On Saturday, July 6, 2024, Iran's Ministry of Interior's election committee announced that the reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian won the second round of the presidential elections. Pezeshkian secured 16,384,403 votes, surpassing his conservative rival Saeed Jalili, who garnered 13,538,179 votes. Consequently, Pezeshkian became the new president of Iran, succeeding hardliner Ebrahim Raisi, who died in a Helicopter crash in May.
The voter turnout for the second round was approximately 50%, with nearly 30.5 million voters casting their ballots, according to the Ministry of Interior. About 61 million voters were invited to participate, across 58,638 polling stations throughout Iran.
While the ultimate power in Iran is vested in the supreme leader, currently Ali Khamenei, as stipulated by the constitution enacted in 1979 and amended in 1989, the president is the second-highest official in the country. Despite the president's limited scope, he still holds a degree of influence, potentially affecting certain domestic and foreign policy decisions.
Several significant indicators emerged from the results of the second round of the Iranian presidential elections:
1. Return of the reformists to power:
In a noteworthy turn of events, Masoud Pezeshkian, a moderate candidate backed by reformists, secured the presidency amid declining prospects for reformist participation in power and the dominance of conservatives in recent years. This victory echoes the 1997 election when Mohammad Khatami, the first reformist president, defeated conservative Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, then the speaker of the Consultative Assembly (parliament).
Reformists successfully rallied support from the "gray bloc"—an estimated 36 million voters who abstained from the first round. This effort added approximately six million new votes to Pezeshkian's initial ten million, culminating in a final tally of about 55% of the total votes. The unprecedented support from prominent reformist and moderate figures was crucial to Pezeshkian's victory. Early endorsements from Mohammad Khatami and former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif were pivotal, with additional backing from former President Hassan Rouhani, former parliament speaker Mehdi Karroubi, and others.
Pezeshkian's lead in the first round reignited hopes for change among many Iranians, leading to higher participation in the second round. The lower turnout in the first round was likely due to the mistaken belief that the conservative candidate, Saeed Jalili, would win, resulting in a perceived lack of incentive for change.
Notably, Pezeshkian is the only reformist who did not win outright in the first round of the Iranian presidential elections. His predecessors, Khatami in 1997 and Rouhani in his two terms, all secured significant victories in their first rounds. Iran has only seen a second round of presidential elections once before, in 2005, when former President Hashemi Rafsanjani faced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who ultimately won.
2. Increased voter turnout:
The second round of the presidential election saw a turnout increase of about ten percentage points compared to the first round, which had a 40% turnout. This figure is also slightly higher than the 2021 presidential election turnout, which stood at 48.8%, when the late President Ebrahim Raisi won the race.
Additionally, the current presidential elections were held separately from the municipal elections, initially scheduled for 2025. The sudden death of Raisi led to an early presidential election, making the 50% turnout reasonable given these circumstances.
The Iranian regime aimed to use the election turnout, regardless of the winning candidate, as a measure of its legitimacy and popularity, which has waned in recent years. Rising public dissatisfaction with the regime and its policies has been evident in recurring protests and lower electoral participation.
The Guardian Council's decision to approve Pezeshkian's candidacy might have been a strategic move to boost voter turnout, given the low participation in the March 2024 Consultative Assembly and Assembly of Experts elections. A viral video on social media purportedly shows Supreme Leader Khamenei voting for Pezeshkian in the second round, contrary to expectations that he would support Jalili. This could be an attempt to quell public anger, considering Jalili's hardline views during televised debates, which could have posed a challenge for the regime already facing numerous crises.
3. Dominance of the hardline faction within the conservative camp:
Despite the conservatives' defeat in the recent presidential elections, the results indicate that the so-called Jebhe Paydari, or Front of Islamic Revolution Stability, representing the hardline faction within the conservative camp, will dominate in the near future. Leading in the first round was Saeed Jalili, a member of this faction, whereas Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the parliament speaker and part of the pragmatic wing of the conservative camp, was eliminated in the first round. This outcome contradicted several opinion polls, which had predicted Ghalibaf as the frontrunner.
4. Decline of clerics:
An analysis of the recent Iranian elections reveals a significant shift in public sentiment, indicating a loss of confidence in clerical leadership. Mostafa Pourmohammadi, the sole cleric among the presidential candidates, garnered only about 200,000 votes out of the 24 million cast in the first round. In stark contrast, the frontrunners came from diverse backgrounds, including political and military spheres, with prominent figures such as Ghalibaf, Jalili, Pezeshkian, Alireza Zakani, and Ghazizadeh Hashemi leading the race. This marks a notable departure from the past, where clerics like Hashemi Rafsanjani and Raisi were elected as presidents of Iran.
