The military tensions between Israel and the Assad regime revealed a new wave of escalation in hybrid wars between regional and international forces engaged in Syria. The Syrian scene witnessed steady decline in the influence of armed non-state actors. Their roles have been solely limited to proxy wars on behalf of regional and international actors, within the scope of rules set by these powers, without crossing the red lines or attempting to achieve independent interests. This indicates that the coming period will perceive military tensions and threats of direct confrontation ratchet up between the states directly involved in the Syrian conflict.
An evident example of this trend can be perceived in the Israeli airstrikes following the shooting down of an Israeli F-16 fighter and hitting another F-15 fighter on February 10, 2018, by the Syrian air defense forces. Although the airstrikes managed to destroy more than 12 targets, including Syrian and Iranian military positions, they were not able to utterly prevent the Assad regime and its allies, Iran and Hezbollah, from targeting Israeli jet fighters. That is consistent with Russian attempt to impose new rules for the conflict in Syria through dominating the airspace and preventing the transfer of advanced air defense systems to militias and armed factions in Syria.
Over many years, Syrian airspace has been an open area for regional and international forces’ jet fighters. Except for Russian military bases, which are protected by the Russian air defense umbrella, there was no site inside Syrian territory immune against targeting by the Israel air force or allied forces led by the United States.
However, the Syrian air defenses strike back at the Israeli jet fighters has numerous significances. The most prominent of which are; the Syrian army and its regional allies, Iran and Hezbollah, have developed their military capabilities. The Assad regime has further benefited from the Russian and Iranian military support, and the ability of Russia to respond to shooting down its jet fighters by the US-backed military factions in Syria. Thus, a new pattern of tangible deterrence, through the projection of power to effectively defend against air attacks, has become the new governing rule of engagement in the movement of military aircrafts over the Syrian airspace.
Diminishing Israeli Hegemony
Shooting down an Israeli jet fighter by the Syrian air defense is not the first precedent of confrontations between both sides in Syrian airspace. On February 7, the Syrian army announced that it was able to intercept several Israeli missiles fired at scientific research center at Jamraya. Moreover, on January 9, 2018, the Syrian Air Defense Forces intercepted two missiles fired by an Israeli aircraft against military positions and training camps in Rif Dimashq.
Previously, Syrian Air Defense units intercepted an Israeli military aircraft that penetrated the Syrian airspace from the Lebanese border in the Baalbek area in October 2017 and launched S-200 missile, forcing the aircraft to retreat. In response, the Israeli army launched an intensive aerial attack on the air defense position, located 50 kilometers east of the Syrian capital Damascus.
Later on, Israel denied that the Syrian Air Defense had been able to ground the Israeli multi-role F-35 fighter, which crashed in October 2017. Official statement indicated that the jet fighter “collided with a bird causing damage in the engine during the flight”, while the Russian media said that the Syrian Air Defense missiles hit the most advanced airplane in the Israeli air force.
On September 22, 2017, Syrian official media published photos of an Israeli missile that the Syrian Air Defense forces had been able to shoot it down, before hitting its target at Damascus airport. Syrian forces reported that the target was downed by the BUK-M2, medium-range air defense system, as the wreckage of the missile fell in the al-Qiswah area south of Damascus. Israel, however, did not comment on the statement.
After the Syrian army’s announcement of shooting down a fighter jet and hitting another during an Israeli air force military operation near Palmyra on March 17, 2017, the Israeli army denied the allegations. Dr. Mordechai Kedar, a lecturer at Bar-Ilan University, said that Syria has military capabilities that could cause damage to Israel, particularly the air defense systems, which counter the Israeli air strikes on Hezbollah and Iran in Syria. In addition, the Syrian stock of ballistic missiles, which could hit targets on the occupied Golan Heights or inside Israel, reveals that Assad’s regime escalation against Israel enhances its legitimacy in Syria and increases maneuverability in its relations with its two main allies: Russia and Iran.
Limited Military Capabilities
Western literature agree that the Assad regime does not possess exceptional military capabilities to repel Israeli airstrikes or missiles launched by the US at the Syrian military sites, the most prominent of which was the launch of 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles at the Shayrat airbase in Syria in April 2017. The airstrikes came in response to the Syrian attack on the town of Khan Shikhon using chemical weapons, according to the American account.
