أخبار المركز
  • أسماء الخولي تكتب: (حمائية ترامب: لماذا تتحول الصين نحو سياسة نقدية "متساهلة" في 2025؟)
  • بهاء محمود يكتب: (ضغوط ترامب: كيف يُعمق عدم استقرار حكومتي ألمانيا وفرنسا المأزق الأوروبي؟)
  • د. أحمد أمل يكتب: (تهدئة مؤقتة أم ممتدة؟ فرص وتحديات نجاح اتفاق إنهاء الخلاف الصومالي الإثيوبي برعاية تركيا)
  • سعيد عكاشة يكتب: (كوابح التصعيد: هل يصمد اتفاق وقف النار بين إسرائيل ولبنان بعد رحيل الأسد؟)
  • نشوى عبد النبي تكتب: (السفن التجارية "النووية": الجهود الصينية والكورية الجنوبية لتطوير سفن حاويات صديقة للبيئة)

How the War in Ukraine Triggered the Domino Effect of Conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus?

21 يونيو، 2023


With the Russian war on Ukraine, numerous analysts and strategic research circles and centers anticipated that this conflict would have far-reaching consequences extending beyond Ukraine itself, impacting Europe and the rest of the world. This anticipation stems from the strategic interests involved, primarily Russia, Ukraine, and NATO, and their respective perspective on the war’s implications and outcomes. Russia believes that the ongoing war could reshape the US-led unipolar international order, advocating for a shift towards a multipolar order that would reinstate Moscow’s lost status following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Conversely, the United States and its European allies perceive their support for Ukraine against Russia as means to prevent such restructuring, aiming to maintain the existing unipolar international order. These different interpretations are intricately linked to the trajectory and consequence of the conflict, influencing the geostrategic outcomes and potential scenarios.

Protracted Repercussions

While analysts’ and strategists' predictions regarding the Russia-Ukraine war have yet to fully materialize, discernible impacts and repercussions are emerging in various politically and strategically interconnected areas and regions. Notably, conflicts such as the ongoing strife between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the recent tensions between Kosovo and Serbia have demonstrated the interconnected nature of these conflicts.

Consequently, the aftermath of the war in Ukraine has surpassed the boundaries of  Transcaucasia and Eastern Europe, extending its influence to South Asia and the Pacific, China, and Taiwan. In the eyes of Beijing, these regions hold integral significance to its territorial claims.

The ongoing war and its evident aftermath have already sparked some low-intensity conflicts (LICs) and rekindled long-standing some old nationalist aspirations. They are rooted in the evolving power dynamics among emerging regional players and are bolstered by the Russian narrative of safeguarding the Russian-speaking population and preserving Russian culture. Serbia's stance toward the Serbian minority in Kosovo serves as a prime example of such dynamics.

Kosovo-Serbia Conflict

The conflict in the Balkans carries profound implications of an ethnic and religious nature, rooted in the historical legacy of imperial control, first under the Ottoman Empire and later under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This region's history includes its role in the outbreak of World War I and its significance during World War II under General Tito, who managed to unite Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia, and Kosovo.

The predominantly Muslim Province of Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, supported by the US and NATO, following its military intervention in Serbia in 1999. However, Serbia refused to acknowledge Kosovo’s independence still considering it as Serbian territory.

Russia, as well as some other EU countries such as Spain, have also not recognized the state of Kosovo, given their concerns over similar within their own borders such as Catalonia. Nevertheless, the Republic of Kosovo has received recognition from 100 nations aligned with the US and Europe.

Initially, the Serbian minority in Kosovo maintained the right to use Serbian identity cards when crossing borders and residing in the state and applying for vehicle license plates. However, recent developments have changed this dynamic. The Kosovo authorities have now compelled Serbs to get Kosovo ID cards and temporary license plates, leading to backlash from the Serbian minority. Serbia views such changes as a long-planned move, prompting it to place its forces on alert and mobilize at the border with Kosovo.

The parties involved in the Kosovo-Serbia border conflict suggest that the conflict is not yet resolved, influenced by the regional power balance following the Russia–Ukraine war. The Republic of Kosovo, not yet recognized by Russia, has taken advantage of the attrition of Moscow during the ongoing war, its flawed military planning, and the renewed support of NATO, which played a significant role in the region’s independence. Meanwhile, Serbia is one of the few countries that maintains good ties with Russia. It has not been part of the sanctions imposed by Western countries on Moscow, given the religious ties between Russia and Serbia, Orthodox Christianity to be exact, and the Serbian public sympathy for Russia's position in the war in Ukraine. In fact, 74% of the Serbian population believes that Russia is a “victim,” leading to a diminished faith in NATO after its intervention in Serbia in 1999.