Internal Implications
Drawing from the declarations of Pezeshkian and his campaign leaders, we can foresee a range of prospective domestic policies and their subsequent impacts:
1. Adherence to the Iranian regime’s principles and values:
Pezeshkian chose to deliver his inaugural speech at the shrine of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic. During his address, he described Supreme Leader Khamenei as a "wise leader" and ensured the presence of Hassan Khomeini, Ayatollah Khomeini's grandson, by his side. These gestures indicate that Pezeshkian, a reformist president, aims to align with the regime rather than oppose it, unlike some Iranian opposition factions, especially those abroad, such as supporters of the "People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran" and monarchists who reject the revolution and the current regime.
Pezeshkian's actions suggest his desire to avoid confrontation with the regime from the outset, which could impede his ability to fulfill his campaign promises. This is particularly important if conservatives attempt to label him as opposed to the revolution and the regime. Speaking simply and without reading from a prepared text, Pezeshkian expressed his need for support from the Supreme Leader, the parliament, and the public to address Iran's crises.
In his first message to Pezeshkian, Khamenei emphasized the necessity to adhere to the path initiated by the late President Ebrahim Raisi, hinting at the direction Pezeshkian should take. Despite Pezeshkian's criticism of some of Raisi's policies, Khamenei's message suggests that while the regime allowed a reformist president to run and win for various reasons—including the desire to contain growing public discontent and the lack of time to engineer the elections for a fundamentalist candidate to win, as was the case in 2021—it will not tolerate Pezeshkian straying from the revolution and the regime's principles.
2- Forming a technocratic government:
In his inaugural speech, President-elect Pezeshkian extended a hand of friendship to all, emphasizing the nation's benefit and acknowledging that "the path is difficult" and that hardships can only be surmounted through collective effort. His meeting with the defeated conservative candidate, Jalili, underscored this sentiment of unity.
Pezeshkian is anticipated to form a technocratic government that does not favor specific political factions. He emphasized the importance of appointing experts to governmental positions, criticizing Jalili and conservatives for excluding qualified professionals from crucial roles. The new administration is expected to prioritize economic issues, foreign policy, and national security.
The appointment of Javad Zarif as Foreign Minister remains uncertain. Despite Zarif's popularity following his support for Pezeshkian, Khamenei’s warning on June 25 against appointing "pro-American" figures poses a potential obstacle, as Zarif is perceived as pro-Washington. Other potential candidates for the foreign ministry include Abbas Araghchi, head of the nuclear negotiation team during Rouhani's tenure, who is likely the leading candidate, and Ali Akbar Salehi, a former foreign minister under Ahmadinejad.
The economic team will be pivotal in Pezeshkian's administration, encompassing ministries such as energy, economy, finance, transportation, roads, agriculture, and the Central Bank. Notable potential candidates include Bijan Zangeneh, the seasoned oil minister during Rouhani's era; Hossein Abdo Tabrizi, one of Pezeshkian's economic advisors; and Pirouz Hanachi, the former mayor of Tehran, who is a potential candidate for the transportation and roads ministry.
For the Intelligence and Security ministry, potential candidates include Mahmoud Alavi, the intelligence minister in Rouhani's government; Ali Younesi, the intelligence minister in Khatami's government; and Mostafa Pourmohammadi, the losing presidential candidate and former interior minister in Ahmadinejad's government.
3- Allowing more freedoms:
During the televised debates, Pezeshkian underscored the necessity for a lasting resolution to the compulsory hijab issue, condemning the "oppressive" actions of the morality police toward women. He also criticized the government's harsh response to the 2009 "Green Movement" protests. The newly elected president pledged to counteract censorship and internet restrictions, and to ensure greater government representation for women and ethnic and religious minorities, particularly Kurds and Baluchis. Notably, Pezeshkian himself has a diverse heritage, with his father being Azeri and his mother Kurdish.
4- Conflict of dual power:
It remains unclear whether Pezeshkian's victory will reignite the dual power conflict that existed during Rouhani's tenure. Many decision-making institutions in Iran are controlled by conservatives, including the Consultative Assembly (Parliament), the Assembly of Experts (responsible for selecting the supreme leader), the Guardian Council (responsible for candidate eligibility), the Expediency Discernment Council (which participates in determining internal and external policies), the Supreme National Security Council, and the Revolutionary Guard Corps and security and intelligence agencies. As a result, decision-making may face a clear duality, particularly in foreign policy, with potential conflicts between military and diplomatic priorities, as seen during Rouhani's administration with his foreign minister, Zarif.
Consequently, Pezeshkian's policies may encounter resistance from these institutions, leading to potential obstacles. Pezeshkian will be faced with two choices: either confront these institutions to fulfill his electoral promises or comply with them, risking the loss of public support and bearing the consequences of each decision.
