On October 21, 2024, the French newspaper Le Monde reported that warnings from Algeria prompted Russia to halt a joint military operation between its Wagner group and the Malian armed forces in the far northern region of Tinzaouaten. Despite ten days of preparations, this operation, aimed at recapturing territory from Tuareg rebels, was suspended due to potential risks near Algeria's borders. Concurrently, the pan-African magazine Jeune Afrique published a series of reports detailing growing distrust and tensions between the Malian government and Wagner, suggesting that Russian forces might soon depart from Mali. These speculations emerged following the operation's cancellation, as neither Mali's army nor Wagner could retaliate after suffering heavy losses to the rebels, particularly the Permanent Strategic Framework for the Defense of Azawad People and the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Support Group for Islam and Muslims or JNIM), in July.
Given these circumstances, a reassessment of Mali and Wagner's military strategy is imperative. The critical questions that arise are: To what extent is a scenario of severance between Mali and Wagner possible? And how might such a development influence Mali's relations with Russia? Whether stemming from Mali's frustration with Moscow's prioritization of Algeria's interests or a potential Russian decision to redirect Wagner's forces to Ukraine, these questions necessitate a closer examination of the dynamics between Mali, Wagner, and Russia. Furthermore, they prompt consideration of the options Mali could pursue to meet its security and sovereignty needs independently.
Mali and Wagner: Contempt as the Price of Dependence
On October 20, Jeune Afrique reported significant dissatisfaction within Wagner ranks over the competence of Malian officers and soldiers, with some Wagner affiliates even labeling Malian soldiers as "amateurs" on social media. Such blatant disdain is particularly difficult for Mali's transitional authorities to tolerate, given their consistent emphasis on nationalism and exaltation of national symbols in their rhetoric of liberation.
This is not the first instance where Mali's authorities have faced challenges to national sovereignty from the Russian group. In November 2023, shortly after gaining control of the city of Kidal in northern Mali, Wagner released a video showcasing its flag raised over the city's fortress, clearly highlighting its role in expelling the rebels. This action was a direct response to Mali's leader, Assimi Goïta, who, in his celebratory speech, had praised the Malian army's heroism while conspicuously omitting Wagner's decisive contribution to this victory—an achievement that had eluded France and Western forces since March 2012.
The circumstances surrounding Wagner's takeover of the largest gold mine in Intahaka, located in Mali's Gao region, in February 2024, exemplify the challenges facing the transitional authorities. Wagner seized the mine after issuing an ultimatum to the Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies, led by a Tuareg general loyal to Bamako, demanding they vacate the site within 24 hours. This aggressive move reflects Wagner's relentless drive to increase its financial revenues, demonstrating little regard for the sentiments of local leadership in the Azawad region.
The humiliation of their general and the exploitation of their resources by foreign forces are unlikely to be tolerated by these local leaders. Consequently, Wagner's actions are likely to escalate toward direct confrontation with Malian authorities, fueled by fundamental differences in how each side perceives the other. Wagner views Malians as dependent on the security its forces provide, effectively considering them indebted for their very survival. In contrast, Mali regards Wagner as a mercenary entity contracted to deliver security services in exchange for material benefits.
Despite these conflicting perspectives, it is important to note that Wagner remains bound by its partnership agreements with Russia, which are ultimately governed by mutual interests between the two parties.
Mali and Russia: An Alliance, Not Subordination
Russia has invested diplomatically and militarily in Mali to establish its influence in the Sahel region, aiming to fill the vacuum left by declining Western presence since the 2020 military coup. By positioning itself as a strong alternative, Russia has effectively addressed Mali's liberation demands, reinforcing the independence of its national decision-making—a stance that resonates with Malian public opinion, which had long perceived French dominance. This strategic alignment was further emphasized in late February 2024, when Mali's Foreign Minister, Abdoulaye Diop, met with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, in Moscow. During this meeting, Diop underscored Mali's intention to strengthen military cooperation with other partners, including China and Turkey, solidifying the country's shift towards diverse international alliances.
This inclination toward diversifying international partnerships, officially expressed during the triumphant reclaiming of Kidal—a victory made possible by Russian support—reflects two key dynamics.
Firstly, it highlights Moscow's flexibility, at least outwardly, in accepting the role of a non-dominant principal ally, which affords Russia certain advantages in economic deals. Secondly, it underscores the Malian transitional authorities' belief that replacing France with Russia as a dominant player in the country's foreign relations would undermine their legitimacy as nationalists seeking to entrench independence.
This belief is further reinforced by their recognition of Russia's limited power, which faces constant scrutiny from Western actors and is deeply entangled in a protracted war of attrition in Ukraine. Consequently, exclusive reliance on Russia carries geopolitical risks, exacerbated by Russia's increasing need for human and financial resources. This strain impacts Moscow's ability to expand abroad, as evidenced by its decision to withdraw personnel from the "Bear Brigade" in Burkina Faso in late August 2024 to support battles in Kursk, and its use of North Korean soldiers and equipment to bolster its forces.
Moreover, Russia's growing financial burden in Mali has led to significant adjustments. These include the amendment of Mali's Mining Law in August 2023 to secure necessary funding by exploiting gold mines. According to the Blood Gold Report published in December 2023, these mines generate approximately $10 million per month to support the Russian presence in Mali.
