The 2024 US presidential election has sparked serious global contemplation about the future of American foreign policy. Decades ago, the United States' primary focus was on the Soviet Union. However, the end of the Cold War and the USSR's collapse prompted forward-looking analysts to shift their attention towards Asia, particularly China's capacity to compete.
Recent developments, such as the Ukraine war—and the ensuing tensions with Russia—and the Gaza conflict, have temporarily diverted attention from the US-China competition. Nevertheless, this issue remains highly topical.
Throughout my extensive diplomatic career, I have had the privilege of hearing high-level American officials, including Secretaries of State, share their thoughts on the driving forces and priorities of US foreign policy. The consistent answer I received was that American foreign policy is always catalyzed by a perceived enemy. This perception also serves as the most persuasive domestic justification for the costs and risks associated with America's global exercise of power.
Moreover, my diplomatic experiences have afforded me ample opportunities to engage with Chinese officials on their foreign policy. My observations here are shaped by both my understanding of American politics and diplomacy, as well as Chinese perspectives on American conceptualization and policies regarding Beijing. These insights are particularly relevant as they heavily influence expectations for either a Harris or Trump administration in the coming years.
Beijing: A Growing Threat
China's initial slow growth and cautious global political positioning, whereby it aligned itself with the developing world, initially resulted in muted American concern towards Beijing. This period of relative indifference was followed by attempts to shape China's socio-political development through economic tools, particularly by promoting more efficient commerce and fostering a growing appetite for consumerism.
These economic strategies dovetailed seamlessly with Deng Xiaoping's reform programs, which included the development of a "socialist market economy," corporatization policies, and encouragement of China's private sector. As Beijing's economic weight increased, making it more competitive on world markets, once-latent concerns in the US began to surface.
I vividly recall heated discussions among pundits at the turn of the century, warning against China's acquisition of American firms on the continent. These concerns intensified with the emergence of the more assertive Xi Jinping as president, reaching a fever pitch following the 20th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.
Since October 2022, the Party has held three annual plenary sessions where economic aspirations were prominent, but so too were security policies. The Ukraine-Russia war further heightened Western anxiety worldwide, especially in the United States, where a "you're either with us or against us" mentality largely prevailed. China, in contrast, adopted a measured approach to the conflict, refraining from admonishing Russia except when threats of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction were made.
This stance has exacerbated existing concerns regarding China's pervasive technology, growing economic weight, expanding global footprint in markets, increasing role as an energy and mineral consumer, and more assertive posture in Asia.
China and the US Elections
National security documents and official statements from both the Biden and Trump administrations clearly reflect that mainstream America now views China, rather than Russia, as the other global superpower in the foreseeable future. Consequently, China has become the state that causes the greatest concern to the United States. Indeed, the entire American body politic is preoccupied with China, whose vast economic and technological potential remains unparalleled, even as the US maintains its military and political influence.
Contrary to his deal-making rhetoric and branding, Trump surprisingly ushered in a rather confrontational policy towards China. This approach extended well beyond economic matters, as Beijing was labeled a "revisionist power" and even a threat. Biden, the traditionalist, did not shift gears upon taking office. In fact, he intensified certain measures, such as imposing stricter caps on technology transfers, further confirming that both parties now envision China as a major adversary.
To China's dismay and surprise, this crucial strategic relationship was being addressed in America in a populist fashion, feeding into fears and heightening anxieties. This approach stands in stark contrast to the more sophisticated Nixon/Kissinger approach to global politics, which carefully balanced threats and opportunities.
Given its traditionally strategic outlook, China likely does not anticipate a major shift in American policy, regardless of whether the election results in a Harris/Walz or Trump/Vance administration. Nevertheless, Beijing will closely monitor the tone of engagement and the concrete measures taken by the upcoming administration. As the US is widely perceived to be in a state of transition, China is unlikely to draw hasty conclusions, particularly since they have observed similar policies from both the Trump and Biden administrations—albeit with a more aggressive tone and controlled measures from the former, and a subdued tonality but equally assertive actions from the latter.
If the Democrats win, there may be a better understanding of Chinese culture and history within the administration, given that Vice Presidential candidate Tim Walz has lived in China. It is noteworthy, however, that Walz has also been a vocal advocate for addressing Chinese human rights violations, suggesting that relations will not be entirely smooth sailing.
In essence, China remains rather perplexed about America and even agnostic as to who is elected, viewing the outcome as having limited short-term implications. Nevertheless, Beijing is deeply interested in the long-term effects of the elected administration's policies on the ongoing "China debate" in America.
Three Possible Scenarios
From the Orient, the "China debate" in the United States is characterized by three distinct schools of thought, all concerned about China but advocating different approaches and tools for American policy.
The first group of analysts frames the issue in Cold War terms, arguing that the competition with China "must be won, not managed." In contrast, a second group of strategists views the "competition" not as a zero-sum game, but rather as "a condition to be managed rather than solved." The third group of strategists seems to perceive "accommodation" as the only realistic approach to this persistent challenge.
While these perspectives dominate the American discourse, it is crucial to recognize that only the Chinese can accurately portray their global foreign policy vision and their outlook toward America. Over the years, Beijing has revealed its stance gradually and incrementally, often reactively incorporating the threat component while emphasizing cooperation, respect, and shared interests. This approach has found considerable resonance in the developing world.
Beijing is acutely aware that Sino-American relations will have a paramount, though not exclusive, effect on its interests and foreign policies. As such, China and America will be closely monitoring each other in the decades to come. Given their size and influence on the global stage, it is increasingly important that no major misunderstandings occur between these two powers.
