On October 16, Iraqi Electoral Commission announced the preliminary results of the 2021 legislative election, which was held on October 10. The results obviously show that Shiite parties supported by Iran have lost much popularity, as Al-Fateh Alliance, led by Iran's proponent Hadi Al-Amiri, won only 17 parliament seats (out of 329), whereas Al-Sadr's alliance, called Marching Towards Reform, won 73, and therefore won the election. The Progress Alliance, led by former Parliament Speaker Mohammed Al-Halbusi, won 37 seats, which makes it the second biggest winner.
The Connotation of the Results for Iran
The final results of the Iraqi parliamentary election have many implications which can be summed up as follows:
1. The defeat of Tehran's allies:
Iran-backed forces and fractions suffered a crushing defeat in this election. It seems that Iraqi voters wanted to punish the political parties which have militias supported by Iran through the electoral process. As mentioned above, Al-Fateh Alliance got no more than 17 seats (they got 48 seats in the 2018 parliamentary election).
Similarly, the pro-Iran Alliance of National State Forces (consisting of Ammar Al-Hakim's National Wisdom Movement and Haider Al-Abadi's Victory Alliance) won four seats. It is noteworthy that this alliance had won about 61 seats in the last parliamentary election.
This shows that the Iraqi people no longer accept these forces and their ideas, especially with their insistence on keeping their weapons out of the state's control. We must not forget that Faleh Al-Fayyad praised the idea of IRGC and said that Iraq should have a similar entity. The results also come as a punishment to the politicians who did not support the October Revolution, and resorted to violence in dealing with it instead of responding to the protesters' demands (the most important of which were improving public services and putting an end to Iran's hegemony).
2. The victory of Al-Sadr:
The 'Marching toward Reform' Alliance won most of the parliament seats (73 seats as mentioned above). It is noteworthy that in the last parliamentary election al-Sadr bloc got 54 seats.
There were many reasons that led Al-Sadr to achieve such a victory. First and foremost, he always focuses on the importance of Iraq's independence and supremacy. Besides, he is on good terms with some Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia and UAE, both of which he visited in 2017. Al-Sadr is generally regarded as an anti-Iran political figure, especially because IRGC was involved in supporting the armed groups which defected from Al-Sadr Movement, such as the Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq Movement and the Hezbollah Al-Nujaba Movement.
The Sadr bloc announced that it desires to form the next government. Some suggest that there is an undeclared understanding between Al-Sadr and former Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, whereby the latter would remain in office, because of his anti-Iran attitude and his policies which are generally aimed to effect reconciliation between Baghdad and the Arab world.
3. Iran loss of popularity among Iraqis:
The preliminary results show that Iran is falling from Iraqi grace. The election's results show that the October 2019 protests - in which people demanded that Iran's hegemony in Iraq be ended, and chanted 'Out, out, Iran!'- did bear fruit.
Secular movements won 20 seats, which is not a big number, but this was expected because these movements did not adopt a unified attitude towards the election; some of them decided to boycott the election, whereas others preferred to participate in it. Besides, these movements failed to make an alliance before the election. Therefore, it can be said that these movements paid the price of too much disagreement.
4. The worsening situation of Iran:
Iraqi election's results make a bad situation worse for Iran, which is preparing to go to negotiations in Vienna over its nuclear activities with P4+1. The USA will indirectly take part in the negotiations. The election's results show that Iran is no longer as hegemonic in Iraq as it was once, which is by no means in Iran's favour as far as the upcoming negotiations are concerned; Tehran will no longer be able to use its regional influence as leverage in its negotiations with Washington.
In addition, Iran will no longer be able to project an image of itself as the protector of the oppressed. It is now obvious that Iran sought to oppress Iraqi anti-Iran protests, and that Iraqis retaliated by giving the cold shoulder to pro-Iran candidates, which, in turn, constitutes a threat to Iran's presence in Iraq.