5. The Issue of Khamenie’s succession:
The election of Pezeshkian, a reformist president, has once again highlighted the issue of the supreme leader's succession. The death of Raisi has left Iran without two key figures: the sitting president and a potential successor to the supreme leader, given Khamenei's advanced age and health conditions. Raisi was considered one of the leading candidates for this crucial position. While the regime has managed to address the presidential vacancy, the selection of the next supreme leader remains a complex and unresolved issue. This situation could lead to several potential outcomes: a smooth selection of the third supreme leader, internal factional conflicts, or even the Revolutionary Guard seizing control if the selection process fails.
External Implications
Pezeshkian's campaign statements provide a glimpse into the potential direction of his future foreign policy:
1. Attempt to open up to the West:
During his televised debates, Pezeshkian advocated for opening up to the West and defended the 2015 nuclear deal signed between Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers, viewing it as beneficial for Tehran. He believes in negotiating with the West to lift sanctions, which he contends are causing significant losses for Iran. Additionally, Pezeshkian calls for joining the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), arguing that Tehran's exclusion from the global banking system stems from its failure to do so.
The involvement of Zarif, the architect of the nuclear deal, in Pezeshkian's campaign underscores his likely approach towards relations with the West, particularly regarding the nuclear agreement. However, there are significant challenges to this approach. The decision to return to the nuclear deal requires approval from the supreme leadership and other influential institutions, not solely Pezeshkian.
Further complicating matters is a law passed by the Iranian parliament in 2020, which mandates the continuation of the nuclear program's escalation as long as sanctions persist. This law implies that the program's development cannot be halted, especially as it nears weapons-grade levels, according to evaluations by Washington and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Another potential challenge is the possible return of former U.S. President Donald Trump to the White House in the November 2024 elections. Conversely, Tehran's disclosure, two days before Raisi's death, of rounds of indirect talks between Iranian and American officials in Oman suggests a desire for progress on this issue, which Pezeshkian's victory might enhance.
2. Continuing the "Look East" policy:
Pezeshkian advocates for strengthening Iran's relations with Russia and China, believing this strategy will position Tehran favorably in nuclear negotiations with the U.S. The Iranian regime perceives the "look east" policy—which emphasizes solidifying ties with non-Western powers such as Russia, China, and other emerging Asian nations—as a strategic alternative to relying on Western relations, given the complexities with the Western bloc.
The Iranian interim government, led by Acting President Mohammad Mokhber, demonstrated this commitment by signing a significant gas exchange agreement with Russia on June 26. Additionally, discussions around a new comprehensive cooperation agreement between Iran and Russia further underscore Tehran's dedication to this partnership. Similarly, Iran's 25-year comprehensive agreement with China and the agreement signed with India on May 13 to continue investment in the Iranian port of Chabahar highlight Iran's broader strategy to deepen alliances with key Asian powers.
3. Continuing to improve relations with regional countries:
The trend of improving relations between Iran and regional countries, which gained momentum during Raisi's presidency with the signing of a landmark agreement to restore relations with Saudi Arabia on March 10, 2023, is likely to continue. This initiative includes efforts to strengthen ties with Arab Gulf countries, and other Arab states, as well as Turkey and Pakistan. This strategic direction appears to be a consistent policy, dictated by Iran's supreme leadership and remains unaffected by changes in presidents or governments. During his electoral debates, Pezeshkian emphasized the importance of better relations with regional countries, viewing it as a solution to domestic issues. Upon his election, Pezeshkian received congratulatory messages from leaders and heads of most regional countries, reflecting their interest in cooperating with him.
4. Persistence of Iran’s regional role:
Regional influence remains a fundamental pillar for Iran, representing one of the "red lines" unlikely to change regardless of the president or government in power. Key decisions in this domain rest primarily with the Supreme Leader, the Revolutionary Guard, and other influential institutions. Consequently, Iran's regional role, including the sustained support of the Revolutionary Guard for its proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, is expected to continue.
Pezeshkian has voiced support for the Revolutionary Guard Corps, highlighting their evolution by stating they are "different from the past." He also condemned the U.S.'s designation of the group as a "terrorist organization," attributing regional tensions to Washington's actions. Additionally, it is improbable that Iran will alter its policy towards Israel, which it regards as a sworn enemy. This ongoing enmity implies that tensions between the two nations will persist, with the intensity depending on developments in ongoing conflicts, particularly since the Israeli war on Gaza and subsequent clashes on other fronts in Lebanon and Yemen.
In conclusion, Pezeshkian's victory might symbolize a case of role-switching within the Iranian regime, showcasing its ability to adapt and renew itself in response to the growing divide with the public. Nonetheless, his election does not indicate a shift in Iran's established stance on domestic and foreign affairs, which remains under the strict guidance of the supreme leader and associated institutions, adhering to Iran's consistent policies. Despite this, the newly elected president may possess some latitude to address these issues within the flexible aspects of Iranian politics. This could enable him to make a distinct impact and implement "permitted" changes domestically, particularly in areas concerning political, social, and economic rights and freedoms, as well as in managing foreign relations.
