially after Washington and the European Troika have insisted that the negotiations must end by the beginning of February 2022, or else they will withdraw and consider other non-diplomatic options to be followed in dealing with Iran's nuclear program.
Washington, Paris and Berlin criticized the launch of Simorgh, describing it as a regrettable step as far as the Vienna talks are concerned. However, Tehran's failure to put a satellite into orbit around the earth means that Iran has failed to use of the launch to impose more pressure on the international powers involved in the negotiations, notably the USA.
2. Proceeding to circumvent the transactions:
By announcing the launch, Ebrahim Raisi's government is attempting to claim that the transactions which Washington imposes on Tehran's ballistic program and space-related research are pointless and ineffectual, and that Iran can dispense with the USA's aid and totally depend on itself.
3. Keeping the ballistic program separate from the talks:
Iran is seeking to reduce the current talks in Vienna into a mere discussion of the new form of the nuclear deal, so that other aspects, such as the ballistic program and Iran's role in the region, should be left out. Furthermore, Iran desires to use the latest launch to give the impression that lifting the transactions on it is not among its top priorities. As a matter of fact, this sounds like a gross exaggeration, given the challenges which Iran's economy is suffering due to the USA's transactions.
4. Responding to the Israeli escalation:
The news of the latest launch concurred with the escalation of the conflict between Iran and Israel. On December 30, Israeli military officials announced that they presented several scenarios for attacking Iranian nuclear targets to the Israeli government. Tel Aviv believes that it is futile to follow a diplomatic path when dealing with Iran, as it does not guarantee that Tehran will cease developing its nuclear and ballistic programs or playing a detrimental role in the region. In this respect, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett said last November that Tel Aviv will not be bound by any nuclear deal between Washington and Iran.
Iran realizes that statements by Israeli officials, as well as sabotage operations occasionally conducted by Tel Aviv against Tehran, is an American reaction to Iran's intransigence in the negotiations, as well as to Iran's escalation of the attacks which it conducts through its armed proxies in Syria and Yemen. Washington has given Israel the green light to targeting the Iranian presence in Syria. For instance, on December 28, Israel air forces attacked the port of Latakia in Syria. This was the second Israeli air strike on Latkia in a week.
In retaliation for these pressures, Iran fired 16 ballistic missiles as part of the Great Prophet Maneuver which started on December 20. Furthermore, it revealed that it used winged missiles, so as to reinforce its negotiating position and make sure that it would not be impaired by the pressures faced by Tehran's armed proxies in the region.
5. Enhancing its intelligence capabilities:
Iran is seeking to own reconnaissance satellites capable of spying on the military sites of adversaries. This is why, the IRGC launched the military satellite Noor-1 upon the satellite-carrier rocket 'Ghased' in April 2020. Nevertheless, US Space Force leader, General Jay Raymond, said that Noor-1 is useless as far as intelligence purposes are concerned, ironically describing it as a 'tumbling webcam'.
In the final analysis, it can be said that Iran's space capabilities are still limited. This means that Iran has failed to use its unsuccessful launch attempt to reinforce its negotiating position, especially after Russia and China increased pressure on Iran so that it should be more cooperative and well-meaning in the negotiations and cease stalling. Moreover, this means that the possibility of Iran's taking advantage of the contradictions between Washington and the European Troika on the one hand and Russia and China on the other hand began to recede. This significantly restricts Tehran's maneuvering potential.
