Recurrent Israeli aggression against Gaza Strip reveals that the continuing presence of an Israeli political right that does not hesitate to shed blood just to please the pro-settlement lobby, beside Palestinian forces insistent on dealing with the Palestinian issue from a narrow factional perspective, neglecting priorities of the Palestinian national project, mean that innocent Palestinians remain a victim of brazen manipulation.
Again, the Israeli aggression proves that as long as Gaza Strip has a very special geo-political connection to Egypt, the latter is destined to be hit from time to time by some shrapnel from attempts to score cheap political points. Also, obviously information and assessments Egypt has concerning goals of the current Israeli attack on Gaza, made it eager – even more than some Palestinians- to reach pacification again at the present time. Of course, such Egyptian desire does not come from its love towards Hamas, or its attempt to retain influence within the Strip, but simply because bad is better than worse!
Conflict in Gaza Scenario
During the last three years, the Hamas regime, in its relationship with the Egyptian regime, moved from an entity that is not an ally to a semi-enemy entity. Still, Cairo makes clear distinction between weakening Hamas through a certain formula in the context of the reconciliation process (as a means to guarantee a non-violent transition of power), and the present Israeli military operation which may not only deter Hamas, meaning to deprive it from its desire and ability to escalate and launch missiles, without weakening its ability to control Gaza as happened in December 2008, January 2009 and November 2012, but also may pave the ground for the scenario of “Da’aishnization” of Gaza, even if this is not what Israel desires!
“Da’aishnization” here means that there will be no one ruling head for Gaza that can be deterred and negotiated with, as a result the fall of Gaza (not necessarily now, but in near future) within the hands of numerous armed groups, fighting each other to gain power. Already there are fears that Gaza now is liable to conflicts that lead not only to deter Hamas, but also to its weakening and making it unable to control the general sphere in Gaza. In turn, this may tempt smaller armed groups within Gaza to compete with Hamas over power.
It is noteworthy that the group of Jund Ansar Allah (Army of the Supporters’ of Allah) already declared in a mosque in Rafah, south of Gaza, in August 2009, the establishment of Islamic State. Yet, Al-Qassam Brigades decisively resolved the matter, killed 24 of emerging group, among them leading members such as Abdelatif Mousa and Abu Abdullah Al-Mohajer. Besides, mounting numbers of Palestinian volunteers among fighters of Al-Nusra Front and ISIS against Al-Asad regime in Syria.
Salafist groups in Gaza declared its support to fight in Syria against Al-Asad regime. In February 2013, Abu Al-Ghany Al-Ansary (former executive in a Jihadi Salafist group in Gaza) mentioned that between 70 and 80 young Palestinian went to Syria to join Jihadi Salafist groups. It is expected that those fighters will gain military experience and links with Al-Qaeda affiliated groups. Thus, when they come back home, they will constitute a grave danger.
Hamas in the Steps of Hezbollah
Some opinions see it unlikely that current Israeli military operation will lead to the aforementioned scenario. Obviously, this assessment is based on strategies adopted by Israel in former operations, that aimed at preventing escalation in Gaza. Israel always preferred the presence of a strong force in Gaza that can be deterred and negotiated with, even if it were Hamas. Yet, these opinions do not take into consideration that current situation has substantively altered.
Hamas during operations Cast Lead (2008) and Pillar of Defense (2012) was the ruling power in Gaza. Thus, there were considerations of political responsibility and retaining power. This is why it always showed willingness to accept settlements and half solutions. Now, things are different following the reconciliation deal between Hamas and head of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), last April, and the formation of a government of national unity in June. So, Hamas left the government, yet still governs. It left official power, but retained its role. This policy is completely different from the one it adopted since 2007 and during the last two confrontations with Israel. This new policy is an attempt on the part of Hamas to walk in the steps of the Lebanese Hezbollah, meaning “to fight without being responsible for power or state”.
Israel strategic calculations
Naturally, any change in the strategic position of one of the two parties of a conflict leaves inevitable effect on the strategic calculations of the other party – Israel. First, it is known that Israel assesses that it is easy to invade the West Bank because of relative low population intensity, while it is difficult to contain it from outside as a result of its size and the length of the Green Line (more than 300 km). On the contrary, it is easy to contain Gaza, but it Is difficult to invade it, because of its small size and high population density. Israeli actions reflect this assessment. During Operation Defensive Shield, 2002, when Israel aimed at achieving a decisive victory during the Second Intifada, Israel invaded the West Bank and temporarily occupied towns under the control of the Palestinian Authority. Also, it invaded trenches of the resistance elements, either to kill or arrest them. But in Gaza, Israel took a different path, because it is difficult to invade it, yet it is easy to contain it from outside. Thus, Israel decided to unilaterally withdraw from Gaza in 2005.
Even before launching Operation Cast Lead in 2008, the experience gained from Operation Defensive Shield was still fresh in Israeli minds. Despite this, the Netanyahu government refused to follow the same strategy, and opted for a limited land operation to weaken the infrastructure of Hamas, but without undermining its ability to control Gaza. The main reason behind such decision is the Israeli desire in deepening Palestinian divisions, while keeping Hamas as a strategic power in Gaza that can be deterred and negotiated with. Israel chose to adopt the same strategy in 2012, as it decided to launch a limited operation that do include any element of land invasion.
Second, the apparent development of Palestinian missile capabilities undermined the hypothesis that Gaza can be contained from outside. By time, risks mount for Israel because of continuous development in the military factions’ abilities, especially missiles. These increasing risks killed the aforementioned theory of the stable strategic force in Gaza for some hawks in Israel. So, it is highly likely that Israel will adopt the same strategy it followed in the West Bank during the Operation Defensive Shield in 2002. Such assessments, beside other considerations, are behind the serious efforts made by Cairo since before the aggression to prevent conflict, and its initiative to stop fighting, officially declared last Tuesday. Yet, some parties still insist on neglecting past lessons.
The fall of Gaza under multiple groups is not the worst scenario for Israel, as some imagine, as long as they will spend time fighting each other, more than the time spent on fighting Israel, as seen today in Syria. The Syrian regime achieved huge gains because of the fighting between Da’aish and Al-Nusra Front and other groups. in Gaza, things may become little different, but Gaza under the rule of Jihadists will strengthen Egyptian-Israeli coordination, and push Israel to expand the occupied line in Gaza, to 2.000 or even 3.000 meters, instead of 1.000 at present.
** This Article is translated and edited from Arabic to English by: Marwa Sabri
