In recent years, the problem of militias and paramilitary or quasi-military groups in the Arab region has worsened, where the collapse of several governments since 2011 coincided with the disappearance of central state authority. Political transformations in countries such as Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Sudan seem to have negatively impacted these political entities’ benefit from the “legitimate” monopoly of violence by a central authority capable of expanding its control and sovereignty over a specific region. The development raises a significant problem for the future of certain countries in the Arab region. The distribution of coercive instruments among rivalries has led to the dominance of patterns of violent conflict. These conflicting interactions have severely reduced the prospects of the desired democratic transition, making the modern state project vulnerable to collapse. The alternative to the state seems to be chaos that destroys stable ways of life because with the state comes security, which is the prerequisite for individuals to achieve their common goals.
Within this context, this analysis seeks to investigate the factors that led to the emergence of paramilitary forces and their persistence in some Arab countries, especially amid worsening armed conflicts in the region, such as the infighting in Sudan between the army and the Rapid Support Forces. It also puts forward proposals for dealing with these quasi-military organizations, particularly concerning their integration into the regular armed forces of the states.
What are Paramilitary Forces?
Paramilitary forces or militias are armed groups that are either supplementary or subordinate and are established to perform specific security roles but do not fall under the regular armed forces’ chain of command and leadership. These entities appear more capable of rapid mobilization and are more in tune with primarily internal threats than regular armies. Additionally, their formation makes them more capable of compliance with a specific commander or the ruling regime because they usually consist of individuals belonging to the same ethnic or tribal group. In contrast, regular armies consist of individuals belonging to various societal structures and upholding a commitment to the regular army’s natural hierarchy of command and control. Generally, the likelihood of creating such groups increases when there is an internal threat to the ruling system. Thus, these entities appear as a convenient means of confronting threats that the regular security forces, i.e., the army and the police, may be unable to handle.
Over the past decades, hundreds of such organizations emerged in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Major powers and not only Third World countries used paramilitary organizations. These entities were widely employed by the United States in its war with Vietnam, by Britain in Northern Ireland, and by the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
While the weakness of the state is considered the primary prerequisite for the emergence of these militias, armed conflict is another factor that helps explain their emergence. Militias and paramilitary organizations reflect a severe crisis experienced by states because of governments’ inability to deal with challenges posed by rebels. Thus, such armed entities rarely emerge before the start of an internal conflict, as evidenced by the prominent example of the Janjaweed militia in Sudan, which was reconstituted and organized to fight against the enemies of the ruling regime in Khartoum. Additionally, most of these organizations are mobilized in the midst of armed conflicts; only a few continue after a civil war is over or after the state grows stronger. That is why forces like the Cobra and Ninja in the Congo were deemed unnecessary and dissolved after the internal conflict ended. As long as the interests of the state intersect with the interests of these militias, they avoid challenging the government or overthrowing it, where preserving the status quo becomes their primary goal. However, these organizations may sometimes ignore governments or act as alternative institutions performing their functions.
The vast diversity of these militias and paramilitary organizations makes any attempt to generalize their characteristics and impact on any country’s security and political environment challenging. However, these organizations can generally be classified per several vital perspectives. Firstly, the prevailing balance of power between these organizations and the regular army can be examined from a military strength perspective, the available resources at their disposal, as well as the combat readiness of their members. For example, some studies estimate the number of Shiite volunteer forces in Iraq to be 90,000 fighters and the total number of Shiite volunteers who participated in the war against ISIS in 2014 to be one million fighters.
Secondly, a significant criterion has to do with political representation in state institutions and working within the legal framework. Leaders of some of these organizations participate in the state’s political life, specifically in the executive and legislative branches, and as such, these militias may have legal status, and their activities may be based on official laws. For example, the Popular Mobilization Forces, or
Al-Hashd Al-Sha’bi, in Iraq, was established by the Ministry of Interior and is subject to the legal framework governing official security forces’ work. However, in general, the multiple Shiite factions in Iraq remain outside the direct control of the central government, although their leaders have close ties with the political elite.
Even though these militias appear to be defending the interests of specific ethnic or sectarian groups, they seek to legitimize their existence by portraying themselves as guardians of national unity and the state’s regional integration.
Reasons for the Rise of Paramilitary Organizations
The American war on Iraq 2003 represented a turning point in the Arab region regarding militias and paramilitary organizations. The US occupation of Iraq was followed by a decision to dissolve the country’s national army, a step that caused a security vacuum. This led to the emergence of many armed sectarian groups made up of a large number of unemployed individuals who were experienced in using violence to achieve their goals. Additionally, the fall of ruling regimes in some Arab countries after the events of 2011 created a suitable environment for forming militias, which are now fighting each other for state control, as is the case of Libya. This contributes to creating a state of unrest and instability in the Middle East region, as seen in the wars in Syria and Yemen.
The crisis of the nation-state in some Arab countries provides a partial explanation of the rise of these organizations and the growth of their influence, where the state’s failure and inability to perform its security, economic, and political functions efficiently has reduced its ability to contain sectarian and tribal identities within a national framework that it embodies. This led to the resurgence of sub-identities. The weakness of the state and the collapse of its central authority in some countries has exacerbated its inability to monopolize the use of military force. The state has also become unable to impose control over its territory and provide security, protection, and other essential needs for its citizens. In this context, it is possible to understand the emergence and expansion of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, as well as many other paramilitary organizations in Sudan and Iraq before and after the Arab uprisings of 2011. It should be noted that a large number of these organizations are military wings of tribes and ethnic groups and reflect sectarian and doctrinal differences. Therefore, identity conflicts in the Arab region since 2011 have been accompanied by a deepening crisis of the nation-state and the rise of the conflict over identity and the expansion of the authority and number of those entities.
