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Fano Militia

Analyzing Why Ethiopia Launched a New Military Operation in the Amhara Region

29 أكتوبر، 2024


In October 2024, the Ethiopian military announced the launch of a major military operation against the Fano militia in the Amhara region. Addis Ababa accused the rebel group of failure to respond to the federal government's peace initiative. The development signals the possibility of worsening the already fragile security situation in the region, with potential repercussions on the broader political and security landscape in Ethiopia, as well as the troubled regional dynamics in the Horn of Africa.

Escalating Tensions

In recent days, the Amhara region has witnessed a sharp escalation in armed clashes between the Ethiopian army and the Fano militia. These developments can be outlined as follows:

1. Major military offensive against the Fano militia:

In early October 2024, Ethiopian military spokesperson Colonel Getnet Adane announced that the Ethiopian National Defense Forces had coordinated with security forces in the Amhara region to launch a joint military operation against the rebel Fano militia. The army accuses the group of rejecting the peace initiative presented by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's government in recent months. The spokesperson hinted that the government forces had decided to use force to assert full control over the region.

This military's announcement aligns with local and international media reports revealing the sharp escalation by Addis Ababa's federal government against various elements supporting the rebel group. Human rights group Amnesty International revealed that the Ethiopian military carried out mass arrests in the Amhara region at the end of September, and several government officials suspected of collusion with Fano were detained.

Some Western reports indicated that the Ethiopian army had deployed large numbers of troops to the Amhara region in the past two weeks, seeking a decisive military victory against Fano. Many officials suspected of collaborating with the Fano group have also been arrested. Since September 17, clashes between the militia and federal forces have been ongoing in the town of Debark, alongside violent confrontations in central Gondar and northern Amhara, which have left many dead on both sides. These incidents have rekindled memories of earlier confrontations between the two sides in recent months when the Fano militia had briefly seized control of key towns and cities in the Amhara region before the government forces regained control.

On the other hand, on October 8, 2024, the Fano militia announced that its forces had killed a senior Ethiopian army officer and around 270 Ethiopian soldiers during two days of fierce battles in Gojjam. The Amhara militia claimed full control over this area and reported the destruction of an Ethiopian National Defense Forces camp. Meanwhile, other areas in the Amhara region, such as Gondar, Bure, Jijiga, and the town of Telele in the Agew Awi Zone, have also witnessed a sharp escalation in armed clashes.

2. Dismantling the Fano:

In their joint statement, the Amhara regional government and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces pledged to continue what they described as "law enforcement operations" in the region through the joint operation launched at the end of September. The Amhara region has been embroiled in conflict between the Fano militia and the Ethiopian government for over 14 months.

In this context, Mengesha Fentaw, head of the Amhara Communication Bureau, stated that the recent military operations launched by Addis Ababa and Amhara aim to dismantle Fano's infrastructure, targeting logistical and intelligence networks within governmental structures and the private sector, and encircling militia leaders while exposing lower-level actors involved in criminal activities.

3. Renewed tensions between former allies:

The current clashes in the Amhara region are linked to the battles that erupted in mid-2023 between the federal forces and the Amhara Fano militia. This militia had previously supported the Ethiopian army during its war against the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in 2020. However, the peace agreement signed by the Ethiopian government with the TPLF in November 2022 caused a rift in relations between Addis Ababa, the Fano militia, and many within the Amhara ethnic group. The agreement was seen as a betrayal by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's government, which had previously promised to grant the Amhara some territories from the Tigray region.

Tensions between the two sides further escalated following the Ethiopian government's decision to disarm regional paramilitary forces across the various Ethiopian regions. The armed Fano group strongly opposed this decision, taking up arms against the Ethiopian government in April 2023. By August of the same year, Addis Ababa had to declare a state of emergency in the Amhara region, although it was lifted in June.

