Gulf-Asian ties are no longer limited to labor exports or assistance provided by Gulf governments to some Asian countries during crises. These traits have traditionally defined these relationships in various academic communities. Several objective reasons urged the Gulf states to intensify their cooperation with their Asian neighbors, both near and far. Some of these reasons are cultural and historical. However, the realist school of international relations proposes that interests are most significant in their broadest sense. It assumes that countries have the right to build the capabilities to ensure their stability, security, and advancement. This concept has become increasingly prevalent in Gulf international trends over the last two decades.
Furthermore, discussion of these relations is no longer limited to specific Asian countries, as was previously the case. When relations were first mentioned, they were thought to refer to the Indian subcontinent, particularly India and Pakistan, but they have since expanded to include almost all Asian countries. In recent years, the dynamics or drivers of these ties have altered according to new foundations based on pragmatism and interests, becoming more extensive than commercial and oil relations to include the political and security aspects. This indicates a specific Gulf strategy centered on "focusing east." It is viewed as a complement to what has been dubbed the "Asian Decade." This is evidenced by the first summit of Gulf Cooperation Council countries with China, the Central Asian Republics, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as numerous mutual visits between Gulf and Asian leaders, including Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida's meeting with Gulf leaders in July 2023.
While Gulf-Asian relations can be defined as long-standing, they have evolved into "strategic partnerships." This analysis summarizes recent Gulf movements towards Asia, identifies areas for improving the "Gulf direction" eastward, and examines internal and external factors influencing Gulf dynamics with Asian countries.
1. Gulf movements towards Asia
Since the end of the Cold War in 1990, the collapse of the socialist bloc, and China's subsequent globalization, Gulf-Asian relations have evolved from traditional relations established in the 1980s to strategic and political ties that have transcended economic dimensions, particularly in the energy field. This aligns with the Gulf nations' policies moving eastward in general, rather than only towards China, within the context of the Gulf states' evolving foreign relations, which are now based on their role in the international arena. This was supported by strengthening relations with several countries, including Russia. These patterns resulted from internal and external influences, which will be described later.
Based on this Gulf vision, Gulf-Asian relations entered a new era, with Gulf states shifting from focusing their foreign policy and security engagements with the United States of America to a policy of diversifying international actors and increasing self-reliance. This is according to Cal Holtsey's theory, known as the "role theory" in international relations, which explains why countries change their foreign policy directions and adopt a new international policy based on interdependence on the one hand while increasing their national capabilities to achieve their goals on the other. Over the last two decades, Asia has undergone a "mutual" political and economic shift with the Arab Gulf states. This resulted in a significant activation of the Gulf diplomatic movement, reflected in Gulf foreign policy by focusing on two factors: the security and stability of the Arabian Gulf region, the continuation of the development process, and the strengthening of the state's capabilities.
The fast trade growth between the Arab Gulf states and Asia demonstrates this, rising from about $46.8 billion in 2002 to $624.5 billion in 2021, more than 13 times its level at the start of the period. Thus, trade exchange between the two parties increased by an average of 26.7% per year, confirming the level of development in their trade and economic relations.
The expansion of trade ties between Arab Gulf states and Asian countries contributed to the global geographical redistribution of Gulf foreign trade. Asian countries' equivalent weight in total Gulf trade grew, while the rest of the world, both developed and developing, has decreased. Asian countries accounted for around 28% of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries' foreign trade in 2002, rising to 41.2% by 2021. Four Asian countries are among the Gulf Cooperation Council's five most significant trading partners in 2022: China, India, Japan, and South Korea. This highlights the importance of trade ties between Arab Gulf countries and major Asian economies.
In addition to developing bilateral relations in various fields in the last three years with major Asian countries, particularly China, Japan, India, and South Korea, GCC countries have worked together to establish and strengthen strategic relations with the many regions of the Asian continent and their operational regional organizations.
In this context, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait have joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as dialogue partners in 2021 and 2022, a multilateral forum for addressing contemporary concerns while ensuring security, stability, and long-term development. This reflects the Gulf countries' interest in engaging Asian economies to strengthen ties with emerging powers in the international system and the importance of developing relationships with non-Western actors. This is particularly relevant given that the population of the organization's member states reached 3.33 billion in 2021, accounting for approximately 42.5% of the global population, while the total trade volume of the organization's member states increased from $668.09 billion in 2001 to $6.06 trillion in 2020. Their share in global trade has grown from 5.4% in 2001 to 17.5% in 2020. In addition, the overall GDP of member states in 2021 was around 23 trillion dollars, or 24.2% of the global GDP, which indicates the organization's optimistic future opportunities and potential on a worldwide economic scale.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization currently has nine full member countries: China, Russia, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran. Belarus will obtain full membership during the current year, while three countries are observers who desire to obtain full membership (Afghanistan, Mongolia, and Belarus). The organization has 14 dialogue partners, including six countries that joined before 2021, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Turkey, in addition to eight countries that joined in 2021 and 2022, namely UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Egypt, Myanmar, and the Maldives.
