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Why did ISIS and al-Nusra Front Strike a Deal?

12 أبريل، 2017


The recent agreement between leaders of ISIS and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (Liberation of the Levant Organization), the current front organization of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (the new brand name of al-Qaeda-allied al-Nusra Front), came as a surprising step. This move is contrary to the traditional hostile relationship between the two organizations that started once ISIS broke away from al-Qaeda. Their disagreement escalated to armed confrontations, the latest of which coincided with their February 2017 negotiations. However, obviously, pressures from current developments on the ground resulting from the international coalition’s ongoing assault on ISIS in Mosul, Iraq, coupled with the coalition’s current preparations for the battle for Raqqa, what drives these terrorist organizations’ to make such change of course. 

In light of these developments, the two sides reached an interim agreement about some tactics, according to revelations made by Samir al-Kaka, a leader in the Jaish al-Islam (Islam Army), that were not denied by ISIS. As per the agreement, ISIS would withdraw its elements from the eastern fronts– Qalamoun, near Damascus, and the rural areas surrounding the cities of Hama and Deraa- to open the way for al-Nusra fighters to advance to the Eastern Ghouta region, which is strategically important for any advancement towards the capital Damascus. 

The fact that this is the first time the two sides have struck a deal of this kind, raises questions: What will ISIS gain in return? Would the deal be a prelude to a repeated merger between the two organizations in the future? What would be the implications for the arena in Syria? 

Obvious Retreat 

It can be said that this tactical agreement presents us with two significant indicators. The first is that ISIS is likely to retreat. Data from the ground show that the organization is massively retreating after it was vulnerable on various fronts where its forces appears to be scattered while engaging in difficult confrontations. 

This party involved in the ongoing battle in Mosul, is facing a harsh fate, where it is unable to engage in decisive confrontations as the Iraqi forces, backed by the international Coalition to Counter ISIS, succeeded in cutting off most of its main supply lines from Syria. This development forced ISIS to downgrade its strategic goal of total victory in Iraq to the tactical goal of disrupting or delaying the battle for Raqqa to be able to make preparations in Syria. 

Nevertheless, in Raqqa, the organization is likely to face a fate that is no less harsh, as the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces, backed by US military support, are closing in on ISIS. Moreover, the organization is confused in the areas from which it is planning to leave according to an agreement signed for Qalamoun, near Damascus, eastern rural Damascus as well as in the southern governorate of Deraa. On the other hand, in battles with the Free Syrian Army, ISIS lost logistic positions in Eastern Qalamoun, and its splinter the Jund al-Aqsa group was involved in confrontations with the rival Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham in February 2017. 

Based on the above, it is believed that ISIS plans, for the time being, to focus  on two main goals. The first goal is to minimize losses and curb the drain of resources on various fronts. The second goal is to re-deploy its fighters in the field. Overall, for ISIS, the optimal way to achieve both goals was to strike this deal with al-Nusra Front. 

Potential Paths

The second significant indicator is that the tactical agreement shines a light on the potential paths that ISIS would follow the battle for Raqqa. These paths hinge on the first indicator, and stem from the fact that the organization recognizes that a coalescence of its enemies while its own power is fading away, would mean that the organization is in the final state of terminal illness, and will inevitably lose the battle in Raqqa. Based on this recognition, ISIS has to secure as many organizational elements as possible to restructure itself again using different techniques.

This perception implies that ISIS is not going in the direction of a new merger with al-Nusra Front due to several facts, including that the former offshoot of al-Qaeda called upon ISIS to withdraw from Syria when the battle to liberate Mosul was launched. Moreover, the trajectory of the agreement, which they announced and did not keep as a secret, suggests that it is setting the course of their future relationship, where al-Nusra will have to secure an exit for ISIS.

However, this scenario can be vulnerable to changes such as the death of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi that would impose difficult choices on the organization, especially because it has lost most of its first-level commanders in recent confrontations. Nevertheless, it is not possible to rule out the possibility that some of ISIS elements, those who will decide to stay in Syria, would join the ranks of al-Nusra Front.

Direct Impact

Based on the revealed information about ISIS’ agreement with al-Nusra Front, recent developments on the ground, as well as ISIS Sanctuary Map produced by the US-based Institute for the Study of War, it is evident that ISIS, since the last week of March, has been conducting an organized withdrawal of its militants from the Eastern Qalamoun region to the Syrian Desert, also known as Badiyat al-Sham. This area stretches from southern Raqqa, in northeastern Syria, to the rural belts surrounding the cities of Damascus, Homs and Hama, in the east, to the international border with Iraq. Once the evacuation of militants is completed, it would be hard to say that the battle for Raqqa will be a long one. 

Accordingly, ISIS calculations are focused on two possible paths. The first path would imply staging what can be called a show-off showdown in Raqqa in a bid to convince its elements that it has fought its existential war to the end, using, as a justification, the details of its agreement with al-Nusra. That is, the publicized part of the agreement show that ISIS has made a swap to draw up a new supply line for its forces in Raqqa after the old lines from Iraq and Turkey were cut off. 

The second path involves another plan to exit Raqqa. According to information leaked from commanders of the Syrian Democratic Forces, ISIS has already started to smuggle its elements of foreign and regional origins and their families to Deir al-Zour, which corresponds to the withdrawal stated in the agreement. The perceived path of withdrawal goes through Badiyat al-Sham, from southern Raqqa to the border town of al-Bukamal on the Euphrates in Eastern Syria, through the Iraqi desert to the suburbs of the Iraqi city of Ramadi. It is also expected that some terrorists would try to return to their home countries. 

For Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, the most important benefits of the agreement with ISIS is that it would enable it to control a large swath of territory stretching from the eastern side of Damascus all the way to Damascus International Airport, which constitutes a source of supplies for Eastern Damascus (the districts of Jobar, Barzeh and al-Qaboun) and a link between the strategically important Qalamoun Mountains and the rural regions that lie in the north and east of Damascus.  

This targeted territory is of high importance in the battles that Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham plans to launch in Damascus. Nonetheless, there could be a provisional goal of creating a firewall by stationing al-Nusra fighters in this territory to prevent elements from the Bashar Assad regime and allies from infiltrating to Raqqa.

In conclusion, this agreement is not the first nor the last between ISIS and al-Nusra. Rather it is an interim settlement of disagreement between them, and means that there is still a flexible version that can allow “a free flow of jihadists” and deals between involved parties on pragmatic grounds. However, overall, and in the foreseeable future, it will be in the interest of al-Nusra which is expected to practically grow stronger, due to its expansion in ISIS-controlled areas, in Eastern Ghouta in particular, and at a later stage, Damascus City, where it will have no powerful terrorist rivals or enemies in the arena in Syria. Al-Nusra will believe that it won a round in the showdown with ISIS, which will contribute towards strengthening al-Qaeda’s influence, once again.