Evidently, Western analyses suggest that Russia is not detached from the developments between Kosovo and Serbia, aiming to divert attention from the Ukraine war towards other conflicts in Europe, with NATO being an integral part of this strategy. However, some argue that Russia’s involvement may not necessarily be driven by hostile intent, but rather by the inherent nature of the war in Ukraine, and the associated stakes, allowing each state to evaluate the outcomes in line with its national interests. In Kosovo's case, this means consolidating emerging realities, while for Serbia, it entails pressing old claims, as it still regards Kosovo as a Serbian territory, despite its declaration of independence.

The situation between the major powers involved in the Kosovo-Serbia conflict remains delicate. NATO seeks to prevent renewed conflict between the two states, considering their location in the vulnerable part of Europe and the Balkans, with their complex historical, religious, and ethnic dynamics. Besides, if Serbia were to initiate the use of force against Kosovo, it would once again find itself facing NATO. The urgency for a peaceful resolution of the situation is apparent to avoid any further border problems in the region.

Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Examining the ramifications of the Russia–Ukraine war on neighboring regions over the course of a year, we find the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Transcaucasia regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. This conflict arose after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1990 and the subsequent independence of Armenia and Azerbaijan, which are considered Russia’s spheres of influence.

In the early 1990s, Armenia won the war against Azerbaijan and gained control of approximately 13% of Azerbaijani territory in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh. However, in 2020, when renewed hostilities erupted, Azerbaijan regained a significant portion of its land. Azerbaijan achieved this by utilizing the proceeds from its natural gas reserves and acquiring advanced weaponry from Turkey and Israel.

Moscow also intervened in the conflict, ultimately brokering a ceasefire agreement. Russian troops were deployed to protect the remaining Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh's largest city, and a key road connecting the region to Armenia was secured. Moreover, in 2020 Russia dispatched 2,000 peacekeepers to monitor the ceasefire, solidifying its position as a major power capable of maintaining stability in the post-Soviet space.

Two years later, in 2022, conflict reignited between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but under new regional and international circumstances. This resurgence tested Moscow's ability and willingness to exert its influence in the post-Soviet space amid the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and the extent of its support for its ally, Armenia.

On December 12, 2022, the mountain route connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia was closed and clashes broke out along the border due to the changing realities and power dynamics associated with the war in Ukraine. These factors significantly influenced the nature of the conflict. While Azerbaijan relied on state-of-the-art equipment, including drones and arms supplied from Turkey, Armenia had to make do with traditional weaponry. This was primarily due to Russia's focus on its military and logistical capacities in the Ukraine war, despite Armenia’s membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) under Russian patronage. Furthermore, the US encouraged Armenia to withdraw from CSTO with then-Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi visiting Armenia to express support for the country's withdrawal. This move aimed to challenge Russia and diminish its influence in the region, which serves as a crucial link between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea.

Thus, Azerbaijan found itself in conflict with Armenia under new geostrategic context, benefiting from the support and modern weaponry provided by Turkey and the United States.  In contrast, Armenia received neither arms nor significant influence from its Russian allies to bolster its position in the conflict, primarily due to Russia's preoccupation with the war against Ukraine, its flawed military planning, and the prioritization of this war over other engagements, despite Armenia demanding the implementation Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership signed in 1997.

Azerbaijan relied on two factors: first, the ability to break the deadlock in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict without direct Russian intervention, and second, the escalation of European efforts to isolate Russia by attempting to form a European bloc comprising EU and non-EU countries, including Armenia and Azerbaijan. Ostensibly, this action aims to address the energy crisis and international developments. However, its true objective is to mobilize countries surrounding Russia, isolate it, and diminish its influence.

It is also arguable that observing the situation in Russian-occupied territories like South Ossetia in Georgia, which had previously claimed it would hold a referendum on joining Russia, but cancelled it in May 2022, highlights the impact of the Ukraine war on the balance of power, Russia's inadequate planning, and the strain on its capacities. Even pro-Russia Abkhazia denied any intention to join Russia. In 2008, Russia had engaged to prevent the annexation of those two regions to Georgia. The current stance of these regions may be attributed to their perception of Russia's preoccupation or lack of interest in protecting their interests.

Finally, while the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union continues to create unease, it is the Russia-Ukraine war that has generated even more significant tremors, surpassing the impact of smaller, contained conflicts and their outcomes, as observed in certain European conflicts and the Caucasus. However, the potential consequences unfolding in the Pacific Rim and the South China Sea may prove to be the most consequential and grave of all