Iranian Foreign Minister, Hossein Amirabdollahian, has made a surprise visit to Ankara, Beirut, and Damascus, reflecting his country’s increased engagement in the region. His trip to Ankara replaced a postponed trip to Moscow, where he was set to meet with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov.
Iran’s Priorities
Amirabdollahian’s visits to critical regional pockets reflect a growing activity and a range of priorities that Iran is tackling, internally and regionally, which may be summarised as follows:
1. Putting demonstrations behind:
The Iranian regime wants to get past the prevalent turmoil it has witnessed over the past few months due to the death of a young Iranian woman, Mahsa Amini. Demonstrations swept the vast parts of the country, especially the Kurdish majority regions. Western economic sanctions followed, and EU countries ceased their nuclear talks with Tehran, pressuring Iran over human rights violations. The regime, therefore, got too occupied with its domestic issues, receding its regional presence and engagement.
Most of its regional engagements have become limited to Iraq, mostly across the Iraqi political process and the ongoing dispute between the Shi’ite and Sadrist factions. Tehran also threatened to carry out military operations in Iraqi Kurdistan, accusing Kurdish parties of supporting and fuelling demonstrations.
Thus, the foreign minister’s latest trip across the region has served as a statement by Tehran that it is still actively engaged in the region and is invested in political and security issues that strategically affect Iran.
2. Keeping up with regional dynamics:
Ahead of his visit to Syria and Lebanon, Amirabdollahian said he had been keen on discussing the latest regional developments with his counterparts, especially Turkey and its possible rapprochement with Syria. His trip follows on the heels of a high-profile meeting between military and intelligence officers and the Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu, in Moscow on December 28, to discuss the implications of a possible Ankara-Damascus reparation on Iran’s political, economic, and military presence in the region.
Moscow has succeeded in patching relations between Ankara and Damascus without Tehran, which is not surprising in the broader context of Russia’s approach to Syria. Earlier, Moscow mediated several meetings between Syrian opposition forces in Astana and a series of meetings between Ankara and Damascus in Sochi.
Keen to play a more active role in these developments and protect its regional interests, Tehran has sent some of its highest diplomats to Damascus and Ankara. Iranian President, Ibrahim Raisi, is also expected to visit Turkey, Russia, and Syria over the coming months.
3. Aligning axis of resistance:
Amirabdollahian’s visit to Lebanon was noticeably busy, having met on the same day Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and the Secretary General of Islamic Jihad, Ziad Nakhala. He discussed the prospects of the “axis of resistance” and other related files.
The meetings could be viewed in the context of Iran’s planning and preparation for ongoing regional changes, especially concerning Palestine, anticipating a possible escalation with Israel. The rise of a new ultra-conservative government, its damaging practices to Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem, and Israel’s frequent threats to Iran’s nuclear program are key drivers to a possible escalation between the two sides.
Key Messages to the Region
The foreign minister carried three key messages during his visits to the region:
1. Resumption of nuclear negotiations:
Despite Vienna negotiations breaking down owing to Iran’s involvement in the Ukrainian war by supplying Russia with drones, Tehran has expressed its desire to resume negotiations. Amirabdollahian said the negotiation window was still open, though not forever.
One of the main messages Iran wants to send to Western negotiators is that its influence in the region, particularly in Lebanon and Syria, still is strong. Iran uses its influence as a bargaining chip in the Vienna negotiations, signaling a position of strength and not succumbing to Western pressure. Iran’s position was exemplified by the execution of British dual national and former Deputy Defence Minister Alireza Akbari, undeterred by wide the West’s outcry.
2. Cementing influence in Lebanon:
Having met Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah, Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Buhaib, and Prime Minister Najib Mikati, the Iranian foreign minister, reinstated Iran’s deep connections in Lebanon. “The Islamic Republic,” said Amirabdollahian, “continues to support Lebanon’s stability and independence, its national armed forces, and the Lebanese people.” Indeed, Iran offers Hezbollah unlimited support across all disputed files, including the ongoing presidential vacuum prolonged by deep rifts among Lebanon’s political factions. Another message to international actors involved in Lebanon, particularly Paris, which has called for an international meeting, has been that Iran is a crucial player in Lebanon and is there to stay.
3. The centrality of Iran’s role in Syria:
Iran disapproves of the Turkey-Syria rapprochement, worrying it is being marginalised in this context. Therefore, Tehran has increased its pressure on Damascus by cutting price-reduced oil supplies. Iran does not want to be pushed aside in Syria.
Ahead of his visit to Damascus, Amirabdollahian phoned Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad and then met with Deputy Foreign Minister Ayman Sosan in Tehran in an attempt to resolve disagreements with Damascus arising from Tehran feeling it is being pushed aside by regional actors.
One may then understand President Bashar al-Assad’s statement on January 12, echoed by his foreign minister, that rapprochement with Turkey has to be in conjunction with ending the occupation and counter-terrorism. This position must have come as a result of Iranian pressure, for the senior Iranian foreign ministry advisor said on January 17, 2023 (while Amirabdollahian was visiting Ankara) that the Syrian crisis could not be resolved without Iran.
In conclusion, Iran has set its foreign minister on a trip around the region to reinstate its engagement amid domestic turmoil and political instability. Tehran wants to assert that internal demonstrations have not hampered its ability to engage with the region’s rapidly changing political stage. Regional and international actors are reminded that Tehran continues to influence regional politics profoundly and has strategic goals in countries where it has vital interests. Neither popular demonstrations nor international pressure could deter Iran from giving up its strategic interests in the Middle East.
