In the political lexicon of modern Russia, specially under President Vladimir Putin, the term ‘siloviki’, which literally means people of power, became dominant. It is used to describe the power of current and former security and military officers. Although siloviki came to power in the time of former president Boris Yeltsin, they today dominate Russian politics not only because of these figures themselves and personal connections, but also because of the way they run the whole state.
What makes this form of government unique is their loyalty to their institutions and collective values despite all internal conflicts and contradictions. Siloviki are known for distrusting civilian officials, who are also divided along political and ideological lines.
It is perhaps useful to cite the Russian siloviki tradition, which is similar to the phenomenon of “strongmen” in Africa, to better understand and describe Sudan’s experience after the removal of former president Omar. This analysis seeks to explain how the “siloviki” form of government gained prominence in Sudan after the failure of the military-civilian diarchy, on the one hand, and the rise of General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, and his controversial visit to Moscow amid Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine. What is it that Sudan wants from Russia? and what does Moscow want from Sudan?
The Siloviki are Coming
After the transitional government led by Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, opposition and protest committees gained traction when exceptional measures were put in place by army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in October 2021. The protestors took to the street because they felt sad that Sudan’s dreams were lost. Although the active civilian masses are evidently riddled with political and many ideological contradictions, they put on the cover of opposing the military and take up the slogan of “no negotiations, no partnership and no compromise.”
On the other hand, and although the military do not constitute one homogenous bloc with disagreement simmering between services of the armed forces, they all have collective interests that they are desperately defending. This invokes the Russian “siloviki” tradition by reliance on the military and security institutions and their networks of interests that represent a major source of political support for them.
The main difference between Sudan’s current regime and former military regimes, dominated by elite figures from the River Nile State, is perhaps the presence of General Hemedti, Sudan’s strongman who will not hesitate to break away from under the mantle of al-Burhan if that is deemed necessary for the interests of the military. Hemedti does not belong to the traditional tribal and demographic power centers. The man who belongs to an Arab tribe in Darfur became a leader of the Janjaweed that was transformed by al-Bashir’s regime into the Rapid Support Forces. Through moves inside and outside Sudan, Hemedti is trying to present himself as the savior leader. But can he take advantage of Sudan’s complicated situation, the worsening economic and security situation to get rid of Hamdok’s legacy just as Putin did with the remnants of the reformers from the days of Yeltsin?
Sudan, which suffers from a chromic identity crisis that led to the secession of the south aiming to break away from the traditional dominance of politicians from the River Nile state, even if it means that the military represented by Hemedti will take control. Back in 1967, the Department of History at the University of Khartoum organized a conference on “Sudan in Africa”, a title that posed a challenge to Khartoum’s intelligentsia who strongly believe in Sudan’s Arab identity. The conference concluded by adopting a call to view Sudan as a bridge between Africa and the Arab nation, a concept embraced by secular politicians concerned that close ties with the rest of the Arab nation would put the country at risk of Radical Islamism. One year later, in 1968, internationally renowned Kenyan political thinker Ali Mazrui, in a lecture at the University of Khartoum, described Sudan as a country that represents a marginal situation that lies on the Arab-African lines of contact. Despite its negative connotation, the concept reflects plurality and cultural interaction that is a requirement across Africa.
This is the right moment for the emergence of the siloviki “strongman” who can preserve what is left of Sudan as a united entity as the world might slip into a new cold war. The world is busy with the war in Ukraine and the rise of Russia and China in the world order. Although the United States remains in control of global financial systems and lending institutions, it is busy reactivating the Monroe Doctrine and even exercising the policy of “double containment” against both Russia and China.
Goals of Hemedti’s Visit to Moscow
General Hemedti, deputy head of the Transitional Military Council, and head of the Rapid Support Forces, made the controversial 8-day visit to Moscow on February 24, on an invitation from the Russian government. Putting an end to the stalemate in Sudan may allow Hemedti to simulate the Russian siloviki tradition to become a leader with unlimited power, albeit behind the scenes. Inside Sudan, many observers were surprised by the timing of Hemedti’s visit, especially because the Russian military forces are busy carrying out a large-scale attack on Ukraine, and also because of a lack of a consensus transitional government in Sudan after al-Burhan put exceptional measures in place in October 2021. It is no secret that his trip to Moscow, Hemedti’s earlier visits to Ethiopia, South Sudan and Arab Gulf countries and stopover in Egypt, where he met the chief of Egyptian intelligence, reinforce his position in the current balance of power inside Sudan. He is engineering his network of alliances inside and outside Sudan, which was evidenced by Sudan’s abstinence from voting an international resolution condemning the Russian intervention in Ukraine.
Hemedti’s visit to Moscow reveals the dynamics of the ruling regime in Sudan. That is, because he still feels confident enough about the situation inside Sudan, Hemedti is making “political safaris” outside Sudan. This is not his first overseas trip since his rise to power in 2019. Although he made the majority of these visits to African and Middle Eastern countries, Hemedti is not too concerned that any rivals inside the security and military institutions could move against him. Despite the “romantic revolutionary demands” of the civilian opposition, and the consequences of al-Burhan’s exceptional measures in October 2021, the military institution now has more power than before, even under its national and international isolation. The actual support for Sudan’s ruling regime, according to the siloviki tradition, comes from outside the military institution i.e. from some rebel groups in Darfur and the civilian remnants of al-Bashir’s Islamist regime.
