On July 10, Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi declared victory over ISIS in Mosul. The Iraqi state now confronts two types of crises that threaten its stability. The first one is adventitious and temporary and it is related to reconstruction, the future of the displaced and ISIS remnants. The main challenge here lies in the weakness of the state’s financial and economic capabilities due to exploiting the economy in the past three years to fight ISIS and due to rampant corruption in some institutions. The second, however, is a chronic structural crisis and that was the main reason terrorism emerged in cities in different forms, of which the most recent was ISIS.
Adventitious Crises
These crises are a direct result of ISIS’ expansion in Iraq, and they are mainly linked to the deterioration of the humanitarian situation. The most important ones are:
1. Reconstruction: During the war on ISIS in Iraqi cities, the infrastructure was almost completely destroyed in the zones that were liberated from the organization. The Iraqi premier estimates the reconstruction cost of the infrastructure that was destroyed in Mosul due to military operations at $100 billion. This reconstruction cost is a major challenge to the state considering the increasing budget deficit.
2. Future of the displaced: The Iraqi government will confront difficulties in returning the displaced to the liberated cities especially that it has not devised a plan until now. According to estimates issued by the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration on July 6, at least 920,000 people were displaced from Mosul as a result of the battles against the terrorist organization.
3. ISIS remnants: It’s normal if the organization still has some present cells considering the large area which the group occupied since June 2014 and which was about one third of the country’s area. ISIS is present in some small pockets in the governorates of Kirkuk and Anbar. The organization will use these remnants to retaliate against Iraqi forces. This will confuse the security situation for some time but security forces are expected to eventually eliminate them.
Structural Crises
The Iraqi state witnessed chronic crises that escalated since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and since the Iraqi constitution was approved in 2005. These crises are represented in the following:
1. Sectarian codification: The Iraqi regime, ever since it was restructured in 2003, has suffered from structural defects which solidified sectarianism in almost all state institutions and even contributed to sectarian codification in most cases. Approving the law to integrate the Popular Mobilization militias in the Iraqi army in November 2016 is one of the most recent examples.
This is dangerous because the Iraqi military institution has become a major party in the Sunni-Shiite dispute and is governed by sectarian considerations. This may destroy any future attempts to turn this national institution into an institution that includes all Iraqis. Therefore, having Popular Mobilization forces leave the areas which they seized control of during the war on ISIS will be a challenge that the Iraqi government must deal with.
2. The Kurdish challenge: This clearly appears in the Kurds’ insistence on the inevitability of separating from Baghdad after the Kurdistan region succeeded in imposing a de facto authority on the Iraqi government and became capable of defying it by showing how serious it is about holding the independence referendum in September. A dispute is expected as result between Baghdad and Erbil. This will increase the Kurds’ insistence to include the disputed lands with Kurdistan and include these areas in the referendum. The Kurds will thus not settle with the traditional borders of the Kurdistan region. Baghdad may reject this and a military clash may ensue especially that the Kurds insist – as they always put it – to draw borders with blood.
3. Regional interference: Iraq has been suffering from regional conflicts over its people’s capabilities ever since the American occupation. It’s also suffered due to the weak state institutions that were marred by vacuum. Regional competition is thus expected to increase within the state during the next phase especially between Iran and Turkey considering their different interests and agendas in the Middle East in general and Baghdad in particular. It’s clear that Mosul’s political and administrative future will not be finalized away from regional interferences especially that the powers which participated in the battle – whether directly or indirectly and particularly Tehran and Ankara – realize that the city’s future will harm the future of the Iraqi state itself and is thus the key to guarantee any future influence.
4. Depending on foreign parties: Iraqi state institutions have since 2003 believed in depending on foreign support to resolve domestic crises. For example. Baghdad requested American support to confront ISIS’ military rise. The US thus became militarily present in the country via military bases that were set in the areas of fighting against ISIS. This happened despite America’s withdrawal from Iraq in 2010. America’s wide presence in Iraq will be a problem that Baghdad’s government must deal with and with its expected consequences in the next phase especially after some Shiite parties – mainly the Sadrist movement – voiced rejection of this presence after ISIS was eliminated from Iraqi cities.
5. Economic defects: This is due to Iraq’s rentier economy which depends on one source of income, which is the oil sector that represents around 95 percent of the state’s general budget. Iraq is also OPEC's second-largest oil producer so when oil prices decrease, its economy declines.
The Iraqi economic structure thus suffers from some defects because of the lack of income resources and underdeveloped growth in non-oil productions, primarily in the agriculture, manufacturing and tourism industries. This is in addition to the increased corruption and squandering of resources as in 2016, Iraq was ranked as the 11th most corrupt country by Transparency International.
