Iran have been the key ally to Russia. Yet, despite the remarkable visit of Russian President, Vladimir Putin to Iran, on November 1, 2017, the Iranian-Russian relations have been hurdled with various challenges. 

There were two main reasons for Putin's visit. The first one was to participate in the tripartite summit of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) held in Tehran, along with with President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Hassan Rouhani and President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev.

The INSTC is a planned "7,200-kilometer multimodal trade corridor" linking Bandar Abbas Port in southern Iran to Helsinki, Finland, via Baku, Azerbaijan, Moscow and Petersburg, Russia. The project is seen as an alternative to the Chinese "One Belt and One Road" transportation corridor. The trilateral summit also focused on "regional issues, as well as areas of common economic cooperation, such as energy, transport and construction," according to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani.^[i]

The second reason for Putin's visit was to negotiate bilateral relations with Iran, and sign a number of economic, cultural and political agreements. Some 35 joint projects were signed to promote bilateral relations between the two countries, with Moscow allocating USD 5 billion for Tehran. In addition, during the meeting of Rouhani and Putin, it was emphasized that cooperation between their two countries regarding the conflict in Syria should continue to ensure the eradication of terrorism.

Putin also touched upon the success of the tripartite cooperation between Russia, Turkey and Iran in the framework of the Astana peace process, as well as the reconstruction of Syria.

Putin's visit to Iran has drawn regional and global attention, especially amid the US President Donald Trump's statements concerning the possibility of revoking the nuclear deal with Iran. In this context, Putin held another important meeting with Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during his visit to Tehran, to discuss Iran’s options for countering what it describes as mounting US threats. Although Khamenei's vow “to isolate US and trade through national currencies” seemed unrealistic, it was perceived as a significant message to the White House.^[ii] The Russian newspaper "Vzglad" said that Putin's announcement of anti-American messages during his visit to Iran would strengthen his stance against Trump, before their meeting at the APEC Summit in Vietnam, on November 11.^[iii]

Within the framework of Middle East policy, Putin's' trip to Iran took place after the visit of Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz to Moscow. In conjunction with this fact, and based on challenges facing the Russian-Iranian alliance, it is possible to observe structural changes in Russia's Middle East foreign policy that are manifested in four important issues, namely the Yemen crisis, the Kurdish issue, reconstruction of Syria and rapprochement between Russia with the Gulf Arab countries, and Saudi Arabia in particular

Contradictory stances on Yemen

Another key issue for Iran is Russia’s foreign policy towards Yemen. That is to say, at international forums, Russia does not voice support for Iran's geopolitical struggle with Saudi Arabia in Yemen. Moreover, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently accepted Ahmed al-Wahishi, proposed by the Saudi-backed President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, as ambassador of Yemen to Moscow. This can be perceived as Russian support for  the Saudis’ role in the Yemeni civil war.^[iv]

Moreover, the development can be linked to what was described by the Russian newspaper Kommersant as Russia’s goal of “entering the military market of Arab countries for decades". However, changes in Russia's Middle East policy should be seen as serious structural changes. As an alternative to its Middle East policy it built through cooperation with Tehran after the Cold War, Kremlin is now seeking multilateral relations with the Arab region.

Strengthening Relations with Riyadh

On October 5, 2017, President Putin hosted Saudi Arabia’s King Salman in Moscow for the first ever state visit to Russia by a reigning Saudi monarch. In addition to its symbolic significance, King Salman’s visit witnessed serious steps towards establishing strong military and economic relations between the two countries. Following the historic meeting between President Putin and King Salman, the two countries signed 14 agreements to enhance economic, political and cultural cooperation, and established a joint investment fund worth one billion dollars. In addition, Russia and Saudi reached a USD 3 billion deal to supply the Saudis with Russia’s most advanced air defence missile system, the S400 Triumph.^[v] The development was especially disturbing for Iran, which is unable to acquire military technology from the West, and instead has to seek stronger military cooperation with Russia. As Iran only has the S300 Air Defense Missile System, Iran was concerned over the acquisition of more advanced Russian missile systems by Saudi Arabia, its archrival in the Middle East.

Russian Cooperation with KRG

Tehran is also disturbed by Moscow's policies towards both Syria and Iraq. Russia's inconsistent policies towards the Kurdish Regional Government's (KRG) independence referendum, as well as the Russian energy deals with Erbil, may very well escalate tensions with Iran over the Kurdish issue. On October 18, 2017, Russian state oil company Rosneft reportedly agreed  to invest USD 400 million in 5 oil blocks in northern Iraq.^[vi] According to Israeli newspaper Haaretz, the Russian state oil major even signed a USD 4 billion oil deal with the Barzani administration.^[vii] The deals show Russia’s sudden emergence as a major customer of  Kurdistan’s  oil and natural gas. Russia has even prepaid USD 1 billion to Erbil buying 70 percent of Kurdistan’s  oil from fields in and around the disputed Kirkuk region.^[viii] Yet, as a result of military operations carried out by the Iraqi central government supported by the so-called Popular Mobilization Forces (the Hashd Al-Shaabi), Northern Iraq has evidently lost its energy reserves to Russia. The Iraqi central government has also revoked the agreements signed between Moscow and Erbil, on the basis that they were signed without its consent and that the fields are in a disputed territory.

The development reveals that Russian investments have been wasted after the central government retook Kirkuk and surrounding areas, following  negotiations between the central government, Turkey and Iran. Later on, Jabbar al-Luaibi, Iraqi Oil Minister, announced that an agreement was signed between Baghdad and Tehran for the transportation of between 30,000-60,000 barrels of Kirkuk oil per day to Iran. What should be noted here is that Iran has utilized oppressive measurements against Moscow's interests.

Different Positions on the Syrian Crisis

Following the 7th round of Astana talks on Syria, the Russian representative announced that the first "congress of Syrian peoples " or the National Dialogue Congress will be held to discuss post-war reconstruction in Syria.^[ix] On November 22, a trilateral summit was held between the leaders of Russia, Turkey and Iran in the Russian city of Sochi as a step towards the congress.

Russia intends to invite the majority of the opposition groups to participate in the peace congress.

Saudi Arabia also expressed its support for this meeting. However, it can be seen that inviting the Kurdish groups of PYD/YPG to this meeting is disturbing for both Tehran and Ankara.

Putin's emphasis on the importance of building the future of the Syria during his recent visit to Iran was intended for this meeting. Yet, Iran remains silent regarding this congress. The Russian media said that there is disagreement between Moscow and Tehran about the future of Syria. In other words, it appears that the only reason for this divergence is not the Kurdish issue, because the future of the regime of Bashar Assad is also another point of contention. The Russians have always stated that they are in favor of the Assad administration on a temporary basis. Frequent comments by the Russian media represent a clear Russian disapproval of Iran's sectarian policy in the Middle East.

Conclusion

Instead pursuing pursuing  policies on the Middle East  that are aligned with Iranian interests, Russia is pushing Tehran to adapt to its new regional policies. Russia believes that it will expand its economic and geopolitical influence through  building a multilateral foreign policy for the Middle East. It can be seen that, despite its alliance with Iran, Russia aims to establish such a policy develop bilateral relations taking into account the interests of the Arab world, as well as penetrate new markets for its exports.