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A Surprising Shift

Is Somalia choosing Moscow over Washington?

14 يونيو، 2023


Somali Foreign Minister Abshir Omar Jama made a surprise visit to Moscow on May 26, 2023, to meet with several Russian officials, including his counterpart Sergey Lavrov. His visit raised several questions regarding motives and implications, particularly in light of the Russian top diplomat’s statements about Russia’s readiness to supply Mogadishu with the necessary military equipment for its ongoing war against the terrorist group Al-Shabaab.

 

Surprise Visit

 

Jama's visit to Moscow followed his talks with Russian ambassador to Somalia, Mikhail Golovanov in early May 2023. The implications of this visit can be presented as follows:

 

1.     Russian military support to Somalia:

Lavrov announced Russia’s readiness to provide military support to the Somali government in its fight against the increasing terrorist threats. Somalia is currently facing severe attacks from the Al-Shabaab movement. The government of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud recently launched a comprehensive military campaign in an attempt to weaken the militant group.

 

2.     Somalia signs a joint cooperation agreement:

Western reports have noted that during his Moscow visit, Jama signed a joint cooperation agreement with Lavrov. Although the content of this agreement was not disclosed by either party, unconfirmed reports suggest that it may involve understandings related to Russian military support to the Somali government and the provision of training programs for the Somali armed forces.

 

3.     Al-Shabaab’s continued attacks:

Jama's visit to Russia came in the wake of a noticeable increase in the frequency of Al-Shabaab attacks in various parts of Somalia. The latest of these attacks targeted a military base of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in the Lower Shabelle region, south of the capital, Mogadishu. The attack occurred during ongoing consultations about the future of the African mission in Somalia.

 

Mogadishu's Objectives


 The Somali foreign minister’s visit to Moscow has significant implications, which can be outlined as follows:

 

1.     Strengthening Cooperation with Moscow:

Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud aims to forge closer ties with Russia, seeking support in addressing the food crisis and securing military assistance to bolster the capabilities of the Somali armed forces in their fight against Al-Shabaab. While previous policies against the militant group have shown effectiveness, the ongoing campaign has faced setbacks due to weak government forces and a lack of comprehensive stability strategies. Exploiting these vulnerabilities, Al-Shabaab has intensified attacks, causing significant losses among Somali forces.

 

2.     Attracting Russian Support:

Since the outbreak of the civil war in Mogadishu in 1992, Somalia has faced an arms embargo imposed by the United Nations Security Council. Despite partial lifting in 2013, the existing restrictions continue to hinder President Sheikh Mohamud's efforts to fight against Al-Shabaab.

Mogadishu aims to secure Moscow's support in addressing this issue during upcoming discussions at the United Nations Security Council. Russia has consistently backed Somalia's demand to lift the arms embargo in previous meetings, often countering the United States' insistence on maintaining it. However, the recent alignment between Mogadishu and Washington has caused a shift, with the US no longer opposing the lifting of the embargo. This change prompted Moscow to obstruct the resolution in the last Security Council meeting.

Thus, one of the main objectives of the Somali foreign minister's visit to Moscow is to persuade Russia to support lifting the arms embargo during the upcoming Security Council meeting, in exchange for backing Moscow's interests in the Horn of Africa and fostering closer ties.

 

3.     Controversy over Military Support to the Somali Government:

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced his country's readiness to provide military support to the Somali government. Somali reports suggested that President Sheikh Mohamud delivered a message to Moscow through Foreign Minister Jama, requesting urgent arms deals to enhance capabilities and address equipment shortages in the ongoing campaign against Al-Shabaab.

However, Western media reports indicate that Moscow's response to the Somali request for military support has been limited due to its current involvement in the war with Ukraine. It suggests that Lavrov's statements might have been for media consumption or could result in minimal military shipments to Mogadishu, which would have a limited impact on the ground.

Additionally, Somali reports revealed discussions about a potential deal involving the deployment of Russia's Wagner Group mercenaries to support the Somali government against Al-Shabaab. However, reaching an agreement on this matter is unlikely, as the United States continues to play a significant role in Somalia.

 

Potential Implications

 

The surprise visit of Jama to Russia carries several potential implications, as outlined below:

 

1.     US Resentment:

Jama's visit to Moscow has raised concerns in Washington and Western allied capitals regarding the potential for Mogadishu to lean towards closer ties with Moscow. This is especially significant given the Biden administration's efforts to reintroduce direct US military presence in Somalia, following the decision by former President Donald Trump to withdraw US troops from the region. Biden aims to enhance Washington's influence in Somalia and the wider Horn of Africa region, while discouraging these countries from aligning with Russia and China.

US concerns are also linked to the presence of an anti-Western elite surrounding the Somali president, who seeks to strengthen ties with Russia and China at the expense of Western alliances. One prominent figure within this elite is Hussein Sheikh Ali, the National Security Advisor to the Somali president.

American reports indicate that President Biden is particularly concerned about the slow progress of security reforms within the Somali government, specifically the cleansing of the National Intelligence and Security Agency from elements loyal to former President Farmajo. These elements are viewed as obstacles to the comprehensive war strategy against Al-Shabaab and contribute to instability in recently liberated areas, particularly in the regions of Galmudug and Hirshabelle.

 

2.     Anticipating US Withdrawal:

Certain members of Congress are urging President Biden to withdraw US forces from Somalia. Although passing this resolution in Congress was obstructed, there is a growing sentiment within the United States that calls for a reassessment of the country's involvement in Somalia, particularly considering the high costs borne by the US.

In light of this, President Sheikh Mohamud may seek to enhance openness to Russia in order to secure broader military support that strengthens the capabilities of the Somali armed forces in their fight against Al-Shabaab. This becomes especially important in the event of a decline in US support or if pressure mounts on the United States not to withdraw. President Sheikh Mohamud has called for an expanded US presence, as well as increased financial and military support, including more drones. However, Washington currently seems unwilling to increase its support for the Somali government, potentially pushing the US to rely more on its regional partners in the Gulf as an alternative to its role in Somalia.

On the other hand, Somalia's openness to Russia could be a response to actions taken by the US administration to bolster support for the secessionist Republic of Somaliland. Reports indicate that Washington has been working to support Hargeisa in exchange for promises of approval to build a US military base in the port of Berbera. However, this plan has faced obstacles, particularly due to the deteriorating security situation in the city of Laascaanood in the Somaliland region.

 

In conclusion, the Somali foreign minister's surprise visit to Russia remains shrouded in ambiguity. Some assessments suggest that the visit could serve as a means to strengthen ties between Mogadishu and Moscow, while others believe it aims to exert pressure on Washington to maintain its support for the Somali government in its fight against the Al-Shabaab movement. Somalia is likely seeking to maximize the benefits of its engagement with international powers in order to garner the highest level of support possible.