According to assessments by IHS Jane’s in a report titled “Syria’s Air Defence Network”, Damascus relies on outdated air defense systems dating back to the Soviet era and lacks the necessary advancement to counter Israeli military planes or hinder the air embargo by the US and the international coalition in Syrian airspace. In this regard, Anthony H. Cordesman confirmed this conclusion in a study entitled “Syria’s Uncertain Air Defense Capabilities” published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in May 2013.
The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies published an analysis on October 18, 2017 by Guy Plopsky on “Russia’s air defenses in Syria”, noting that the agreements governing Russian military deployment in Syria provide for the protection of Russia’s more advanced air defense systems, such as S-300 and S-400 of the Russian forces’ deployment areas at the Tartous and Hameimim bases only. On the other side, Syrian air defense systems, which lack effectiveness- as he put it- take over all areas controlled by the Assad regime. According to the available and incomplete estimates on the Syrian armament, the Syrian air defense systems are limited to the following:
1- S-200 systems: This Soviet-era system, known as SAM-5, is the backbone of the Syrian air defense force. The system was designed and deployed in the 1960s, with a range of 80-150 km. The Assad regime has approximately 240 air defense missiles of this type, obtained from the Soviet Union during the 1980s, according to a report published by the Time magazine in June 2013.
2- BUK- M2 systems: These are mid-range air defense system, with a range of about 50 km, developed by the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Western military sources call them SAM-17. Syria has 38 systems of different types, according to the reports of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London.
3- Pantsir-S system: This system is ahead of the pack in Syria’s short-range air defenses. It is the newest in the Syrian air defense arsenal, with a design dating back to the year 2000. It comprises 12 to 20 short-range missile types and can hit targets ranging from 7 to 20 km. Syria has about 50 short-range systems, according to available data.
4- Shoulder-fired rockets: The Assad regime also has a large number of limited-range air defense rockets, Strela shoulder-fired rockets and other old weapons dating back to the Soviet era. This prompted Israeli assessments to confirm the superiority of Israeli air force and its ability to penetrate the Syrian depth without facing real threats, according to the report published by the Bijin-Sadat Center in October 2017. According to this report, the continued Israeli air supremacy hinges on Russia’s willingness to stop buttressing the capabilities of Syrian air defenses.
Shifts in the Balance of Power
The recent confrontations between Israel and Syria demonstrate a shift in the balance of power in Syria. They reveal that the Assad regime, Iran and Hezbollah have been able to exploit the complexity of the Syrian conflict to develop their military capabilities. They are emboldened by the long-standing Russian military presence in Syria and Moscow’s quest to secure its forces and counter the armed militias, the Free Syrian army factions, ISIS -affiliated extremist groups, Ahrar al-Sham movement and the regional and international actors intervening in Syria. In this regard, the most important aspects of the growing military capabilities of Syria and its allies are as follows:
1- Modernization of armament systems: The Syrian regime has signed contracts with Russia to modernize and develop its arsenal of obsolete Soviet weapons, especially the aging air defense systems. In the wake of the Israeli air strike on Syrian military positions in Deir ez-Zor in September 2007, Assad’s regime realized that its air defense systems were unable to fight off Israeli military jets.
In 2008, Syria signed a four- years contract with Russia to upgrade its weapons and train the air defense forces. The contract was renewed after the Russian military intervention in Syria in 2015. Syria further signed a contract to buy short-term Pantsir-S systems and negotiated another one for S-300 missile systems. However, Russia did not deliver these systems to the Assad regime in 2013 due to the latter’s diminished control over Syrian territory and growing fears that such advanced weapons might be seized by the Free Syrian Army factions.
The modernization plan included the replacement of radars in the air defense systems, upgrading early warning systems, in addition to repairing and modernizing the launch and directing capabilities of S-200 missile systems. In November 2016, the Russian Defense Ministry announced that it had completed the repair of Syrian air defense systems, confirming that they can be used to protect Syrian territories. Moreover, Russian experts assisted the Syrian army in setting up air defense platforms and positions near Aleppo.
