Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov embarked on an international tour from June 2 to 6, 2024, visiting several African countries (Chad, Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville, Burkina Faso). His tour is part of Russia's foreign policy strategy aimed at strengthening its relationships with African nations to enhance its role and influence and safeguard its strategic interests in Africa.
Political and Security Changes
Lavrov's visit to several African countries occurred amidst significant political and security changes, both regarding the escalating political tensions between Russia and the West and the political and security developments in African countries, particularly those included in his tour. The key factors are:
1. Russian-African alignment:
This visit was particularly significant for several reasons. It marked Lavrov's sixth visit to African nations in two years, his first-ever visit to Chad, and his first visit to Guinea since 2013. This underscores Russia's growing interest in strengthening relations with African countries across political, economic, security, and cultural spheres, aiming to leverage this rapid alignment to establish strategic partnerships.
2. Declining American influence in Africa:
The visit coincided with increasing signs that American and Western influence in Africa is declining. Notably, the US has recently withdrawn from several Sahel and Sahara countries. For instance, the United States and Niger agreed in mid-May 2024 to begin withdrawing US forces from Niger, with the process expected to be completed by September 15, 2024. This indicates a qualitative shift in U.S.-African relations, reflecting the diminishing acceptance of American presence both officially and popularly. Consequently, this will likely reduce American influence in the Sahel and Sahara regions, negatively impacting US interests in Africa.
3. Political and security turmoil:
Lavrov's recent tour coincided with political, security, and economic instability in some African countries. Burkina Faso, for example, continues to experience severe security issues with the rise of al-Qaeda activities and numerous terrorist attacks against the army and counter-terrorism forces. Politically, Burkina Faso faces instability, especially after announcing a five-year extension of the military council's rule under Ibrahim Traoré.
Chad also continues to face political and security challenges despite Mahmat Idriss Deby winning the presidency after leading the transitional military council for three years. According to the 2024 Global Terrorism Index, the country has witnessed an increase in activities by armed and extremist groups, ranking second globally in terrorist incidents after Afghanistan. Meanwhile, both Guinea and Congo-Brazzaville are grappling with severe economic crises, where Russia could potentially assist in improving their economic conditions in return for extending its influence and gaining economic advantages.
Expanding Influence
Lavrov's Africa tour aimed at achieving several objectives, namely to bolster and expand Russian influence across the continent:
1. Establishing strategic partnerships:
Through frequent diplomatic visits, Russia seeks to elevate its relations with African countries to strategic alliances. Lavrov's invitation to his counterparts for the African Foreign Ministers Conference in Sochi in November 2024, in preparation for the upcoming Russia-Africa Summit, exemplifies Moscow's commitment to strengthening ties with African nations. This helps Russia maintain its strategic interests in African countries eager for Russian support across political, economic, and security fields, legitimizing their political regimes amid pressures from regional organizations like the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which oppose power changes in countries such as Chad, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, as well as from the US and European countries, especially France, which oppose Russian-African rapprochement.
2. Enhancing military cooperation:
Russia aims to sign more military and defense cooperation agreements with African countries, including arms deals and sending Russian experts to train their armed forces, particularly in combating the rising terrorism in the Sahel and Sahara regions. Lavrov's talks with Congo-Brazzaville officials led to agreements on developing military-technical cooperation and continuing the 2019 agreements for sending Russian military specialists to Congo. Russia also agreed to enhance military cooperation with Guinea to bolster the African country's defense capabilities against security threats arising from increasing terrorist activity and to maintain military cooperation with Chad, especially regarding arms and equipment supplies, competing fiercely with France, which still has strong ties with Chad, in the ongoing Moscow-Paris power struggle in Chad, home to nine French military bases after France was expelled from Mali and Burkina Faso.
