Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian broke with tradition by choosing Iraq for his first foreign visit, a departure from his predecessors' choices. While Mahmoud Ahmadinejad initially traveled to New York, and both Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi opted for Central Asian destinations (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, respectively), Pezeshkian responded to an invitation from Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani.
Accompanied by a high-level delegation, Pezeshkian's visit was comprehensive in scope. He engaged with a wide array of Iraqi leadership, including President Abdul Latif Rashid, the Speaker of the Parliament, and the head of the judiciary, as well as other prominent officials and business figures. The itinerary spanned six Iraqi provinces: Baghdad, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Karbala, Najaf, and Basra.
Upon arriving in Baghdad, Pezeshkian made a stop at the site where former Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy head of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, were assassinated.
Tehran's Objectives
Pezeshkian's visit to Iraq encompassed several key issues, which can be highlighted as follows:
1- Signing 14 cooperation agreements:
Economy stood as a prominent priority on the agenda of the Iranian president's visit to Iraq, as evidenced by the composition of the accompanying delegation. This high-profile group included Minister of Economy Abdolnaser Hemmati, Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadeq, Governor of the Central Bank of Iran Mohammad Reza Farzin, and other notable officials. The visit culminated in the signing of 14 memorandums of understanding, spanning a diverse range of fields. These agreements covered areas such as free trade zones, activities of chambers of commerce, telecommunications, agriculture, media, religious tourism, culture, sports, labor, and beyond.
In a significant move, Iranian and Iraqi officials reaffirmed their commitment to increasing trade exchange, setting an ambitious target to increase it from $12 billion to $20 billion annually by 2027. Tehran's reliance on Baghdad is underscored by Iraq's unique position as one of the few countries exempted from certain sanctions imposed on dealings with Iran. Furthermore, Pezeshkian engaged directly with Iranian businessmen and merchants residing in Iraq, urging them to play an active role in finding innovative solutions to Iran's economic challenges stemming from sanctions. It is noteworthy that Pezeshkian had previously emphasized the critical importance of revenue generated by Iranians abroad, positioning it as a key component in the country's comprehensive strategy to mitigate the adverse effects of Western sanctions.
2- Resolving the issue of frozen Iranian funds:
One of the most prominent topics addressed by the Iranian president during his visit to Iraq was the issue of Iraq's debts owed to Iran and the frozen Iranian funds in Baghdad. Despite the Iraqi Central Bank's announcement in October 2023 that an agreement had been reached to settle Iraq's debts to Iran related to natural gas imports, the matter remains unresolved. A significant portion of Iran's dollar-denominated funds continues to be frozen in Iraqi banks, primarily due to difficulties in repayment or transfer stemming from U.S. sanctions.
Tareq al-Faihan, head of the Iraqi Chamber of Commerce, stated that approximately $11 billion of Iranian funds—revenues from gas and electricity exports—remain frozen in Iraqi banks. Iran is actively pursuing the recovery of these funds, with its urgency intensified by the current economic crisis and the sharp decline in the value of its currency. The Iranian rial has plummeted to over 600,000 per US dollar, further fueling Iran's determination to reclaim these frozen assets.
3- Implementation of the joint security agreement:
Pezeshkian, along with political and security officials from Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, discussed the ongoing implementation of the security agreement reached on March 19, 2023, between Tehran, Baghdad, and the Kurdistan Region. This agreement stipulated that Iran would give Iraq until September 19, 2023, to relocate the headquarters of armed Kurdish groups opposing Tehran's regime from eastern to western Iraq. Furthermore, Iran demanded the disarmament of these Kurdish groups, particularly the Komala Party.
Despite Iraq's efforts to fulfill this agreement, Tehran has repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction in recent months regarding the measures taken by the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Region concerning the relocation of these groups' headquarters. Iran deemed these Iraqi steps "insufficient."
In preparation for Pezeshkian's visit, authorities in Baghdad and Erbil took preliminary measures. They evacuated several Komala Party members from their camps and relocated them to the Surdash camp, situated 40 kilometers from the Iranian border. Additionally, they responded to a request from the Iranian judiciary seeking the extradition of approximately 120 leaders of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties residing in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. On September 6, 2024, Tehran received Kurdish activist and refugee Behzad Khosravi, who had been in Iraqi Kurdistan. Baghdad also announced the closure of dozens of locations affiliated with these parties and their removal from the border area. National Security Advisor Qassem al-Araji discussed resettling the opposition members in a third country in coordination with the United Nations.
Consequently, Pezeshkian addressed the full implementation of the agreement's provisions during his visits to Erbil and Sulaymaniyah in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, where regional government officials had invited him. When asked about his message to the people of Iraq and the residents of the Kurdistan Region prior to his visit, Pezeshkian stated, "We send them peace, and we are at their service."
4- Support for the railway connection with Iran:
Pezeshkian's visit once again highlighted the importance of completing the railway connection between the two countries, specifically a 32-kilometer railroad linking the Iranian town of Shalamcheh to the Iraqi city of Basra. This project aligns with Iran's broader efforts to establish an economic link between Imam Khomeini Port and the Syrian port of Latakia on the Mediterranean Sea, traversing Iraqi territory, which could yield substantial economic returns. The two countries officially launched this project in September 2023.
This development coincides with increased discussions surrounding the Iraq Development Road project, officially launched in May 2023. This initiative aims to transform Iraq into a major international corridor for transporting goods and commodities between the Middle East and Europe via Turkey. The project has raised significant Iranian concerns regarding the potential reduction of opportunities for its own projects connecting with Iraq and Syria, as well as the international corridors passing through Iranian territory, such as the North-South Corridor. Iran's apprehensions have intensified following al-Sudani's government's confirmation in August 2024 of its intention to secure substantial funding for the project, estimated at around $17 billion, from the state budget while encouraging private sector participation.