Mali’s Options: Diversifying Alternatives
Mali's awareness of Russia's limited capabilities, coupled with its skepticism about Wagner's future presence and recognition of escalating financial demands, has prompted the country to bolster its strategy. In response, Mali has begun exploring all available alternatives to Russian involvement, starting with its Sahel neighbors, Burkina Faso and Niger.
A significant milestone was reached in September 2023 with the announcement of the Alliance of Sahel States. This alliance saw Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger pledge mutual defense against internal rebellion and external aggression, while also committing to combat terrorism and organized crime within their shared space. Concurrently, experts from the three nations convened to expedite economic and financial integration, proposing the establishment of an economic and monetary union.
The collaboration deepened in December 2023 when the foreign ministers of the three countries recommended forming a confederal union. Building on this momentum, their military leaders announced plans in March 2024 to establish a joint force aimed at combating jihadists and addressing security challenges in their respective territories.
Mali's strategic diversification extends beyond regional partnerships. In late September, the country's minister of economy revealed ambitious aspirations to join the BRICS group. Furthermore, Mali has been actively expanding its security alliances, which now include China, Turkey, and Iran, as detailed below:
1. China:
Mali has strengthened its security relations with China, a global power that has demonstrated solidarity in the face of Western pressure. In January 2023, China urged the international community to support Mali's counter-terrorism efforts through funding, equipment, intelligence, and logistics, while emphasizing respect for Mali's right to engage in security cooperation. Furthermore, China facilitated payment options for Mali's arms purchases, accommodating the ECOWAS-imposed sanctions. During the September 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit, Mali reached an agreement with the Chinese defense company China North Industries Group Corporation Limited (Norinco Group) for the provision of equipment, training, and technology in key military sectors. This relationship is set to expand further following the September 2024 elevation of bilateral relations to a "strategic partnership" by the leaders of both countries. Assimi Goïta expressed optimism about benefiting from China's expertise in security and other fields, while commending Beijing's contributions to regional and global peace and development.
2. Turkey:
Malian diplomacy has increasingly focused on Turkey, which has pledged support for Mali's fight against insurgent groups. Turkey's defense industry, particularly its Bayraktar TB2 drones, has proven highly effective. In March 2023, three of these drones were supplied to the Malian army, followed by the delivery of 20 more at a special ceremony presided over by Goïta earlier this year. Building on this military cooperation, consultative meetings between Malian and Turkish officials took place in October 2024, culminating in a visit to Mali by a Turkish parliamentary delegation. The delegation, received by the transitional president, engaged in discussions with Malian officials to explore ways of strengthening bilateral cooperation across various fields, including security. In a significant development, recent reports indicate that Mali has sought the services of SADAT International Defense Consultancy Inc., a private Turkish military company with close ties to the Turkish government, to address its security challenges. This collaboration has reportedly resulted in the training of a substantial number of Malian soldiers, who have been assigned to protect the transitional president.
3. Iran:
For Mali, Iran, which perceives the West as a "hegemonic power," is a potential ally that helps fill the void left by the withdrawal of Western troops. This partnership not only offers Iran access to the Sahel but also overcomes the setbacks of former Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif's unsuccessful visit to Bamako under the previous regime in 2016. In this context, Tehran has promoted its capability to assist Mali in its fight against insurgents, with arms and drones in particular serving as the cornerstone of their partnership.
Security issues have indeed been a recurring theme in their discussions, solidifying this alignment. This was evident during the late Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian's visit to Mali in August 2022 and further reiterated during the meeting between the two countries' defense ministers in Tehran in late May 2023. Moreover, in October 2023, following a meeting between Mali's defense minister and the Iranian ambassador to Bamako, the Malian army emphasized the two nations' commitment to strengthening cooperation in defense and security.
Rift with Wagner Vs. Moscow’s Flexibility
Mali is approaching the possibility of a rift with Wagner as a realistic scenario, particularly given the group's rebellion against its parent state, Russia, under its former leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in June 2023. This memory remains fresh despite the formal integration of Wagner into the Russian state under the name Africa Corps, also called Russian Expeditionary Corps (REK). In response to these changing dynamics, Mali has diversified its partnerships, making security a cornerstone of its strategy. However, these alliances, despite their importance, cannot fully address Mali's growing security needs in the event of a sudden withdrawal by Wagner. This limitation stems from factors such as the weakness of its partners' defense industries, financial difficulties, and the repercussions of their unequal competition with Western powers.
Furthermore, the rising threats from terrorist and separatist groups have intensified, with increasing indications of their collaboration and the escalation of their attacks. Adding to this complexity, there is speculation about foreign involvement, including Ukraine, in exacerbating Mali's security challenges. Consequently, in the event of a break with Wagner, it is in Mali's interest to retain an active but non-dominant role for Russia in its security framework.
Moscow's flexibility in its relationship with Bamako makes this possible, potentially shifting the partnership towards enhanced intelligence cooperation, training, arms supplies, or assisting in forming militias instead of direct combat, which could become costly for Russian troops in terms of human losses. Russia might adopt an even more flexible stance to ensure Mali does not return to the Western fold. This concern is not unfounded, as evidenced by recent developments: Spain has been in talks with Mali about training its soldiers, as reported by El País on October 25, 2024; the United States' ambassador to the UN met with Mali's foreign minister on September 30, 2024; and Morocco proposed its Atlantic Initiative in November 2023, all of which could potentially draw Mali back into the Western sphere of influence.
