Al-Qaeda enjoys an unprecedented organizational strength and geographical expansion, due to the growing power of its offshoots, which are taking advantage of ISIS retreat in the region, to expand their own influence. This has encouraged these branches to pursue a new policy that differ significantly from that of the parent organization, as it has become less focused on targeting U.S. interests, the favorable target of al-Qaeda. This shift occurred despite of the intellectual and organizational system of al-Qaeda that considers targeting US interests a top priority. Al-Qaeda has become more interested in cementing its influence where they exist and spread into new areas, which has forced the parent organization to be less centralized. Hence, al-Qaeda has become a mere media facade rather than a true organizational entity, capable of moving, spreading, and staging terrorist attacks.
Relative diversity
Therefore, these offshoots have become the real force of the organization, especially in light of the relative diversity of strength among them, as each one has a distinctive strong point, the sum of which represents the overall strength of al-Qaeda. This does not mean that each branch possesses the characteristic that only distinguishes it, meaning its hallmark. The single branch has more than one characteristic, which lead us to illustrate the most important features. Now, let us first shed light on the importance of al-Qaeda offshoots.
Al-Qaeda offshoots have generally adhered to the organization, first intellectually, by spreading al-Qaeda’s ideology in their spheres of influence, having survived the intellectual attacks on the hands of ISIS. The offshoots managed also to adhere to al-Qaeda organizationally, providing it with long arms that enable it to strike in many areas, after the parent organization became incapable of carrying out terrorist attacks due to the disappearance of most of its elements and leaders, and the inability of those who remained to move,. This deprived the terrorist organization from the ability to recruit new elements. Indeed, these branches managed to bring al-Qaeda to the forefront of the jihadist arena, after ISIS pulled the rug from under its feet for a while.
Independent organizations
That mounting power of al-Qaeda affiliates has made its leaders more powerful and influential organizationally -albeit they still stress the symbolic position of al-Zawahiri-especially since each branch has become more like an independent organization, some of which have become a cross-border organization, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Some branches control large swaths of land, such as Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen in Somalia. Thus, it can be argued that al-Qaeda is a group of powerful branches, with vitality and vigour, without which there will be no al-Qaeda. On the contrary, ISIS has been a powerful organization on the ground, enjoyed considerable operational activity and managed to establish several external branches.
The strength of al-Qaeda affiliates varies, giving each one certain advantage, which all combine to give the organization strength and vigour in multiple regions. The most salient of those differences can be identified in the following points:
1- Broad geographical expansion: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is the largest and the most powerful branch of al-Qaeda, given its wide expansion and spread in the North and West African region a major advantage among all branches. AQIM has been able to spread significantly in recent years, whether through its multiple groups such as the Sahara Emirate and Signers in Blood or al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam, al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad or the Unification and Jihad and Uqba bin Nafi, or through the strong alliances with a number of like-minded armed organizations, such as Ansar al-Dine in northern Mali and the Macina Liberation Movement.
This led to the emergence of a new group called Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen in March 2017, under the leadership of Iyad Ag Ghaly, the leader of Ansar al-Dine. This alliance enabled al-Qaeda to extend its influence over multiple areas of the Sahel and the Sahara. This development reinforced al-Qaeda’s influence in that region, since it forced all members of the new group to pledge allegiance to the parent organization.
2- Hiding behind multiple designations: This is a characteristic of al-Qaeda affiliates in Libya, such as Ansar al-Sharia and the Benghazi Defence Brigades (BDB), endorsed by al-Qaeda publicly on June 2, 2016, when the organization expressed its support for the group. Al-Qaeda endorsed Ansar al-Sharia, in its statement regarding Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen group, in which it praised Muhamed al-Zahawi, the former leader of the organization in Libya. Nevertheless, these groups deny any links to al-Qaeda, which makes al-Qaeda’s presence in Libya lacking organizational characteristics.
Moreover, al-Qaeda’s presence in Libya is highly identified with al-Qaeda groups in the Sahel-Sahara region, which enabled such groups to move to Libya, whether to establish training camps in the bastions of local groups, or to aid and support these groups in order to entrench the invisible presence of the organization in the country. This happened, for example, in Ras Lanuf port confrontations in March 2017, when the organization rushed a number of external groups to support local groups in those battles. These groups are keen to hide their presence in the country, which is consistent with the organization’s attempts to conceal its influence, so it can operate in Libya without attracting much attention and hence avoid future strikes by the international counterterrorism forces.
3- Organizational cohesion: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), based in Yemen, is one of the most powerful branches in terms of organizational cohesion, which enabled it to survive despite all the blows it sustained, whether from the U.S. or the legitimate government of Yemen, with the backing of the Arab coalition forces. AQAP has a formidable number of highly organized cadres, enabling it to quickly replace the leaders who are killed.
An example of this is what happened following the killing of Nasser al Wuhayshi, the former leader of the organization, in June 2015, immediately appointing Qasim al-Raymi, who is no less efficient than the former commander. In addition, tribal alliances and the presence of some foreign fighters contribute to its cohesion, as Qasim al-Raymi hinted in an interview, published in April, where he hailed the role of tribes and “immigrant Mujahidin” (foreign fighters) in countering the risks they face.
4- Mounting extreme violence: The Somali Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen movement is described as one of the fiercest and deadliest branches of al-Qaeda, as evident from its horrific and successive operations that do not differentiate between civilian and military targets. It sometimes kills hundreds in a single terrorist operation, such as the attack by a car bomb in the capital Mogadishu on October 14, 2017, which left 358 killed and 228 injured. Two weeks later, it carried out a twin attack with two car bombs in the center of the capital, leaving at least 17 dead.
The movement’s bloody violence against Somalia has not stopped there, as it spills over to neighboring countries, such as the attack on a shopping center in Nairobi, in 2013, which killed more than 67 people, as well as the attack on Garissa University in Kenya in 2015, which killed 147 people. Moreover, the movement is considered the most utilizer of car bombs in attacks, along with suicide operations, which highlights its extreme ideology compared to other branches of al-Qaeda.
5- Forging flexible alliances: Al-Qaeda branch in Syria (currently Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (Liberation of the Levant Committee) is a vivid model for flexible and “mobile” alliances. The current organization relies on alliances, forged in January 2017, with several armed groups in Syria, although they do not embrace al-Qaeda’s ideology, such as Nur al-Din al-Zanki, Liwa al-Haqq, Jabhat Ansar al-Din, and Jaish al-Sunna, which enabled al-Qaeda to control about 30,000 fighters. Earlier in July 2016, the organization managed also to forge alliance with several groups called Fatah al-Sham Front, which enabled it to control Idlib.
Al-Nusrah Front alliances with other factions are constantly changing, in accordance with the realities and exigencies. In addition to the diverse alliances, it maintains for example, relations with non-ISIS affiliates, such as Ahrar al-Sham, but it quickly turns on them. It also cooperates with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), although the latter includes several different factions, many of whom do not want to cooperate with al-Nusrah Front, which makes al-Qaeda alliances in Syria in constant flux.
Undermining the power
In the light of the above, it can be argued that the strong points that characterize al-Qaeda affiliates, albeit in entirety, constitute points of strength of the terrorist organization, and they could have negative repercussions too. They could lead to the unravelling of the organization into multiple ones, each vying for the vanguard of the scene, amid the decline of the parent organization. This in turn could lead to rivalry among them, since each of them wishes to be a command center of al-Qaeda, especially if Ayman al-Zawahiri died or was killed, a matter that could trigger an internal conflict, thus ravaging al-Qaeda as a unified and cohesive organization.
