Deterrence is a key concept in conflict management, but it is necessary to differentiate between its academic definition and the common perception of it. Academically, deterrence typically does not involve the literal use of force; instead, it aims to prevent conflict through the threat of potential consequences. In contrast, the general public often associates deterrence with defeating an enemy through a successful military strike. This misunderstanding among non-specialists may be partly due to the language used in some Arab military statements. More importantly, the failure of deterrence may lead to the actual use of force to restore it.
This article seeks to present key ideas about the concept of deterrence and the steps to take when a party trying to deter its opponent fails to achieve its goal. In this context, the article offers reflections on the concept of deterrence and its restoration, followed by observations from practical experiences, particularly in the Middle East, specifically Israel and Iran, with references to important international experiences that provide further clarification.
Conditions for Successful Deterrence
Interestingly, the meaning of deterrence in Arabic dictionaries aligns with its academic sense. For example, in the Al-Maany Dictionary, the verb "rad'aa" means to curb or stop someone's momentum, which corresponds well with the theoretical concept of deterrence in international relations studies. The essence of this concept involves a state threatening another state to prevent it from taking a certain action or to stop continuing an action if it has already begun, especially if this action would harm the vital interests of the actor that is the source of the threat (threatener).
This threat implies that the cost of the action the threatened party intends to take, or is already taking, will be much greater than any benefits that could be gained from pursuing or continuing the action. The threatening party aims to protect its interests without having to actually use its military power, as the use of force is far more costly than simply making a threat, even if proving the seriousness of the threat requires costly measures (such as conducting large-scale military maneuvers) because the cost of these measures cannot be compared to the cost of actual military engagement.
For a threat to be successful in deterring an opponent, certain conditions must be met. The first condition, naturally, is that the threat must be backed by real power that enables the threatening party to carry out the threat successfully. For instance, when the United States, during the October 1973 War, threatened countries participating in the oil embargo against pro-Israel nations, it was relying on its status as the world's leading military power.
The second condition is that the threatener must be able to prove its seriousness, such as by sending its naval vessels close to the opponent's territorial waters or even temporarily violating these waters from time to time, as China often does during crises with Taiwan. The key is for the threatener to appear irrational and ready to take any action, regardless of the cost.
The third condition, however, is the opposite of the second: both sides in the deterrence equation must act rationally. The threatener should only make threats if it is capable of carrying them out and is prepared to do so if its opponent does not back down. Meanwhile, the threatened party must recognize the seriousness of the threat and adjust its behavior to avoid the costs of the threat being executed unless responding to the threat means sacrificing a higher value (such as the territorial integrity of the state), which might justify bearing the cost of the threat being carried out. It's important to distinguish here between threats aimed at deterring the opponent and those that are formulated in a way that provokes the opponent and makes it impossible to accept, as the cost of accepting the threats might be more severe than the cost of the threat being carried out.
When both parties act rationally, they might not need to make threats at all, as seen in the nuclear balance of terror established after the Soviet Union developed the capability to retaliate against a sudden U.S. nuclear attack in 1957 when it successfully launched a satellite into space, demonstrating its ability to deliver nuclear warheads to any location in the United States, regardless of accuracy. This led to a stable deterrence balance that remained effective until the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, both sides occasionally needed to issue serious threats in situations where one side believed the existing balance was being disrupted, as seen in October 1962 when President John F. Kennedy discovered Soviet medium-range nuclear missile bases under construction in Cuba. Kennedy declared that he would not allow this and demanded that the Soviets dismantle these bases and remove all offensive weapons, or else he would destroy them, and he quickly imposed a military blockade on Cuba. Here, too, the importance of rationality in managing deterrence situations was evident, as the Soviets complied with Washington's demands after securing a U.S. commitment not to repeat the invasion attempt of Cuba and to withdraw its nuclear missiles from Turkey and Italy in return.
When deterrence fails due to the incomplete fulfillment of the conditions of its success, the use of force becomes inevitable if the threatening party wants to maintain its credibility and status, as Russian President Vladimir Putin did in February 2022 when he launched his military operation in Ukraine. It's important to differentiate here between military actions intended to convince the opponent who wasn't deterred by the threat that they were wrong, and therefore, these actions stop once the opponent is deterred, or they may continue if the opponent is able to withstand (as in the case of the ongoing war in Ukraine) or if the party trying to achieve deterrence changes its goals, especially if it finds that the opponent's performance in battle is below expectations.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no comprehensive study analyzing the success and failure rates of deterrence restoration operations, although general observations from monitoring these operations suggest that restoring deterrence is not usually an easy task.
Firstly, because the very challenge of the threat by the party intended to be deterred may indicate its belief in its ability to withstand.
Secondly, because the behavior this same party is being forced to stop involves a value that it cannot sacrifice.
Thirdly, because the conflict has become polarized within an international framework that provides substantial support to the party that was attempted to be deterred (as is the case with Ukraine after two and a half years of war).
Fourthly, because deterrence restoration situations may involve asymmetric wars between regular armies and non-state armed actors, which complicates the process of resolving the conflict, especially if these actors receive external support, as is happening in the current confrontations in the Middle East, which brings us to the second part of this article.
Israeli Behavior
The above analysis is significant for understanding the developments around us, particularly in the present, given the impact of these developments on the stability and security of Arab countries. Therefore, the following analysis focuses on practical experiences and the lessons learned from them, specifically the practices of important international actors in the region. This article will focus on Israel and Iran due to their roles in the current confrontation in Palestine and the Middle East more broadly.