2- Redeployment of troops: With the help of Russian troops, Syria was able to set up air defense platforms, radar and airspace monitoring networks, and early warning systems to cover the airspace of Syrian-controlled territories. The Assad regime took advantage of restoring large swaths of Syrian lands, at least 53 percent of the entire Syrian land, to bolster military deployment and rebuild air defense network.
A report by Reuters, quoting a Syrian military commander on February 6, 2018, confirmed the deployment of new air defense systems and anti-aircraft missiles in Aleppo and Idlib to protect north Syria and to confront the threats of Israeli and Turkish air strikes. Over the past two months, Syrian officials warned repeatedly that air defense systems in Damascus can protect Syrian airspace from the incursions of neighboring countries.
This is closely linked to the ability of Assad regime forces to regain control of the Abu al-Duhur strategic air base in Idlib governorate in northwest Syria on January 20, 2018, which was captured by the Free Syrian Army factions in 2015. This demonstrates that the Assad regime is focused on regaining control of air defense bases that have been lost over the past years during the civil war.
3- Unified air defense systems: The mounting attacks against Russian fighter jets by Syrian militias and some neighboring countries, such as Turkey, prompted Moscow to set up “unified integrated air defense system” in Syria. In August 2017, the Deputy Commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces Major-General Sergey Meshcheryakov, announced the creation of this system in Syria through integrating Russian air intelligence and early warning systems with its Syrian counterpart in one system.
Under this system, the Syrian radar and early warning networks are linked to the command of the Russian air defense forces in Syria, reinforcing the capabilities of the Assad regime to monitor Syrian airspace and to confront threats. The new system can monitor air targets within a radius of 400 km, and altitudes up to 35 km, according to Russian statements.
Russian support for Syrian air defense capabilities stems from Moscow’s desire to distribute the burden of defending its military bases and reduce the cost of Russian military deployment in Syria. In addition, Russia facilitated the use of Syrian radar stations and early warning systems to detect threats before hitting Russian troops.
4- Russian reprisals: The Syrian strikes against the Israeli jet fighters are inseparable from Russia’s desire to retaliate against the US and its allies after shooting down a Russian Sukhoi-25 fighter and killing its pilot on February 3, 2018. Russia accused the US of providing Syrian armed factions, including the al-Qaeda-linked Ahrar-al-Sham movement, with shoulder-launched Stinger, US-made missiles.
In January 2018, the Russian air defense forces repelled an attack by squadrons of drones carried out by Syrian factions against Russian military bases in Syria. This incident prompted Moscow to warn international forces, which support armed militias, against providing them with advanced weapons that would upset the military balance in Syria.
Apparently, Moscow attempts to send strong messages to the US and its allies by giving free reign to the Assad forces to strike back and prevent the Israeli jet fighters from penetrating the Syrian airspace. This convey an indirect response to the US military support to the Syrian armed factions and incitement against the Russian troops stationed in Syria, which could trigger military confrontations between the international forces.
5- The involvement of Iran and Hezbollah: The smuggling of Iranian weapons through Syrian territory has not stopped during the past years. The survival of Assad regime, in the face of the armed factions over the past years, is attributed to the continued Iranian military support and the military involvement of Hezbollah in the Syrian front.
In February 2016, Israeli military sources revealed that Hezbollah had developed advanced air defense systems that could threaten and restrict the activities of the Israeli air force in the Lebanese airspace. Hezbollah utilized its field involvement in the civil war in Syria to develop its military capabilities and to evolve from irregular militias into quasi-regular army with equipped advanced air defense system.
Hezbollah has managed to acquire monitoring and surveillance systems and radar stations. It was further able to smuggle Syrian air defense missiles into Lebanon. On the other hand, the Assad regime forces have relied on radars operated by Hezbollah in Lebanon as an advanced monitoring and early warning station outside the Syrian border to detect Israeli air traffic across the border between Syria and Lebanon.
Overall, the Syrian scene have witnessed a shift towards direct confrontations between the conflicting states involved in the crisis. With the involvement of Turkey in Afrin, the Israeli airstrikes, the recent US strikes, and calls of the EU that it might be involved militarily in the crisis, it is expected that Syria will perceive further military tensions between states.
