Western reports noted that Turkish Air Force aircraft landed at the al-Watiya Air Base, west of Tripoli, at the end of November. Turkey aims to reinforce its influence in Tripoli in anticipation of any new potential arrangements resulting from the current regional dynamics.
Remarkable Turkish Moves
Turkey's remarkable moves in recent weeks over Libya can be outlined as follows:
1. Reinforcing military presence in Tripoli:
Western sources specialized in air traffic noted that four Turkish Air Force cargo aircraft arrived at al-Watiya air base. The effort is part of Ankara's bid to reinforce its military presence in Libya. Earlier, local reports noted that about 20 containers left al-Watiya airbase for the capital Tripoli only hours after the Turkish military aircraft landed.
On November 22, other reports from Libya said that two Turkish frigates arrived at Al-Khums naval base in Western Libya over two days. This aligns with reports that Ankara and the government led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah agreed to give effect to a memorandum of understanding signed with the former Government of National Accord in 2019.
2. Continuing cooperation with western Libya troops:
Commander of the Turkish forces in Libya, Colonel Osman Itaj, on November 24, attended the graduation ceremony of a new batch of infantry, artillery, and armour officers to mark the completion of their training by Turkish officers operating in Tripoli. In this context, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the outgoing National Accord Government, Mohammed al-Haddad, hinted that work is underway to form two infantry and artillery brigades in coordination with Ankara.
In the same context, the security adviser of the Turkish Embassy in Tripoli held a meeting with the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior of the outgoing National Accord Government, Mahmoud Saeed, in which they agreed on a joint plan to enhance cooperation, including training, between the interior ministries of Ankara and Tripoli.
Intensified Regional and International Tactics
Turkey's moves in Libya coincide with internal, regional and international development, including the following:
1. European calls for abolishing border delineation:
The European Parliament, in mid-November 2022, issued recommendations on Libya. It labelled the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), signed between the Dbeibah government and Ankara in early October 2022, on the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean Sea, as illegal. The MoU allows Turkey to explore Libya's oil and gas in areas viewed by the EU Parliament as part of the exclusive economic zones of Cyprus and Greece. The EU Parliament called for the cancellation of the MoU, urging parties to the conflict in Libya not to further fuel tensions through direct military intervention, and called for the withdrawal of mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces from Libyan territory.
Turkey seems to be concerned about the growing European rejection of its role in Western Libya. That is why it sought to establish a long-term military presence in Tripoli to reinforce its influence and secure its economic and geostrategic interests.
2. Talks between Saleh and al-Mishri in Cairo:
In late November 2022, Cairo hosted extensive consultations between Speaker of the Libyan parliament Aguila Saleh, Head of the High Council of State Khalid al-Mishri, held in the presence of Abdoulaye Bathily, the United Nations Special Envoy to Libya. The consultations were held as part of current understandings between the House of Representatives and the High Council of State. Saleh stressed that broad understandings were reached on resolving the issue of sovereign institutions and the restructuring of a unified executive authority. Within this context, Turkey's recent moves aim to secure a continuous role in Libya whether or not the Dbeibah remains in power.
3. Potential rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt:
Recently, renewed talk about potential rapprochement between Ankara and Cairo emerged after a meeting between President Recep Tayyib Erdogan and President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Doha, Qatar, and statements by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu that his country is looking forward to cooperation with Egypt and the United Arab Emirates to find a settlement to the crisis in Libya.
Based on this, Turkey’s recent moves in Libya show that Ankara, even if it is prepared to make some concessions on Libya to move closer to Cairo, is still seeking to send a message to Egypt that any rapprochement will not push Turkey to withdraw its troops stationed in Tripoli.
4. Qatar’s increasing involvement:
Doha seeks to reinforce its presence in Libya by mediating between influential regional parties to the Libyan crisis. This was evident in UN Special Envoy to Libya Abdoulaye Bathily’s recent visit to Qatar, where he held consultations with Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani.
Moreover, Speaker of the Libyan parliament Aguila Saleh, on November 24, held a meeting with Qatari Ambassador to Libya Khalid al-Dosari, who reiterated Doha’s support for efforts to find a settlement to the Libyan crisis and the Libyan parliament’s efforts to create suitable circumstances for holding elections based on an agreed “constitutional base.”
Potential Implications
Potential implications resulting from ongoing internal and regional dynamics, and the resulting moves by Turkey, can be laid out as follows:
1. Continued consultations about forming a new government:
Consensus reached by the heads of the parliament and the High Council of State in UN-brokered talks in Cairo is set to be followed by a further round of talks inside Libya. The aim is to mobilize a maximum of internal backing for this consensus. The assumption is perhaps evidenced by the announcement of a new round of talks between Salih and al-Mishri in Zintan City in northwestern Libya in the presence of Abdoulaye Bathily, the United Nations Special Envoy to Libya. In the talks, the parties will continue discussions about positions at sovereign institutions, the executive authority and the constitutional base.
Although Bathily announced the failure to hold the meeting scheduled for December 4 because of logistical reasons, there are assessments that the failure was caused by the opposition of Zintan-based armed groups loyal to Dbeibah, especially because the said meeting was supposed to see the official launch of efforts to form a new government and open the door for nominating candidates for sovereign positions.
2. Resuming efforts to complete the constitutional base:
Saleh hinted that the consultations of the joint committee of the House of Representatives and the High Council of State about the constitutional base were delayed because of the failure to name a new UN envoy to Libya. But Salih also noted that in the coming days, the committee would resume its duties in Cairo to enable the two sides to reach an agreement on the constitutional base, which will be turned into a referendum.
3. Dbeibeh swaying Tunisia:
Dbeibah’s visit to Tunisia and his meeting with President Kais Saied, and Prime Minister Najla Bouden, reflected the Libyan official’s efforts to reinforce his position against internal and foreign efforts.
Dbeibah led a senior delegation including Governor of the Central Bank Sadiq al-Kabir, Minister of Economy Mohammed Hwej, Minister of Economy Khaled Al-Mabrouk Abdullah, and Acting Minister of Interior Emad al-Trabelsi. The visit came after chilly relations between the Dbeibah government and Tunisia after the prime minister expressed annoyance at relative rapprochement between Tunisia and the eastern-based government led by Fathi Bashagha. But this rapprochement between Tunisia and Algeria became a crucial determinant in shaping Tunisia’s position, especially in light of Algeria’s support to the Dbeibeh government.
Moreover, the visit came days before a surprise visit by Tunisian Prime Minister Najla Bouden to Algeria and a visit by Algerian Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra to Tunisia, both representing a significant indicator that a tripartite bloc could be formed, one that Dbeibah is seeking to use to reinforce his internal position.
The conclusion is that despite the failure to hold a meeting between Saleh and al-Mishri in Zintan City, most assessments show that the coming period is likely to witness preparations for new talks between the two sides in a Libyan city. At the anticipated meeting, al-Mishri would officially announce the outcome of the current agreements between the two sides. Despite doubts shrouding the two council’s ability to carry out any of their agreements, international support for these agreements and the fact that they are also based on regional understandings can facilitate their implementation. Al-Mishri already proposed the formation of a new government as well as a “dialogue commission” to be tasked with following up on the implementation of the agreement.