Three major summits were held recently as part of the Gulf region's collaborative drive toward Asia. The first Gulf summit with China took place in December 2022, and the two sides agreed to strengthen collaboration in fifth—and sixth-generation communications networks, big data, artificial intelligence, satellites and space, and high-tech startups. This summit reflects the remarkable growth of Gulf-China relations. For example, their trade volume rose from $10 billion in 2000 to $230 billion in 2021.
The second summit was the first president-level meeting between the GCC countries and the five Central Asian republics (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) on July 19, 2023. This comes after the foreign ministers of the GCC nations and their Central Asian counterparts launched a strategic discussion in Riyadh on September 7, 2022, intending to increase collaboration in all areas of mutual interest. The summit's statement emphasized the importance of strengthening political and strategic relations at the collective and bilateral levels, dialogue and partnership to open up new horizons in various fields, and the continuation of political coordination to achieve regional and international security and stability. It also highlighted facing challenges and working to ensure the flexibility of supply chains, transportation, and communication, as well as food, energy, and water security. This is in addition to encouraging collaborative relationships in developing green and renewable energy sources and technologies, establishing business prospects, supporting investment opportunities, and expanding trade interchange.
The first summit between GCC and ASEAN countries, held in Riyadh on October 20, 2023, has significant implications for the Gulf countries' approaches toward all regions of Asia. Four countries preceded the summit by signing the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with ASEAN. The UAE, Qatar, and the Sultanate of Oman signed in August 2022, with Saudi Arabia signing in July 2023.
The "Gulf and ASEAN Summit" is the center stage of bilateral and collaborative efforts between the two sides. It will serve as a solid foundation for developing a road map for cooperation between the Gulf and Asian blocs in bilateral, regional, and global domains and issues. The conference agreed on a five-year cooperation framework (2024-2028), which includes political, security, economic, and investment collaboration, as well as tourism, energy, food and agricultural security, and social and cultural cooperation.
According to the 42 issues in the summit's statement, collaboration between the two blocs has multiple dimensions, the first of which is geostrategic. The countries of both regions are united in their determination to avoid involvement in global conflicts and to remain neutral, with an essence of global rivalry and its consequences. The second factor is security and stability at the international and regional levels. That is Gulf and ASEAN security, particularly the maritime aspect. The two blocs overlook the open seas and play an important role in global strategy, exposing them to a threat to stability caused by the international struggle for control, influence, and interests. The third dimension focuses on development, economics, investment, and technology, particularly given the enormous growth in trade volume between the two blocs. After averaging $54 billion annually from 2016 to 2020, overall trade exchange increased to $73.8 billion in 2021 and $101 billion in 2022.
2. Drivers of the Gulf's Move Toward the East
Gulf-Asian ties have shifted quantitatively in terms of the number of relations with Asian nations and their strategic depth. Despite one pole's control over the global system, countries maintained political "flexibility" in developing their international relations, particularly regional ones. The debate over the effectiveness of "regional" systems in achieving international security was reignited by Barry Buzan's theory of regional security, which he proposed in his 1983 book "People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem," in which he presented a security approach to the state both internally and externally. It covers political, economic, environmental, and military issues. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, emphasized regional security in 1992 as the ideal social framework for resolving global crises. As a result, regional and sub-regional groups commit to addressing security, economic, and political concerns.
The shared Gulf direction toward Asia can be characterized in three fundamental ways:
A. If it is true that the international system has become unipolar since the end of the Cold War, then most, if not all, countries are expected to adopt the same political trend around the world. However, this fall allowed the Gulf states to reformulate many visions and concepts governing their foreign relations, particularly with countries affiliated with the former Soviet Union, such as China and Central Asia. This is while recognizing that these relations do not imply a decline in Gulf relations or a reduction in relations with traditional allies. In light of these changes, the Arab Gulf states' foreign policy began to be founded on a pattern of economic interests and a re-transformation of their foreign goals, including, later, the formation of security relations in addition to economic and political ones. The emphasis was on a single characteristic distinguishing each Asian country from the others. The Gulf tendency aligns with the global interest in Asia's rise. This reinforced the Gulf's aim to maintain balance in its interactions with Asia, an important international and global environment aspect.
B. Although Gulf-Asian relations are long-standing, they were primarily concentrated in the Indian subcontinent. In addition to these countries, the rest of the Asian continent has been less critical to the Gulf countries since the 1970s, even though some Gulf countries have long preferred Asian markets for marketing their goods. This has changed significantly in recent years, with the Gulf Arab states now having special relations with China, ASEAN, and the Central Asian republics and strong bilateral relations with China, India, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and others. This is in addition to deep and long-standing bilateral relations with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Central Asian countries. This demonstrates a realistic trend among Gulf governments toward distinctive relations and complete strategic partnerships with most Asian countries while maintaining the balance of alliances with the West and the United States.
C. For Gulf interests, Asia is divided into four groups. The first includes countries with historical ties to the Gulf, such as India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh (from the Indian subcontinent). These countries are distinguished for being the most significant labor exporters to Gulf states and the largest beneficiaries of Gulf aid. The second includes ASEAN countries. The third is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes China and Central Asian countries seeing rapid economic expansion. The fourth includes the two Koreas, China and Japan from East Asia.