Multiple Implications
The visit indicates several implications, which can be highlighted as follows:
1- Enhancing Iraqi mediation:
Pezeshkian's affirmation that improving relations with neighboring countries is a top priority for his government underscores the significance of his visit to Iraq. This visit may signify Iraq's potential role in mediating between Tehran and various Arab and regional countries, aiming to facilitate a breakthrough and restore relations. This approach mirrors Baghdad's recent diplomatic successes, particularly its hosting of negotiations between Iranian and Saudi officials over the past two years, which culminated in the Chinese-brokered agreement to restore relations on March 10, 2023.
Notably, the Iranian president's historic visit to Basra, southern Iraq—the first by an Iranian president in a century—carried symbolic weight. By donning the traditional Arab cloak and calling for "unity" among West Asian countries, akin to the European Union model, Pezeshkian conveyed a message of reconciliation to the region.
Furthermore, the timing of the Iranian president's visit, occurring just before his attendance at the United Nations General Assembly in New York, suggests potential diplomatic maneuvering. It raises the possibility that Iran may be seeking Iraq's mediation in the nuclear negotiations between Tehran and Western powers. This speculation is bolstered by recent positive signals from Iran regarding its willingness to return to the negotiating table on its nuclear program, as evidenced by statements from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the Iranian president, and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Iraq's unique position, maintaining relationships with both Iran and the United States, further enhances its potential as a mediator in this complex diplomatic landscape.
2- Iran’s openness to the Kurdistan region of Iraq:
Pezeshkian's historic visit to Iraq's Kurdistan Region marks the first by an Iranian president to this Iraqi territory. During his trip, he engaged in high-level meetings with key regional leaders, including President Nechirvan Barzani and Prime Minister Masrour Barzani. Notably, Pezeshkian held a special meeting with Masoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, extending an invitation for a reciprocal visit to Iran. The Iranian president's itinerary also included Sulaymaniyah, where he convened with leaders of the Kurdistan National Alliance.
This diplomatic mission to Iraq reflects Tehran's strategic shift towards employing diplomacy in its relations with the Kurdistan Region. Iran's complex perspective on the region is twofold: it views it as a sanctuary for Kurdish opposition groups while simultaneously suspecting it of harboring Israeli Mossad facilities. From Tehran's standpoint, this perceived presence poses a threat to Iranian national security from its western flank. Consequently, Iran has repeatedly conducted military strikes against sites it alleges are linked to Israeli intelligence. The most recent of these operations occurred in January 2024, when the Iranian Revolutionary Guard announced targeted attacks on what it described as "spying centers and gatherings of terrorist groups opposed to Iran" within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. This aggressive stance likely prompted Prime Minister Masrour Barzani to emphatically assert that the region's territory would not be utilized as a launchpad for attacks against Iran.
3- Iran's affirmation of its leadership of the so-called axis of resistance:
Although the so-called "Axis of Resistance" falls under the purview of the Revolutionary Guard and its Quds Force rather than the Iranian president, the timing of the Iranian president's visit to Iraq is particularly significant. Occurring amidst escalating tensions between Iran and its regional proxies on one side, and Israel and the United States on the other, this visit underscores Iran's leadership of this axis. The significance is further amplified by the fact that Iran's proxy militias in Iraq and Syria have been consistently launching attacks against American bases and forces, while also targeting Israeli installations in both the occupied Syrian Golan and within Israeli territory. During the visit, Pezeshkian and Iraqi officials jointly condemned Israeli actions in the Palestinian Gaza Strip.
Notably, an explosion occurred at Baghdad International Airport within an area used by the US-led international coalition forces during Pezeshkian's visit to Baghdad. A leader of Kataib Hezbollah, one of the prominent Iranian-aligned armed groups in Iraq, claimed that the attack was an attempt to disrupt the Iranian president's visit and called on security authorities to identify those responsible. This escalation can be interpreted as an effort by certain Iraqi militias to exert pressure on Tehran, stemming from their belief that Iran has failed to respond adequately to Israel's assassination of Ismael Haniyeh, the former chief of Hamas's political bureau, in Tehran in July. This perspective is particularly relevant considering Pezeshkian's support for postponing Iran's response, which aligns with his desire to fulfill his electoral promises and pursue rapprochement with the West.
4- Offsetting Arab openness towards Iraq:
Pezeshkian's government is determined to reaffirm Iran's pivotal role in Iraq, aligning seamlessly with the core tenets of Iranian foreign policy. This strategy views Iraq as one of its most crucial traditional spheres of influence in the region. In light of Iraq's recent pivot towards economic and political openness with its Arab neighbors, Tehran remains vigilant, wary of potentially losing its hard-earned political and economic clout in the country. Consequently, this high-profile visit serves as a clear signal of Iran's unwavering desire to reinforce its influence in Iraq and to emphatically assert that this influence is immutable.
In conclusion, Pezeshkian's choice of Iraq as his first foreign destination is highly symbolic. It underscores the new president's approach of prioritizing the enhancement of relations with neighboring countries, while simultaneously highlighting Iraq's significance in Iran's broader regional strategy. Iraq serves as a vital gateway to the Arab world for Iran, and this visit may also position Iran as a potential mediator between itself and Western powers in future nuclear negotiations.
Furthermore, Tehran aims to leverage this diplomatic mission to reaffirm its leadership of what it terms the "Axis of Resistance." Iran considers Iraq one of the most critical support arenas in its ongoing efforts to counter what it perceives as "Israeli and American aggression." This stance gains particular significance at a time when tensions are escalating between Iran on one side, and Israel and the United States on the other.
