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Limits of Changes in the roles of Anti-ISIS Coalition's Actors in Syria

01 يونيو، 2017


Actors in the US-led Global Coalition to Counter ISIS are now playing new roles in the theatre of operations in Raqqa, ISIS’ self-proclaimed capital. Recently, as part of the war on ISIS, some international powers deployed special operations forces to the theatre to carry out new missions. The move reflects a change in the coalition’s current strategic goals of conquering Raqqa and eliminating ISIS, after previous operations aimed to degrade and undermine the structure of the terror group, and curb its expansion. 

It can possibly be said that the new roles will increase the chances of these powers into becoming significant stakeholders that will take part in the efforts being made to settle the crisis in Syria. Moreover, this would not imply a downgrade of other international partners’ contributions to the war on ISIS. Rather, it maintains the wider coalition and the possibility for capitalizing on it. 

Different Patterns

When the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS was formed in September 2014, its main mission was to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIS. At first, sixty states joined the anti-ISIS coalition, and two years later the number increased to 66. Less than a half of these states, or precisely 27 states, joined the military component of the coalition and conducted combat operations and logistic missions, according to an August 24, 2016 study conducted by Kathleen J. McInnis, an international security analyst for the Congressional Research Service.

When the coalition was formed, its campaign had four objectives: Stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters; supporting military operations, capacity building, and training; cutting off ISIS’ access to financing and funding; and addressing associated humanitarian crises. 

The US Pentagon’s reports, known as DOD News, reflected these objectives. On April 6, 2016, one such report stated that the coalition had degraded the enemy’s ability to move freely on the battlefield, while regaining significant amounts of territory and degrading ISIS’s leadership and resources.

However, at the current stage different types of operations are being conducted. Previously, the operations were limited to airstrikes, but recently, new high-profile ground operations were introduced. However, it cannot be argued that these operations can address failures of the coalition’s previous operations, but they are carrying out the coalition command’s combat plans announced by the US, Britain and France. 

The new role of these powers bear several indications, the most prominent of which is a change in the type of coalition’s operations that aims to bolster ground troops in a professional manner using capabilities that such troops cannot conduct. 

It is known that the land forces of the troops of the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces, (SDF) are tasked with conducting ground operations in Raqqa. As these troops moved from the perimeter surrounding Raqqa City (the desert and the countryside) and entered strategic positions such as al-Tabqa City, special operations forces were deployed to conduct special operations such as the liberation of al-Tabqa Dam and al-Tabqa Airport. 

Other high-profile operations included disengagement between troops to prevent potential clashes in areas such as the lines of contact between the SDF and Turkish forces. These include operations conducted by the US Marines in the north and strikes against ISIS’ gatherings, as is the case in Deir ez-Zour province.

This change in the coalition’s role can be explained by studying the nature, type and pattern of the new interventions that in turn reflect a development in the roles of four major international powers, namely the United States, France, Britain and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 

In early April 2017, the British newspaper the Daily Mail, revealed that the Special Air Service (SAS), a Special Forces unit of the British Army, joined the SDF and US troops.   

The intelligence allowed the soldiers to work with the Syrian Democratic Forces in liberating the dam and airport in al-Tabqa. While the exact number of the squad of elite SAS troops was disclosed, the paper revealed the operation they had carried out using a C-130 Hercules military aircraft in a desert area west of Raqqa, where the al-Tabqa dam and al-Tabqa airbase are located. 

Moreover, Britain deployed 400 soldiers to carry out surveillance operations in both Syria and Iraq and using Tornado GR4, a two-seat all-weather attack aircraft capable of delivering a wide variety of weapons, as well as in-flight refuelling tanker aircraft.

The new French Minister of Defense, Sylvie Goulard, on May 26, 2017, told Europe 1 radio that “we have special forces performing surgical operations. France fully fulfils its role in the coalition. Our planes are there.”

As part of conventional missions with the global coalition, France contributed 1,000 personnel in theatre of operations in support of missions in Syria and Iraq, that include air-combat and air-combat support. France’s contribution also includes 6 Dassault Rafale M multi-role fighters, 8 Dassault Mirage 2000D fighters, support aircraft that include 1 KC- 135FR tanker, one E-3F AWACS (Airborne Warning And Control System) on a rotational basis, one Breguet Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft, and sea-based operations that include 1 La Fayette-class frigate. The Charles de Gaulle Carrier Strike Group also supports counter-ISIS operations on a rotational basis.

At the same time, on May 24, 2017, the Secretary-General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, announced that the alliance is joining the US-led international coalition fighting ISIS, but will not contribute to ground combat operations requested earlier by the United States. This also coincides with the new role of actors operating on the theatre of operations in Syria and Raqqa in particular. 

NATO, at a July 2016 summit of heads of states and governments of member states held in Warsaw, specified its contribution to the anti-ISIS coalition saying it was providing direct AWACS support to increase the coalition's situational awareness. 

However, the alliance recently announced that it is stepping up its role in the fight against ISIS. Stoltenberg said NATO will step up its practical support with more AWACS support, more flying time and more information sharing and air-to-air refuelling. It will also establish a new intelligence fusion cell at its headquarters addressing terrorism, including foreign fighters, and appoint a special coordinator for NATO’s efforts fighting terrorism. 

Potential Consequences

The expanded role of the anti-ISIS coalition forces would impose, in the current stage, several consequences of which the following stand out: 

1- Accelerating operations in Raqqa. The major combat operations - conducted in Raqqa to eliminate ISIS elements, estimated by international reports at 4000 militants in Raqqa alone- have come into force, significantly after Iraq’s recent announcement that the Iranian-allied People Mobilization Forces ( Hashd al-Shaabi), have reached the Syrian border. The announcement signals that major operations in Mosul are almost coming to a close.

While the United States is securing borders with Iraq’s neighbors to prevent ISIS’ forces from infiltrating - as was the case in its recent airstrike - all the preparations were completed to advance towards eliminating the organization in Raqqa following the siege. 

2- Different command for operations. Although the Hashd al-Shaabi and the Iraqi government police and army forces jointly commanded anti-ISIS operations, special operations forces did not have a role in ground operations. However, while the nature of the conflict in Syria imposes this type of operations. Undoubtedly, the theatre of operations and the type of ISIS militants’ defense tactics in Raqqa, the organization’s main stronghold, are tighter than in any other location. 

3- Special plans developed by the four coalition partners. Some states involved in the global anti-ISIS coalition will continue to carry out conventional operations as requested by the coalition’s command, while the four major international powers will play high-profile roles that suit the demands of phased combat operations conducted as part of a mission to eliminate ISIS. 

No doubt, these new role will increase the chances of involved forces in taking part in the process of reshaping the political and security arrangements in Syria in the coming stage, or in the formation of a main task-force that will be following up the next stages of ISIS after the fall of Raqqa.