3. Gulf Stimuli Internally and Externally
The collective Gulf policy, which has focused more attention and increased collaboration with Asian countries, is linked to several internal variables and developments in Gulf countries, as well as external and international trends, as stated below:
A. Internal changes: The most significant changes revolve around the emergence of new Gulf leaders. This, in turn, has impacted the leader's perception of their country's position and capabilities and, consequently, their interest in achieving their goals in light of the current global transformations that require greater engagement and deep partnerships and investments. This has led to an increased desire to avoid relying on a single international strategic ally as the sole guarantor of the region's security and stability. Also linked is the pursuit of Gulf leaders to diversify their economies and venture into broader horizons focused on advanced technology, nuclear energy, heavy industries, and artificial intelligence among others. The young leadership in the GCC countries possesses strategic development visions that mark a new phase in the history of Gulf foreign relations. In Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030, announced by Prince Mohammed bin Salman, indicates that the Kingdom has internal ambitions to strengthen its regional and international standing. In the UAE, there is the "Ten Principles for the Next Fifty," and in Oman, the "Oman Vision 2040." While the focus of these visions is primarily on achieving economic and developmental goals, this has been only part of a far-reaching change in the foreign policy objectives of the Gulf states and their tools and vitality. This helps to understand their subsequent moves towards economically emerging Asian countries. Not far from the above, Gulf states have become, in the past decade, producers of regional policies and influential in international politics, albeit to a relative extent. In this regard, we can be guided by the realist theory of international relations, which states that "the greater the state's capabilities, the greater its rise in international role, and rise is a characteristic of power of influence." This has become particularly evident since the conflicts in the internal affairs of some Arab countries following the 2011 revolutions. The Gulf states have set themselves the primary goal of self-reliance in the face of regional and international challenges. To achieve this, it was necessary to diversify international partners and manage interests and relations independently, and at the heart of this is developing relations with major and middle-power Asian countries.
B. External changes: When discussing the impact of external developments on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, changes in the composition of regional and international systems come to mind regarding unipolarity or multipolarity. This is due to the importance of the Arabian Gulf region in international politics, both in terms of the international waterways it overlooks and its status as a significant energy source for the world. Regionally, interest in Asia has been a global phenomenon on the rise for the past two decades. Therefore, it is a global trend, not limited to the Gulf states. In fact, except for Japan, the Asian continent had not been significantly crucial in the global balance of power compared to the West, as Asia was considered a part of the Global South. However, with the successive cases of Asian rise, particularly with China and India, the growing Asian weight in the global balance of power has led to a strengthening of the Gulf's shift towards the Asian continent, with growing common interests between different Asian regions in the context of relatively different global calculations. Therefore, it is noticeable that there has been an increase in these relations, reaching the level of holding multiple Gulf summits with various parties from Asia. This reached the point, China could broker a reconciliation between the two largest countries in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Iran, in March 2023. This indicates the progress in the interdependence between Asia and the Gulf and the extent of trust between them. The reconciliation was as if it were a signal that Asia's security and stability are the responsibility of its countries. This also proves that Asia, especially the countries close to the Gulf states, can be an essential strategic depth for the Gulf region. On the international level, and despite the challenges that the Arab region has faced since the strategy of former US President Barack Obama, which focused more on the Asia-Pacific region than the Middle East, including the Arabian Gulf region, and the policy of President Donald Trump, during which US role in the region declined, the advantage is that it prompted GCC countries to reconsider the importance of their Asian surroundings. This change was an opportunity, not an obstacle, for the Gulf to move eastward. Instead, this East also included other Asian regions, such as Central Asia, to expand the relations of the Gulf countries from an economic and commercial perspective. On the other hand, diversification of alliances and partnerships is the optimal approach for countries of the size of the Gulf states in an international system gradually moving towards multipolarity. This leads to the localization of international issues, meaning that regional organizations and sub-regional organizations play a role in addressing security, economic, and political issues, according to Barry Buzan's theory of regional security, to which Frederick Kbryson and William Thompson added another criterion, which is the intensity of interactions between the parties regardless of geographical proximity.
Gulf states have been able to turn some international challenges into opportunities. With each step in which the Middle East region undergoes strategic shock, the Gulf states turn it into opportunities to diversify their international partnerships. The Gulf shift to the East reflects the changes in the global landscape, from a unipolar world to a multipolar world characterized by the growing influence of multiple actors. It confirms that the Gulf seeks to balance its interests between the West and the East in the face of global competition between the United States and China. This does not mean a decline in relations with traditional strategic allies but rather a reordering of priorities and formulating new tools to achieve interests according to those priorities. This is embodied by the change in Asian-Gulf relations, especially with the participation of the Gulf with major Asian countries in many trends, especially about tolerance, coexistence, and the call for peace as a gateway to development and prosperity for all countries. This indicates that relations are not limited to the economic, developmental, and human fields only but extend to the political, security, and strategic aspects.