3. Maximizing economic gains:
Lavrov's tour also aimed to boost economic and trade relations between Russia and African nations by offering economic aid to those in severe economic crises through agreements to bolster economic cooperation in vital sectors. For instance, Congo-Brazzaville, which holds the sixth-largest oil reserves in Africa and possesses vast natural resources requiring significant investments to maximize gains, faces extreme poverty with a domestic debt of 107% of GDP in 2021. Additionally, Russia seeks to help Sahel and Sahara countries (Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso) counter the economic impact of severing their ties with ECOWAS, which imposed sanctions over military coups in these countries. During Lavrov's visit to Guinea, the two countries agreed to enhance economic cooperation, particularly in mining, with investments from "Rusal," Russia's largest investor in Guinea, providing thousands of jobs for Guineans.
4. Strengthening influence in Libya:
Russia aims to bolster its role in the ongoing crisis in Libya by leveraging an initiative proposed by Congo-Brazzaville's President Sassou Nguesso under the African Union's umbrella. This initiative, known as the "Brazzaville Call for Accelerating the Path to Peace and Reconciliation in Libya," invites Libyan parties to a conference to achieve national reconciliation and conduct parliamentary and presidential elections. It also calls for the withdrawal of all armed groups and mercenaries from Libya. Lavrov has expressed Moscow's support for this initiative, intending to use Russia's current rapprochement with Congo-Brazzaville to play a more active role in Libya. This effort aims to counteract US attempts to form a unified military force from armed groups in Libya and challenge Russian influence in southern and eastern Libya. Moscow announced the formation of the "Moscow Corps," consisting of 20,000 soldiers stationed in the Central African Republic, directly commanded by the Russian Ministry of Defense, indicating an intensifying Russian-American rivalry in Libya in the near future.
5. Combating terrorism:
Lavrov's tour to Chad, Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville, and Burkina Faso also aimed to enhance security and intelligence coordination to strengthen these countries' capacities to combat increasing terrorist activities, thereby securing Russian presence and protecting Russia's strategic interests in Africa. As part of this cooperation, Russia recently joined Chadian armed forces in liberating several Chadian soldiers held captive by an extremist group known as the "Lions of the Desert and Mountains," reflecting military collaboration between Moscow and N'Djamena.
6. Countering Western pressures:
Lavrov's visit to the African countries aimed to create new balances, especially in the Sahel, Sahara, West, and Central Africa, thereby enhancing Russia's influence by exploiting the void left by the declining American and Western presence. Russia has successfully expanded into Congo-Brazzaville, a long-time French stronghold, and Sahel countries, including Chad, which still maintains good relations with France. This shift is evident in the foreign policies of the new regimes ruling these countries, preferring engagement with Russia and rejecting continued reliance on Western countries in various political, economic, cultural, and security arenas.
Public opinion in these African countries has also supported stronger ties with Russia, as evidenced by protesters raising Russian flags and backing transitional governments' decisions regarding relations with the US and France. This has opened a significant opportunity for Russia to position itself as a trustworthy alternative, forming political and military alliances. This alignment was reflected in African countries' votes in the UN Security Council in favor of Russia against Western sanctions. Consequently, Russia seeks to benefit from the substantial voting bloc of African countries in international forums, especially at the United Nations.
In Conclusion, Lavrov's tour to Africa reflects a pragmatic Russian foreign policy, signaling to the US and European countries that Russia is capable of filling the vacuum created by the overall decline of Western influence in Africa. Russia may potentially succeed in expanding into Guinea, thus securing a new outlet on the Atlantic Ocean and achieving further political and economic gains.
Additionally, Russia's intensified moves in Africa represent efforts to break out of international isolation imposed by US and European sanctions over the Ukraine war. This explains Russia's drive to establish new alliances with as many African countries as possible to gain more room for international maneuvering.
In return, African countries view Russia as a reliable partner for achieving economic and security goals domestically and reducing political, economic, and security dependency on Western countries internationally. This suggests that the coming period will likely witness further Russian expansion in Africa and increased African engagement with the Russian actor.