Despite the reduction in armed clashes between the government forces and the Fano militia in recent months, amidst talk of a peace initiative, Addis Ababa had aimed to reach an agreement with the group to disarm it without having to engage in violent confrontations. However, this initiative apparently failed to bring about a peace agreement between the two sides, leading to renewed armed confrontations at the end of September.

Turbulent Context

The escalating tensions in the Amhara region reflect the complex internal contexts within Ethiopia and represent one of the repercussions of the ongoing regional changes in the troubled Horn of Africa. This can be outlined as follows:

1. Deep-rooted ethnic conflicts:

The current crisis in the Amhara region exemplifies one of the most prominent features of Ethiopia's internal landscape, which is primarily characterized by ethnic divisions and traditional conflicts among the country's over 80 ethnic groups. The Oromo make up approximately 34.4% of the total population, while the Amhara represent around 27%, and the Tigray constitute about 6%. 

There exists a historical animosity between the Tigray and Amhara ethnic groups. The Amhara believe they have rights to certain territories administratively belonging to the Tigray region, asserting that the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) has dominated the political scene since the early 1990s until 2018, resulting in the appropriation of these lands. After the Amhara failed to pressure Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to grant them these territories and enshrine this in the peace agreement with Tigray at the end of 2022, the longstanding ethnic conflict between Tigray and Amhara was further inflamed.

2. Fano's Threat to Abiy Ahmed's "centralization" aspirations:

The Fano militia views itself as a special force defending the rights and interests of the Amhara region. Its influence grew significantly during its involvement in the Tigray war, but this increasing power raised concerns for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who aims to establish a centralized governing system in Ethiopia as a substitute for the current federal system that is based on ethnic divisions, granting extensive powers to regional federal governments. This concern likely explains Abiy Ahmed's April 2023 decision to dismantle armed militias in various Ethiopian regions and integrate them into the army and police forces, a move perceived by Fano as primarily targeting them. Consequently, Fano organized extensive protests against the federal government in several Amhara cities, before escalating their military actions against government forces.

3. Deteriorating security conditions in Amhara:

The rise in clashes between the Fano militia and government forces coincided with warnings from local and regional reports about the deteriorating security situation in the Amhara region, which is the second-largest in Ethiopia after Oromia. The region is home to numerous militias and armed groups, as well as lawless entities benefiting from its strategic location, with borders adjoining Sudan and Eritrea and connections to four neighboring Ethiopian regions, facilitating illegal trade and arms smuggling. Some reports indicate that armed groups in the Amhara region have joined Fano to support them against the Ethiopian government forces, complicating the situation further.

4. Allegations of external support for Fano:

Fano's presence in the Metemma town of northwest Amhara, on the border with Sudan, has led to an uptick in heavy artillery attacks against government camps close to the town. This shift in combat strategy—moving from guerrilla tactics to intensified assaults near the Sudanese border—has been linked to claims of external support for Fano from certain regional actors. This could correspond to recent threats from Somali leaders to support rebel groups in Ethiopia as a reaction to increasing tensions between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa due to a memorandum of understanding signed by the latter with the Republic of Somaliland in January 2024. However, there is currently no solid evidence confirming this claim.

Nonetheless, this does not negate the possibility that Fano may seek to exploit the ongoing regional tensions in the Horn of Africa, as well as Ethiopia's current disputes with several countries, particularly Somalia, Eritrea, and, to a lesser extent, Djibouti, to exert pressure on Abiy Ahmed's government. Fano might also aim to leverage these tensions to establish external connections with regional powers that could support them against Addis Ababa. This could explain why Fano has focused its attacks on the border areas between Ethiopia and Sudan, striving for an external outlet to achieve these goals.

