The war in Gaza is far from over, with ongoing scrutiny, particularly regarding the events that triggered it. The attacks launched by the Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip, led by Hamas and their allies, on October 7, 2023, marked a significant failure on Israel’s part, its intelligence, and the broader security system it has imposed on the strip since 2006. Thus eventually, the Israeli political and security apparatus will be a subject of investigation for its failure to keep Hamas at bay, along with the shortcomings of the intelligence and poor military performance during the ongoing war.
Such investigation will reveal more mishaps, loopholes, and vulnerabilities in the techno-military surveillance structure deployed in Gaza and the restrictive policy of besiege. As one awaits these findings and more, this article will discuss how the October 7 attacks resemble a perfect Cassandra event, which is a failure to anticipate a looming catastrophe despite the unmistakable signals.
What is a Cassandra Event?
In Hellenic mythology, Cassandra was a gifted and damned priestess of Apollo. She had the ability to predict the future, yet her warnings were unheard or disbelieved. For instance, she correctly warned the Trojans, her people, against the looming invasion of the Greeks, but was never believed. In the realm of strategic foresight and futurism, the term “Cassandra Event” originates from this legend, as detailed in Homer’s Iliad. The concept is further explored in the 2017 book Warnings: Finding Cassandras to Stop Catastrophes by Richard Clarks and R. P. Eddy.
Drawing on several instances of catastrophes that occured because of dismissed warnings, Clarks and Eddy proposed the “Cassandra Coefficient” model to improve policymakers’ and analysts’ ability to develop systems of detecting early warnings. In doing so, the model highlights the complex system in which predictions are made, ignored, and turned into catastrophes. Their answer to anticipate political, technological, environmental, social, and economic disasters is to detect “Cassandras” or develop a technique of Casandra Coefficient that involves four components:
- Warning against a threat or a risk in question.
- Policymakers who need, or are required, to respond to the threat.
- Cassandras who warn against the threat.
- Critics who dismiss the warning due to their biases or political interests.
A Cassandra event, therefore, entails the intricate interplay of personal, perceptual, and political structures within a system. It has often taken place as a result of the political failure to anticipate the threats, perceive them correctly, and act accordingly. Applying this model, proposed by Clarks and Eddy, on the October 7 Hamas attacks allows for a better and more comprehensive analysis of what went wrong with the Israeli system of control over Gaza. But in this case as the catastrophe had already taken place, the model will be reconfigured starting with Cassandras, policymakers, and critics.
Multiple Cassandras for Israel
Since day one of the war, a video dated to 2019 went viral on social media. It featured a retired IDF Major General, Itzhak Brik. In the video, he warned of potential Hamas attacks in southern Israel, arguing that the IDF was not prepared for such an attack or war. It seemed prophetic or delusional for some, given the tight system of control and surveillance imposed on Gaza, designed to anticipate any attack and neutralize any breach of the USD 2 billion siege surrounding Gaza.
In fact, Brik’s warnings were not prophetic in nature, regardless of his language and tone; they rather relied on his assessment of the IDF and its ground capabilities. In an August 2023 interview with an Israeli radio channel, a few weeks before the attacks, Brik reiterated his concerns about the IDF’s declining competence, overreliance on airpower and technological spyware capabilities, and the dismissal of the “political echelon... to the IDF disintegration”.
As the attack occured in a manner mimicking (or mostly similar to) what Brik claimed (or predicted), he gained credibility and sought counsel by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu regarding the plans for a ground invasion in Northern Gaza. Once again, Brik’s advice of postponing the attack went against the desire of Netanyahu’s warmongering cabinet.
The accuracy of Brik’s prediction is contentious, given the polarization of Israeli politics. Nevertheless, the Israeli intelligence community, the Mossad, and military intelligence “Aman” deem more valuable and tangible evidence of an imminent catastrophe.
Recent reports of the Financial Times (FT) and BBC investigations revealed that the Israeli intelligence dismissed detailed warnings against the attacks that had been in preparation over the last two years. Videos of Hamas fighters training to invade settlements and destroy Merkavas military vehicles using heavy artillery were circulated across telegram channels and social media platforms. Nevertheless, such evidence was not taken seriously.
Another shocking report by Ronen Bergman and Adam Goldman of the New York Times asserted that Israel obtained detailed plans of Hamas attacks in a document dubbed “Jericho Wall.” According to the Former Deputy National Security Advisor, Ben Rhodes, such a spy treasure is a rare hunt in the spy world. Yet, it was also dismissed as inspirational.
Delusions of Policy Makers
In the FT’s account, it was low-ranking soldiers monitoring the borders that warned against the potential moves of Hamas, yet the high-ranking general in Aman rejected their assessment, deeming it imaginary. Thus, not only are Netanyahu and his security ultraright-wing ministers to blame, but military commanders also share the responsibility for such an intelligence and security fiasco.
This collective state of denial echoes historical instances, such as 50 years ago during the Yom Kippur War when they dismissed the possibility of the Egyptians and Syrians launching an attack. The reasons for such denial include distractions caused by Netanyahu’s scheme of Judicial reforms and its impact on the military, the inadequacy of Netanyahu’s ultra-right-wing ministers, particularly Itamar Ben-Gvir, their clashes with military commanders, and an overconfidence in the Israeli techno-military capabilities that have gained the reputation of lethality and precision regionally and globally.
Indeed, like previous and upcoming Cassandra events, hubris explains it all. As per the historical legend, the Trojans and their King Priam dismissed Cassandra’s prophecy claiming that no man had been able to breach his walls for decades. So did believe the Israelis. Their over-reliance on data-driven tech and cyber systems, in which they invest a lot, did not pay off.
If it is hubris that explains why Israeli decision-makers dismissed their Cassandras, Hamas military planners recognized their adversary’s psyche. They deliberately made their moves too obvious to exploit such overconfidence. For them, it was nearly impossible to conceal their trainings, so they fed Israeli intelligence with what Clarks and Eddy call “invisible obvious”, which can blind the enemy as much as the visible. They further exploited human intelligence on the ground in Gaza to feed Israel’s ears and eyes with false information.
The consequences of the war are far-reaching and have not played out yet. However, the initial lesson to draw from the Israeli intelligence fiasco is Achilles heel of hubris, both in mythology and reality, could pose a threat to any power.