In addition to the above, because weak governments in some Arab countries rely on these organizations to maintain security in some parts of the state or to fight their enemies, they helped the proliferation of armed militias. In Iraq, for example, after ISIS seized control of Mosul in 2014, the government led by then-prime minister Nouri al-Maliki accepted the participation of the Popular Mobilization Forces militia in the fight against the terrorist organization. Thus dozens of armed groups and militias based on sectarian foundations, primarily Shia, emerged.
Furthermore, external support provided these organizations with the necessary elements to survive and play an active role. Iran’s military and financial support has played a key role in the continued presence of Hezbollah in the Lebanese arena and in enhancing its military capabilities. External support for paramilitary forces and armed militias has also been a primary characteristic of the civil war in Syria, where the country has become a battlefield for proxy wars between regional and international powers seeking to promote their interests. In Yemen, Iranian military and economic support for the Houthis have helped the armed group to continue the war against the Yemeni legitimate government forces.
Finally, the rise of quasimilitary organizations in the Arab region cannot be separated from the economic and political interests that these organizations seek to achieve. The situation in Libya following the fall of the Gaddafi regime is a typical example of the conflict between dozens of armed militias competing for control of the country’s economic resources, especially oil. In addition, these militias engage in criminal activities such as human and drug trafficking and arms smuggling, further weakening Libya’s fragile state and threatening its unity.
Strategies for Dealing with Non-state Armed Groups
Arab countries and international powers have implemented diverse strategies for dealing with non-state armed groups. These include using military force to confront or at least reduce their capabilities and the risks they pose. This is followed by reintegrating these entities into regular military forces, as was the case with the Popular Mobilization Forces, which were reintegrated into the Iraqi army. Finally, another strategy is to coexist with these groups. Some countries accept these actors either because of the inability to disarm them or because of the state’s desire to avoid a confrontation that could lead to a civil war. A clear example of this is Hezbollah in Lebanon.
In general, strategies and approaches for dealing with paramilitary organizations can be outlined as follows:
1. The realistic approach:
In this approach, coercive measures are employed to deal with militias, including using military force, as well as politically and materially marginalizing and isolating those entities from their true supporters and potential supporters. This option seems attractive for dealing with weak actors when there is near consensus among political elites and community formations not to deal with those entities and not to respond to their destructive actions. It is also possible to trigger internal conflicts and defections among those groups by selectively granting certain leaders certain advantages, such as involving them in the political process. The essence of this approach is the use of coercive measures that put more pressure on paramilitary organizations to compel them to change their beliefs and behaviors.
2. The institutional approach:
This approach involves attempting to initiate a mediation and negotiation process between the various parties, including non-governmental armed groups, to reach a political settlement. It also involves attracting and engaging those organizations in the political process by giving them benefits and responsibilities. This strategy involves a certain amount of power-sharing in order to grant these groups a role that they can fulfill, which may open up the possibility of changing their political preferences and orientations. At the heart of this institutional approach is establishing necessary rules, procedures, and institutional contexts to allow for a degree of peaceful coexistence, which opens up a broad space for negotiation, bargaining, and mediation. Thus, the logic underlying this approach is the recognition that many militias and quasi-military organizations may suffer from specific political and economic grievances that can be addressed through political means.
3. The constructive approach or engagement:
One of the most important measures included in constructive engagement is granting amnesty for specific crimes committed by armed groups to incentivize behavior change and respect for certain norms in the future. This approach can be used as a last resort to end violence and as part of a broader political deal. Perhaps this option is suitable when members of those groups tend to start a different life and show a genuine desire to change their behavior. Generally, constructive engagements emphasize the role of persuasion and attempt to encourage armed groups to accept some norms and traditions associated with peace-building. The ultimate goal is to launch a long-term process of transformation that includes genuine changes in the policies and perspectives of those organizations.
The Dilemma of Reintegration
Overall, including militias and paramilitary organizations in the national armies into the regular army raises many issues and challenges. While this strategy may be useful in attracting some groups, it poses many potential risks to military operations’ cohesion, organizational structure, and effectiveness. Integration is a costly process that requires the necessary resources and the support of regular army personnel. Financial and political resources are scarce for many countries emerging from costly wars, making integration costs enormous and difficult for governments to bear.
In some cases, countries with limited military organizational capacity lack sufficient resources to reintegrate a large number of non-official militia members. For example, in the Central African Republic, affiliated or attached militias expected little benefit from joining the regular armed forces and chose to remain outside the formal structure of the military institution. In addition, the weak organizational capabilities of some armies block them from controlling forces characterized by violence and extremism, as the integration of these entities poses risks of endangering military cohesion and possibly even leading to the complete collapse of the formal military apparatus. On the other hand, highly organized armies have sufficient force in numbers and equipment to overcome their opponents, and they do not have a real incentive to integrate those non-official forces. These armies tend to have a group of officers who vehemently oppose any changes in the hierarchy of the army and the formation of its units, as these officers have an official background in military training and tend to view non-governmental armed actors as amateurs who negatively impact the readiness and ability of the regular armed forces to respond to security threats, due to fears of the lack of professionalism and discipline. This is what happened in countries such as Nigeria and Pakistan.
To conclude, the integration of militias and paramilitary organizations into the structure of the regular armed forces hinges on several considerations, such as creating sufficient acceptance by officers to integrate these entities, the readiness of these groups to join the regular armed forces, and the extent of the legitimacy of this procedure in the eyes of various societal sectors. All of these issues must be taken into account when designing effective strategies for integrating these armed actors.