Regarding Israel, it should be clarified that the Zionist movement and the Jewish state it created on Palestinian land have never fully grasped the concept of deterrence. Instead, this movement adopted a political project to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, which it successfully achieved in 1948 on part of Palestinian land through the UN General Assembly's 1947 partition resolution, leading to confrontations with the Palestinian people and the Arab states supporting their rights.
Therefore, concepts such as expansion and conflict are more appropriate to describe Israeli behavior, at least in the early decades of the Jewish state's existence, because the strategic vision from the outset considered all of Palestine as territory for the Jewish state, necessitating the use of force rather than deterrence against opponents. This is why Israel colluded with Britain and France behind the back of the United States in 1956 to attack Egypt in an attempt to stifle its liberation experience, which it saw as an existential threat. Israel also lured Egypt and Syria into the 1967 war, which enabled it to seize all of Palestine. At this point, Israel could have started replacing the concept of expansion with deterrence, but it was clear that the war's outcomes did not deter Egypt, which began fighting against Israel the following month, leading to a genuine War of Attrition that eventually culminated in the joint Egyptian-Syrian military action in October 1973, with significant contributions from other major oil-exporting Arab countries, which halted oil exports to Israel's allies, especially the United States.
On the other hand, Israel's occupation of the remaining parts of Palestine led to the rise of the Palestinian resistance, for which deterrence is not an appropriate response but rather the necessity of eliminating it. The Egyptian-Israeli peace in 1979 opened the door for Tel Aviv to adopt a deterrence approach in dealing with countries and forces still in conflict with it, especially as the approval of the Twelfth Arab Summit, held in 1982 in Fez, Morocco, of the Saudi peace initiative that Arab showed that coexistence with Israel was possible. However, two important developments thwarted this possibility: the Iranian Revolution, which adopted a hostile stance towards Israel, and the rise of the Palestinian resistance, which forced Israel to invade Lebanon in 1982, highlighting the limits of Israeli deterrence. Israel invaded Lebanon and even occupied its capital, Beirut, but failed to impose a peace agreement, as the Lebanese parliament, under popular pressure, rejected the deal after its signing in 1983.
Israel was forced to withdraw from Lebanon except for the southern border strip it had occupied since 1978, and it was later forced to withdraw from that strip in 2000. Israel's last chance to deter Lebanon came with Hezbollah's 2006 operation to capture Israeli soldiers for exchange with Lebanese and Arab prisoners. In response to this operation, it was clear that Israel aspired to eliminate Lebanese elements with usual American support, but things did not go as Israel wished. The war ended with a balanced settlement under UN Security Council Resolution 1701.
The above indicates that Israel did not pursue a policy of deterrence against its opponents until after the 1967 war, as its goal was the effective use of force until it gained complete control over all of Palestine during that war. Afterward, its policy of deterrence failed against Egypt and Syria, leading to the War of Attrition and the October War of 1973. Israel's deterrence policy also failed to stop Palestinian and Lebanese elements, forcing it to withdraw from Lebanon after its full invasion in 1982. Israel failed to impose a peace agreement on Lebanon and was also compelled to withdraw from the southern Lebanese border strip in 2000 and then from the Gaza Strip in 2005, including the nearby settlements. Israel also failed to curb the escalating armed resistance in Gaza despite its repeated military operations in the strip from December 2008 until May 2023.
Thus, Israel's inability to deter Palestinian factions after their operation on October 7, 2023, up until today, is not new. What is new this time, however, is that Israel faces threats from other parties supporting the Palestinians in Gaza, regardless of their relative weight. However, it is clear that Israel's ability to restore deterrence has come under significant doubt, if not already eroded, for the reasons mentioned at the end of the first part of this article. Even if Israel wins the current battle, it would be a mere repeat of its experiences with "the resistance," especially since the beginning of this century.
Iranian Policy
There is an important difference between Iran and Israel, which has been reflected in the mechanisms they used to enhance their influence in the region. There is a sectarian commonality between the majority of Iran's population and sectors of the population in some Arab countries. Shah-era Iran relied on its relationship with the United States to achieve their shared goals. However, when the 1979 revolution erupted, Iran developed its own regional political project based on the idea of "exporting the revolution." Iran implemented this project by relying on sectors loyal to it—or rather by winning the loyalty of the Shia in some Arab countries—and by building strong relationships with some Arab regimes. Thus, Iran was able to establish bases for its influence in several Arab countries, exploiting the Israeli threat to Lebanon, the Arab isolation of the Syrian regime, the disruption caused by the 2003 American invasion of Iraq to the state and society there, instability in Yemen, and the Palestinian factions' need for external support. This explains the confrontations between Israel and these factions since October 7 last year, with support from Tehran-aligned groups in four Arab countries.
In all these developments, Iran's behavior was based on the concept of penetration rather than deterrence. However, Iran's increasing involvement in the conflict with Israel forced it to directly employ force against Israel, as seen in its missile and drone attack on Israel on April 13, 2024, in response to an Israeli airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria, which killed 16 people, including a senior Iranian commander of the Quds Force earlier that month. Although many mocked this Iranian response, pointing out that its timing was known and that it did not hit significant targets or inflict even symbolic losses on Israel, others saw this attack as establishing a precedent by which Iran granted itself the right to directly attack Israel—a move that could have a deterrent function.
An Iranian response to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, head of the Hamas political bureau, in Tehran in late July, is anticipated. The nature of this response, its effectiveness, and its subsequent repercussions will have clear effects on the rules of deterrence games in the region, in which Iran does not seem to be currently excelling due to Israel's intelligence superiority and the comprehensive Western, especially American, support for Israel. However, this does not negate the fact that Tehran has other tools to build and increase its influence.
