Chad’s foreign affairs ministry, on May 8, announced that the inclusive national dialogue, scheduled on May 10, was postponed on request from Qatar, which is mediating in the talks. The postponement was aimed at giving more time to involved parties i.e. the ruling Transitional Military Council (TMC) and the armed opposition to reach a peace agreement before the inclusive dialogue is held in Chad.
Evident Faltering
Over the past two months, Doha has hosted precursor peace talks between Chad’s junta and tens of armed opposition factions seeking a peace agreement before an inclusive dialogue that would include all factions of the political inside and outside Chad. Within this context, the precursor dialogue hosted by Doha witnessed significant developments that can be outlined as follows:
1. A faltering start:
Although the precursor talks were launched in Doha on March 13, 2022, direct talks between the representatives of the ruling council and the opposition factions did not begin until April 14, because some of the powerful armed factions rejected the participation of some of the 52-armed factions that do not have solid armed forces presence on the ground. When some of these armed groups withdrew from the talks, Doha mediated to reach agreements, while the armed groups formed three main groups called Rome, Doha and Qatar.
2. Relative agreements:
The armed opposition groups presented a series of demands that Qatari mediators conveyed to the Chadian military council, which eventually agreed to meet some of them. In particular, they approved some demands such as equality on a constitutional basis, a general amnesty and a halt to all government military operations against the armed opposition groups, as well for handing back the confiscated assets of armed groups. N'Djamena also approved to give guarantees of safety to members of the armed groups if they return to the country and decide to engage in politics. The military council also agreed to launch a disarmament and rehabilitation program for members of the armed groups who renounce violence and abstain from attacking the authorities.
3. Rejected demands:
The military council, however, rejected some of the demands on the basis that most of them have to do with the inclusive national dialogue set to be held after the pre-talks are concluded.
N'Djamena also rejected some of the requests jointly presented by the main three opposition groups. These include the following:
an announcement of ceasefire, creating a committee for investigating damage caused by actions of the government forces in some Chadian regions, restructuring the committee tasked with organizing the inclusive dialogue, the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners, guaranteeing the safety of all participants in the inclusive dialogue through deployment of troops from the African Union, and integrating rebel forces into the Chadian army.
Multiple Clarifications
The precursor talks in Doha were delayed for several reasons that can be outlined as follows:
1. Faltering talks in Doha:
In the past few weeks, the armed movements demanded the inclusive national dialogue to be postponed on the basis that pre-talks failed to produce solid results.
These movements believe that reiterations by head of the TMC Mahamat Idriss Deby, known as Kaka and that the inclusive dialogue to be held on schedule, show that the Chadian ruling council is not serious about engaging in an all-inclusive dialogue with all involved parties. This view was expressed by head of the Rome group, Adam Yacoub, and spokesperson of the Doha group Abkar Asilik.
2. Deby accused of bribing the opposition:
The Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic withdrew from the precursor talks and their representatives left Doha. The move came after a tape recording was leaked on which the chief of the militant rebel group Rachid Mahamat Tahir is heard accusing the Transitional Military Council (TMC) of attempting to disrupt the Chadian opposition by bribing some groups participating in the talks.
3. Qatar’s Efforts to Ensure the Success of Pre-Talks:
The decision to delay the inclusive national dialogue was made based on a proposal from Doha, especially because many movements would boycott the gathering if the transitional military council insists on holding it on May 10 as scheduled, and may even allow for a resurgence of armed confrontations.
Significant Implications
1. Reciprocal legitimization:
The sessions of the pre-talks in Doha gave legitimacy to the participating parties as the transitional council in N'Djamena implicitly recognized the armed opposition which it used to label as mercenaries. Likewise, by attending the meetings the rebel movements acknowledged the constitutionality of the transitional council led by Mahamat Idriss Deby who, after his father’s death, took over as the country’s leader without constitutional authorization.
2. Deep French involvement:
French President Emanuel Macron, in a phone call, assured the chief of the Transitional Military Council Mahmat Idriss Deby, that France backs Chad’s endeavors to reach an agreement with armed rebel groups. He further noted that Paris insists that the inclusive national dialogue should start as soon as possible, and that it is prepared to endorse the current talks between Chadian parties in Doha in preparation for the inclusive dialogue.
It should be noted that Macron’s statements reflect a major shift in France’s long-standing traditional stance on dialogue with armed rebel groups. Although Paris has always rejected to negotiate with rebel groups, France’s fading influence in the Sahel region in general, and in Mali in particular, prompted Paris to back N'Djamena to consolidate stability and preempt any armed confrontations that would lead to France’s loss of Deby, its most important ally in the region.
That is why, France is working on expanding its military bases in Chad. Wakit Tama, a coalition of opposition and civil society, condemned the transitional military council for allowing France to build five new military bases in Am Timan, Adre, Ati, Ouara, and Tes.
3. US Anticipation:
Late president Idriss Deby succeeded in establishing Chad as a strategic ally of the West, and of France in particular, and to a lesser degree the United States, by increasing Chadian military participation in peace operations in the Sahel region thus backing Paris’s and Washington’s interests.
Within this context, the US Department of State takes special interest in the precursor talks. Washington reportedly sent a diplomatic team to follow the talks hosted by Doha. The move followed a visit made by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee to N'Djamena in late March. The US Department of State urged all parties in Chad to speed up political transition though a comprehensive agreement that establishes stability in N'Djamena.
Potential Trajectories
Based on the above, three potential trajectories in Chad can be outlined as follows:
1. Partial agreement:
The pre-dialogue talks may lead to a limited peace deal between the Chadian government and some opposition groups while the remaining armed groups would continue to oppose the government and withdraw from the talks. If the inclusive dialogue is held with groups that agreed to engage in the pre-talks, the dialogue would not be completely legitimate but would give the transitional council an opportunity to neutralize some of the rebel groups.
2. Complete collapse of talks:
The pre-talks can falter and collapse if all parties insist on their stands and if a majority of participating rebel groups withdraw. This would prompt some of these groups to launch large scale attacks against the government forces. Such a development would draw foreign interference. That is some rebel groups would seek help from Russian security firm Wagner. But France’s support to the de facto authorities is likely to prevent rebel groups from achieving any victory unless internal divisions in the transitional council develop.
3. Reaching initial understandings:
This would also be another potential scenario, especially because of the growing involvement of France, as well as the United States, in the issue. That is, the pre-talks would lead to an initial agreement while larger issues would be referred to the inclusive dialogue which will be organized by a joint committee.
In conclusion, it is still hard to reach an agreement between the transitional authorities and the armed rebel groups. This was evidenced in the Chadian government’s response to demands presented by the three main rebel groups. Despite their disagreement over a number of issues, most of the pending issues were either objected to or delayed to the inclusive dialogue thus prolonging the transitional period. This would be widely refused by armed groups and eventually cause a return of armed confrontations.
