On September 14, another round of the Astana talks will be held in Kazakhstan to resolve the Syrian crisis. On the sidelines of the conference, a series of meetings will be held between Iran, Russia and Turkey to discuss the anticipated military operation in Idlib. This trilateral negotiation and the formation of a new alliance will face various challenges that are not disclosed to Idlib operations. Thus, to better understand this alliance, one need to present an overview of the fluctuating relations between both countries over the last fifteen years.  

Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the highest-level of military talks between Iran and Turkey have been marked by the visit of Iran’s Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Mohammad Hossein Bagheri, to Turkey on August 15, 2017, leading a delegation of nine senior generals. During the three-day visit, Bagheri met with his Turkish counterpart, as well as President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the Defense Minister. According to Turkish and Iranian media reports, the meetings addressed various regional issues of common interest including the situation in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, where a referendum on independence will be held this month, cooperation between the US and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Kobani, northern Syria, the presence of Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Afrin, northern Syria, and most significantly the issue of Idlib province in Syria. [i]

Background: Areas of Competition and Collaboration between Turkey and Iran 

After the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the Multi-National Force, led by the United States and the United Kingdom, a rivalry emerged between Tehran and Ankara over influencing Baghdad. Turkey used to criticize, and even attempted to halt the Iranian expansionist policies against Iraqi Sunnis Arabs, Turkmens and Kurds. Nevertheless, Turkey was trying to establish balance in its relations with Iraq through rapprochement with Iran.

This became significantly evident before the Arab Spring, where strong relations between Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan grasped attention. Then, Turkey was supporting the Tehran for alleviation of economic and political sanctions that the West imposed against İran. Iran perceived the Arab Spring as an uprising against secular leaders.[ii] Accordingly, it attempted to seize what it called the post 2011 “Islamic awakening” in Egypt and Tunisia.[iii]

When the Muslim Brotherhood seized power in both countries, Iran perceived the group not as a rival but as a collaborator.

It should be noted that the leaders of the Iranian Revolution were heavily influenced by the literature and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei himself reportedly translating some of the Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid Qutb translated into Farsi.[iv]

Therefore, for Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood ability to reach power marks a new equation in the Middle East. During the rule the reign of now-ousted Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, Iran sought to cooperate thoroughly with two major Middle East powers, Egypt and Turkey.

However, when the Syrian crisis broke out in 2011, and because the Muslim Brotherhood failed to stay in power, a new balance of power emerged on the regional political scene. Iran sided with its long-time ally, the regime of Bashar Assad, and provided it with direct military support. On the ground, this alliance created a new arena for competition between Turkey and Iran, as the two major regional powers seek to serve different interests. Nevertheless, although they are competing for influence in Iraq and Syria, Iran and Turkey have never allowed these tensions to escalate into a crisis that can significantly impact their bilateral relations.

Reconciliation amid the Syrian Crisis in 2016

In the wake of the July 15, 2016 failed coup attempt in Turkey, rapprochement between Russia and Turkey, and the launch of Operation Euphrates Shield by the Turkish Armed Forces in Syria’s territory, a trilateral anti-Western cooperation alliance between Ankara, Tehran and Moscow was established marking their cooperation about the Syrian crisis. The emergence of this trilateral cooperation was primarily driven by a reaction to the United States’ policy towards Syria and and its cooperation with the People’s Protection Units (YPG), initially formed by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD).

The establishment of a Kurdish corridor and an autonomous Kurdish region in Syria presents an eminent threat for Turkey’s national security. Turkey claims that the Kurdistan Free Life Party in Iran (PJAK) and the PYD in Syria are not only subsidiary organizations of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), but also an inseparable part of the party designated as a terrorist organization by both Turkey and the United States.[v] However, it is not even assuring for Turkey to deploy its troops along the Kurdish militia in Afrin and Kobani cities to counter the Kurdish threat. 

Moreover, a Kurdish corridor is likely to impose a similar threat also for both Iran and Russia because they are not willing to risk losing Syria's territorial integrity.

The first round of talks between Russia, Turkey and Iran, held in Astana, Kazakhstan, from December 23-26, 2016, presented the first challenge for rapprochement between the three states regarding the Syrian crisis. The three states were able to cooperate and agree unanimously on the need to counter terrorist organizations including ISIS and Al-Nusra Front. Furthermore, Turkey and Tehran put pressure on Russia to prevent Kurdish groups in participating in talks about Syria in both Astana and Geneva.

Kurdish Referendum

The government led by the Justice and Development (AKP) in Turkey has always maintained good relations with Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq through business alliances and economic cooperation. Relations between the Turkish and Iraqi Kurds are of paramount significance in counterbalancing the Iranian influence in the Middle East. The strong relations between Erbil, Kurdistan’s capital city, and Ankara raised the possibility of stronger bilateral cooperation against the PKK in Turkey and across the region.

Despite its support for Barzani’s administration, Turkey strictly opposes the Kurdistan independence referendum, to be held on September 26, 2017. Turkey fears that the domino effect of the outcome of the vote would encourage the PYD to call for independence with the help of the United States, in which case, the territorial integrity of both Syria and Iraq will be at risk.

At the same time, Iran and Turkey share the same stance on the Kurdish issue. Both countries are concerned about Barzani’s tendency to annex the Kirkuk governorate to the KRG. However, Iran is further concerned about the disintegration of Iraq and the formation of a Kurdish state under the leadership of PYD / YPG backed by the US influence in Syria. Moreover, both countries are alarmed by the domino effect of the Kurdish issue would influence their own domestic Kurdish minorities.

Iran, Russia and Turkey: From Cooperation to Military Operation

Recent reports by Turkey’s and Russia’s news organization jointly emphasized that both countries have already reached an agreement about the KRG’s referendum, while negotiations on their joint operation in Idlib will be continued. Some articles even claimed that Iran, Turkey, and Russia could conduct a joint military operation in the Syrian northern province. Russia and Iran aim to set up a safe zone defeating and clearing al-Qaeda-linked forces from areas north of Idlib and south of Turkey. In a bid to continue negotiations between the three states, Russian Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, General Valery Gerasimov, is expected to visit Ankara. According to unofficial information leaked to the Turkish press, Russian Chief of Staff General Gerasimov made a one-day secret visit to Ankara in 20 August.[vi]  

On August 23, 2017, the US Defense Secretary Jim Mattis visited Turkey and held a meeting with the Turkish President. In the meeting, Mattis aimed to “look for ways to help Turkey address its legitimate security concerns- including the fight against the PKK.”[vii] However, despite the US reassurances, Turkey is still concerned about the Pentagon’s support to the Kurdish rebel groups, a situation that pushes Turkey to be more lenient towards its alliance with both Russia and Iran. Yet, this alliance will not be able to survive without the support of the Assad regime.