Even worse, the fact that the Taliban has taken over again in Afghanistan puts more pressure on Tehran, as there is nothing to guarantee that Iran's interests in Afghanistan will not be harmed by such a development. Iran has also lost much of its hegemony in Syria since Russia took matters into its hands and started to try to get rid of Iran's militia there (Russia's tolerant attitude to Israel's repeated attacks bears witness to this). In addition, as Moscow and Washington are negotiating over the situation in Syria, they may reach a decision to get rid of the Iranian presence in it.
Tactics of Tehran’s Allies
As the Iraqi election's results can be considered a crushing defeat to the Iranian presence in Iraq, Tehran's allies were quick to act as follows:
1. Doubting the results:
Once the election's preliminary results were out, pro-Iran parties and movements in Iraq started to challenge the credibility and fairness of the election. This was manifest in statements by the Coordination Framework of Shiite Forces (comprising Al-Fateh, National Wisdom, Victory, National Approach, and State of Law). Hadi Al-Amiri, Chairman of Al-Fateh Alliance, said that the results were 'fabricated'.
It is noticeable that Iran is approving of this attitude, and even stirring it. Kayhan newspaper, backed by Iran's Supreme Leader, even referred to 'electoral fraud' and manipulating election results in Iraq'.
It is quite strange that the State of Law Alliance, led by Nouri Al-Maliki, was among those who objected to the election results, though the former prime minister won more parliament seats this time than he did in the last election. This shows that he identifies with Iran and its agenda in Iraq. It also bears witness to the enmity between him and Al-Sadr. We must take into consideration that if the latter succeeds in becoming Iraq's next prime minister, Al-Maliki will be deprived of such a chance.
2. Threatening to use arms:
Quds Brigade leader Esmail Qaani visited Baghdad a few hours after the preliminary results of the election were announced. Following this visit, some militias waved their weapons in the streets, and Abu Ali Al-Askari, security official of Iraqi Hezbollah Brigades, said that the preliminary results are 'the biggest fraud' that Iraqis have ever been victim of. He also said that they have to make up their mind and prepare to defend their sacred entity (meaning the parliament). Beside, a Popular Mobilization leader said that 'this institution was created with our blood, and we will protect it now with our blood'.
Such statements may lead to armed confrontations between Al-Sadr militias and the Popular Mobilization Forces, especially as Al-Sadr gave a TV speech, after the results were announced, in which he pledged weapons will only be left to those who are specialized in using them, and that they will be taken even from those who 'claimed' that they were resisting the USA, in a reference to the Pro-Iran armed fractions.
3. Utilizing Lebanese Hezbollah's strategies:
On October 17, following the announcement of the election results, several parts of Baghdad saw limited protests. The very fact that the protests were 'limited' shows that the forces objecting to the results are no longer as 'popular' as they used to be. Consequently, the political forces related to Iran decided that desperate measures must be taken; they ordered their militias to block some important roads in many Iraqi governorates, such as Wasit and Basra, so as to cause escalation between the protestors and the security forces, which would expectedly try to prevent the protesters from blocking the roads and paralyzing life. This is actually Lebanese Hezbollah's style; protesters would 'ask for it' and then accuse the security forces of oppressing or even killing them, and this would be the militias' cue to wreak havoc.
By following such a path, the pro-Iran forces aim to put pressure on the winners, especially Al-Sadr, in order to prevent him from translating his victory into a government that would seek to achieve the October Revolution goals. It is interesting that Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi criticized such behaviour and stressed that to some, the word 'politics' has become an equivalent to the words 'blackmail', 'lying', 'conflict' and 'deceiving others'.
Using arms to gain political concessions is not new as far as Iran's regional policies are concerned. We must not forget that after Lebanese Hezbollah occupied western Beirut on May 7, 2008, the Doha Agreement was signed, whereby Hezbollah was given 'the blocking third' and, therefore, continuous control over Lebanese governments. Iran's militias are seeking to repeat the same scenario in Iraq to impose itself on the Iraqis.
In the final analysis, Iran's moves, through its armed militias and proxies, show that it is keen on gaining through violence what it lost through democracy, by attempting to reproduce the scenario of chaos which had the upper hand in forming the Iraqi governments under the US occupation of Iraq. In other words, Iran is seeking to thwart Iraqis' attempts to get rid of the Iranian hegemony and to achieve economic progress.