Means of Fortification
During the next phase, the Iraqi government must focus on fortifying the country and protecting it from the emergence of ISIS alternatives as it must resolve the structural crises which the political regime has suffered from for years by doing the following:
1. Addressing social incubators: Following the Iraqi government’s success, it is its responsibility to address the environment where terrorism repeatedly emerges and it can do so via taking some measures such as:
A. Push Sunni communities to work with security forces to achieve social peace. This will make residents in these areas feel that they are part of the solution and partners in determining their future. Terrorism will thus lose its incubators which contributed to its rise in several forms in the past.
B. Economically developing Sunni societies – especially Anbar which area constitutes one third of Iraq’s – by setting the same number of plans as those devised for other Iraqi governorates. Iraqi Sunni governorates are poor in economic resources especially in the oil sector. It’s worth noting that the seeds of extremism and terrorism usually find a fertile soil in poor societies to spread their ideas.
2. Controlling Iraqi-Syrian borders: Solidifying Iraqi military achievements against ISIS will be linked to what can be achieved in terms of besieging the group’s influence and bases in Syria and along the land borders between the two countries. This is supported by the following:
A. ISIS’ defeat in Iraq will represent a chance for al-Qaeda organization and its affiliates in Syria in particular to propose themselves as an umbrella for ISIS remnants. It’s thus possible for the organization to intensify its secret work in Iraq in the future and this may alter the jihadist map in the region during the next phase.
B. ISIS remnants are expected to exploit the Sunni environment which supports them in order to carry out some activities in the future – especially that the social incubator of the organization in Iraq is the strongest while in Syria it’s mainly limited to northeastern areas.
3. Restructuring the Iraqi army: Although it overcame the defeat it suffered in Mosul in June 2014 and it succeeded in improving its image during the recent battles against ISIS, the Iraqi army still suffers from these weaknesses which are:
A. Some parties attempt to add a sectarian characteristic to the army. The nature of the Popular Mobilization will alter the army’s doctrine with time and upset its balance especially that the Popular Mobilization includes jihadist ideological factions that have organizational and administrative notions which differ than the military institutions’. This is all in addition to the nature of relations between the Popular Mobilization factions and their hierarchy and their different loyalties which the military institution cannot comprehend.
B. The main role in the battles against ISIS was that of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service which according to American estimates lost 40% of its members during the battles it fought. This means that major army branches and departments are still unqualified to perform a role similar to that of the Counter-Terrorism Service.
4. Limiting regional interferences: Following its military victory over ISIS, the Iraqi government will not find a better chance to break free from the pressures resulting from regional interferences in Iraqi domestic affairs. The Iraqi prime minister can adopt some measures to confront these interferences. The most important ones are:
A. Disbanding the Popular Mobilization militias and disarming them since they are Iran’s main military wing in Iraq and their loyalty to the Iraqi state cannot be guaranteed. Hadi Al-Amiri, a Popular Mobilization leader and the leader of the Badr militias, said in August 2016 that the “Popular Mobilization forces have become stronger than the Iraqi army.” If the Iraqi government decides to disband the Popular Mobilization forces, it will be logical, especially considering that these forces’ goal ended after eliminating ISIS in the country.
B. Finding a solution to what is known as the “national mobilization” forces by negotiating with those in charge of it and either disbanding them or integrating them within Mosul’s security apparatuses. This prevents Turkey from exploiting and employing these forces to confront the Iraqi state like what happened before. Within this context, it’s worth noting that these forces recall the Sahwat which were targeted by former premier Nouri al-Maliki as he cut off their salaries and restrained their activity in the past.
Mysterious Future
Although different Iraqi forces (the army, the Popular Mobilization, the Peshmerga and tribal units) united to confront the common threat represented in ISIS in Mosul, their conflicting agendas emerged once the enemy was defeated. This warns of internal conflicts during the next phase which means that the political and administrative future of the cities liberated from ISIS will be mysterious since there’s nothing that guarantees the stability of these cities.
It’s important that the Iraqi government resolves the adventitious crises – particularly the humanitarian ones – which ISIS is behind but this will only guarantee Iraq’s stability over the short and medium terms. Focusing on resolving structural crises will however guarantee the country’s stability on the long term and it will resolve the crisis of mistrust among Iraqi components.
Finally, we can say that although the Iraqi state succeeded in eliminating ISIS, it still confronts complicated crises especially that there’s still fertile ground to reproduce new generations of terrorism. Although ISIS’ organizational structure has been destroyed, its terrorist ideas are still present and they can develop with time to emerge under new names and in new military forms. Former terrorism experiences in Iraq have shown this.
