Turkey did not anticipate that its former ally, Massoud Barzani, would go to such great lengths in holding the Kurdish independence referendum. Turkey assumed that it was just a political maneuver to improve the terms of negotiations with the Iraqi government, after the differences between the latter and Erbil over oil, budget issues, disputed territories, among other issues that have accumulated over years to make the secession a reality.
As the referendum results revealed that the majority of Kurds support secession, Ankara is currently focused on preventing the establishment of an independent Kurdish State, given that it threatens Turkish national security. This may explain the reasons behind the escalatory measures taken by Turkey against the referendum, which led to forging an alliance with Iran and Baghdad's central government against the region’s independence.
Reasons for Rejection
Turkey rejects the establishment of a Kurdish State for two main reasons. First, a recognition that an independent Kurdish State in Iraq would have significant implications for the Kurdish issue at home, where more than 20 million Kurds are constitutionally deprived of their national identity and of forming any form of local government. Turkish authorities have been engaged in a bloody war with them for nearly half a century in the name of combating PKK terrorism.
Given the recent developments in Turkey and neighboring countries, Syria and Iraq, Turkey finds itself confronting Kurdish issue beyond its borders that overshadows the internal situation, posing a direct threat to its national security. Ankara fears that the referendum would form a basis for the establishment of an independent Kurdish State in Iraq in the coming stage, amid a concern that it would push Turkish Kurds to raise the bar of their national demands, and perhaps trigger a call for a similar referendum to establish a Kurdish State that would alter the geographical maps in the area, set by Sykes-Picot agreement a century ago.
Secondly, Turkey believes the US has a role in Kurdistan referendum, despite the administration’s professed rejection of the referendum. This comes amid tense Turkish-American relations against the backdrop of Washington’s support for the Kurds in Syria and Iraq and providing them with weapons, as well as Ankara’s moves to forge alliance with Russia, and reconsider its entire regional foreign policy in favor of rapprochement with Tehran and Baghdad.
The referendum prompted Ankara to shift its policy towards the Iraqi government. After describing the latter of being sectarian and a satellite of Iran, Tukey allied with the central government against the Kurdish referendum. This change reveals Turkey’s conviction that the establishment of a Kurdish State will change regional alliances, particularly in light of Israel’s overt support for the Kurdish move. One must note that the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) allied with Tel Aviv to create a new status quo in the region that would alter the equation of the Iranian-Turkish rivalry over influence in the region, especially in Iraq and Syria, which would ultimately affect Turkey’s future strategy.
Bargaining Chips
Turkey has many cards to play against Kurdistan unless the latter backtracks on its recent steps towards independence, the most important of which are the following:
1- Economic relations: Turkey is of economic importance to Kurdistan, after the latter increased its economic and trade relations with Ankara over the past years. Kurdistan has been utilizing the Turkish ports to export of oil and gas. Estimates indicate that the volume of trade between Turkey and the Kurdistan region reached nearly five billion dollars and the volume of Turkish investments in the Kurdistan exceeded 40 billion dollars.
Since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 Ankara aimed to build strong economic and trade ties with the KRG. Kurdistan served as a bridge for the Turkish trade to Iraq and the Arab Gulf countries, after its trade was cut off in the wake of the Syrian crisis. In return, the Kurdish oil is exported to the global market through Turkey.
Despite the card of economic relations is important for both sides, it remains a bargaining chip to be used to exercise more pressure on Kurdistan, which finds itself currently completely besieged, given Turkey and Iran talk about closing all border crossings with it.
2- Political relations: Turkey has maintained strong political relations with Kurdistan, to the extent that Ankara used to roll out the red carpet for Barzani, because it was betting on him to weaken the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). However, Ankara’s move towards coordinating with Iran, after accusing it of dominating Iraq’s resolution through its sectarian policy, indicates its quest to exert more political pressure on Kurdistan.
Informing the representative of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by Massoud Barzani, to leave its territories, through a representative of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), as well as restricting the travel of people from Kurdistan to Turkey, reveal that the latter has begun to take deliberate steps to pile political pressure on the region’s leadership.
3- Military option: Although some analysts exclude that Turkey will resort to the military option against Kurdistan, it should not be ruled out as an alternative. If Kurdistan’s leadership declared an independent State, the Turkish Parliament might then authorize the military to take such steps. Ankara has already conducted joint military exercises with Iraq coinciding with military maneuvers with Iran on Kurdish borders.
Perhaps Turkey aims to achieve a more significant goal out of its joint military exercises with Iran and Iraq, which is to try to destroy the PKK strongholds in Qandil and Sinjar mountains. In this regard, Ankara wants to seize the opportunity of its alliance with Tehran and Baghdad against the Kurdish rise.
4- The Turkmen card: During the past years, Turkey ignored talking about the Iraqi Turkmen, due to its improved relations with Erbil. However, it has begun to use this card amidst its dispute with Kurdistan by showing itself as the protector of Turkmen, threatening that any action against them would lead to Ankara’s intervention. This comes at a time where the far-right in Turkey views Kirkuk as a historically Turkish territory that was peeled off under the Convention of 1926 with Britain. Turkey perceives Kirkuk today as equivalent to Turkish Cyprus, which Turkey invaded in 1974.
Two Alternative Paths
What worries Turkey is Kurdistan’s independence, not the referendum per se. Hence, its position will depend on the path that Kurdistan takes in the next phase, either to take advantage of the referendum as a basis for improving the terms of negotiations with the Iraqi government on contentious issues, or as a basis for declaring the independence and secession from Baghdad. There is a huge and strategic difference between the two paths for Ankara, hence it will have two main options:
The first alternative is to adopt policies that place pressure on the Kurdish leaders forcing them to negotiate with Baghdad and backtrack on the independence. Such policies include comprehensive economic, trade and financial blockade, through full coordination with Iraq and Iran. Indeed, this is what Turkey is doing currently, as it considers them effective steps given the economic crisis afflicting Kurdistan and the latter’s heavily dependence on Turkey.
The second alternative is military intervention, which is strongly floated in light of the remarks of the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who described Barzani as traitor, and his constant threats of a military intervention as he did in northern Syria.
Given those two options, the time factor is important as Kurdistan bets on time to change regional and international stances gradually. In doing so, KRG blends negotiation and resilience to cope with the pressures. Yet, the experience of Kurdistan Republic (Mahabad) in 1946, in which the father of Massoud Barzani was a partner, still reminds us of the lack of support from the international community for the Kurdish aspiration to establish an independent state.