Potential Impacts

The current escalation between the Amhara Fano militia and the government forces in Addis Ababa has several internal and regional repercussions that may arise in the near future, which can be outlined as follows:

1. The domino effect:

Numerous Western reports have warned of the possibility that the current tensions in the Amhara region could spread to other regions in Ethiopia, especially given the existing tensions in some areas, such as the ongoing political divisions within the Tigray political elite regarding the peace agreement with Addis Ababa and the potential return of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) to the Ethiopian political scene. Additionally, there are increasing tensions in the Afar and Oromia regions and the Somali region of Ethiopia. Therefore, the escalation of clashes between government forces and Fano militants in the Amhara region could lead to a spread of tensions to other Ethiopian regions and a restructuring of existing alliances, particularly in light of the strained relations between the federal government in Addis Ababa and some ethnic nationalists from various Ethiopian ethnic groups.

Furthermore, some Western reports have indicated the possibility that the Fano militia may seek to form an alliance with the Oromo Liberation Army. This could pose a significant threat to the federal government in Addis Ababa, especially in light of the deteriorating economic conditions in Ethiopia caused by the Tigray War, which has led to a sharp increase in inflation levels in the country. Additionally, this situation has compelled the United States to exclude Ethiopia from the African Growth and Opportunity Act, resulting in severe negative consequences for Ethiopian exports.

2. Potential impacts on the already troubled Sudanese scene:

The Amhara region of Ethiopia hosts a large number of Sudanese people who were displaced by the ongoing war in their country. Since the war in Sudan broke out in April 2023, the Metemma crossing has been the only route for Sudanese to enter Ethiopia. Therefore, the escalation of armed clashes in the Amhara region between the Fano militia and the Ethiopian government forces could exacerbate the internal situation in the region, including the shelters for Sudanese refugees. Furthermore, the impact of these clashes may extend into Sudan itself, affecting the continued passage of Sudanese into Ethiopia or leading to reverse displacement back to Sudan, which could worsen the security situation along the Ethiopian-Sudanese border.

3. Restructuring Addis Ababa's regional position:

The current escalation in the Amhara region coincides with rising tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia. The intensifying clashes between Ethiopian forces and the Fano militia could shift Addis Ababa's focus away from the Somali front, making it challenging to manage both issues simultaneously. This situation may compel Ethiopia to soften its stance toward Mogadishu, potentially offering concessions as part of Turkey's mediation efforts between Somalia and Ethiopia. Alternatively, Addis Ababa might rely on the passage of time by prolonging negotiations until a military or political resolution regarding the Fano militia is achieved.

Moreover, some assessments do not rule out the possibility that Addis Ababa might accept Djibouti's offer, which was presented to Ethiopia at the end of August. This proposal involves granting landlocked Ethiopia the authority to manage the Port of Djibouti in the north as part of Djibouti's efforts to ease tensions in the Horn of Africa. This move is motivated by Addis Ababa's aspirations for access to a maritime outlet on the Red Sea. If the Ethiopian government accepts this offer, it could alleviate the current disputes with Somalia, allowing Ethiopia to focus more on its conflict with the Fano militia.

4. Pushing towards a military resolution:

The possibility remains strong that the Ethiopian government may attempt to achieve a military resolution against the Fano militia, given the strategic importance of the Amhara region for Addis Ababa. This could lead to an intensification of armed confrontations in the near future. However, achieving a military resolution does not seem to be an easy task for Ethiopian forces, considering the various tactics employed by the Fano militia, as well as the ethnic support that the militia may receive from certain armed groups in the Amhara region, not to mention the potential for external assistance.

Nonetheless, negotiation remains one of the proposed alternatives for resolving this conflict. The Ethiopian government might opt to exert military pressure on the militia to compel them to enter a peace agreement similar to the one established with the Tigray People's Liberation Front.

In conclusion, the internal Ethiopian landscape is at a pivotal point for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's government. The military operation launched by Addis Ababa against the Fano militia could reinforce the central government's dominance in the country's internal affairs. However, it may also solidify polarization and undermine Abiy Ahmed's authority if government forces fail to achieve a decisive military resolution or at least diminish Fano's influence. Furthermore, this conflict is expected to have broader regional repercussions, either through the involvement of regional actors in the Horn of Africa in this confrontation or by influencing Addis Ababa's regional maneuvers.