In any case, it is valid to elaborate about a new strategic approach to the forging of Sudan’s foreign relations where the ruling regime seeks support from Russia and China. So, what is it that Sudan wants from Russia?
1. Political support at international forums:
Russia, which has veto power, became a major supporter of Sudan's army. In its immediate reaction to al-Burhan’s seizure of power, the Kremlin emphasized that the development was not a coup d’etat, and that condemning the Sudanese army is considered foreign intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Russia took this position at the Security Council where it vetoed a resolution condemning the measures taken by al-Burhan. There is evidence that actors with ties to Russia launched a media campaign to weaken the protests and offered consultations and support to the Rapid Support Forces, the second pillar of the armed forces, to stoke European fears about migrants.
2. Financial and economic support:
Hemedti’s visit to Moscow should be viewed within the context of Sudan’s economic crisis, which was worsened when the United States and western countries halted financial aid to Sudan, and scrapped a previous decision to deliver significant debt relief to the African country. The move caused Sudan's currency to plummet against the US dollar while inflation rate remains one of the highest globally. Despite the importance of this economic incentive, Russia is not a donor state because its economy does not match the economies of donor states, including China. That is why Hemedti’s visit to Russia is likely just a sign of strategic shift and a maneuver aimed at taking advantage of concerns in the United States and western countries that Sudan, despite its history of turning to the West and negotiating over starting relations with Israel, would be now capable of turning to the other camp i.e. Russia and China.
3. Military and security support:
In 2019, Sudan became the second-biggest buyer of Russian arms in Africa, after Algeria. Russian arms account for about half of Sudan’s arms purchases. Additionally, Sudan’s navy hosted a Russian frigate in Port Sudan in March 2021 as part of efforts to promote relations between the two countries and cement ties between their navies. Moreover, in January 2019, the Russian foreign ministry stressed that Russian contractors trained Sudanese troops and police forces in response to anti-government popular protests. Some 500 contractors from Russian private security firm Wanger Group worked in Khartoum, Port Sudan and South Darfur. Wagner gradually expanded its activity to train Sudan’s intelligence and security personnel.
Moscow’s Three Goals
Moscow seeks to achieve three strategic goals in Sudan to serve its quest to revive its status as a great power in the world order, especially in the post-Ukraine-war era. These goals can be outlined as follows:
1. Expanding Russia’s influence in Africa:
It is no secret that building friendly relations with Sudan also serves Russia’s strategic interests in Africa, where it is seeking to expand its influence through deeper and closer ties with Khartoum. A look at the map would reveal that Russians attempted to get a foothold in Libya through backing General Khalifa Haftar, Commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA). Elsewhere in Africa, they also reinforced their presence in the Central African Republic and filled the security void in Mali after France’s withdrawal. The moves show that Russians are carrying out a strategy to rebuild international influence through Africa where relations with Sudan are the key to Africa, according to toppled leader Omar al-Bashir.
2. Access to gold and other natural resources:
Although official data show that Sudan does not export gold to Russia, British newspaper The Daily Telegraph reported that the Kremlin is the largest foreign player in Sudan’s huge mining industry. Russia smuggled hundreds of tons of illegal gold from Sudan over the past few years as part of efforts to protect Russia from expected international sanctions over the war in Ukraine. Russia’s central bank now holds more than four times the amount of gold it did in 2010, which continued towards the creation of a war fund consisting of a mix of foreign currency and huge local gold assets. It should be noted that Russia is the third largest producer of gold in the world. Evidently, attempting to mitigate the impact of international sanctions is a feature of Russia’s policy in Africa. This becomes evident during Russia’s expansion of influence in Mali, Burkina Faso and the Central African Republic. Russia is scrambling to get access to African countries rich in natural resources and seeks strong international support to protect itself from the conditions and development models imposed by the West.
3- Building a Naval Base in Port Sudan:
Russia signed a deal with former president Omar al-Bashir to build a naval base on the Red Sea. But after the army toppled al-Bashir and a transitional government was formed and led by civilians, the deal was suspended. After al-Burhan seized power, the military leaders suggested that the deal could be revived. During his visit to Moscow, Hemedti said he was open to plans to build a Russian naval base in Sudan. Moscow is putting pressure on Khartoum to maintain significant military presence in the Red Sea. The Sudanese army objected to the location of the planned base. The Russians expressed their preference for the peninsula of Suakin, 50km south of Port Sudan or Flamingo Bay, north of Port Sudan, which already has a pier. The deal, published last year on the official portal of government documents, allows Russia to keep up to four navy ships in the Red Sea, including nuclear powered ones. The agreement can be automatically extended for 10-year periods if neither party expressed intention to terminate it. In return, Russia will supply Sudan with arms and military equipment.
In conclusion, Russia’s favorite scenario in Sudan is a transition to some form of civilian government that can provide the military with immunity to run its institutions, on the one hand, and an influential voice in the process of foreign-policy making. Such a scenario will be appropriate for Russia’s major partners such as China as well as regional powers, as it will prevent more sanctions from being imposed once again to restrict Russia’s economic relations with Sudan. Additionally, this scenario would allow Moscow to negotiate directly with Sudan’s army, which will contain the civil society opposition to Russian presence. As such, such a preference is likely to encourage Russia to declare sponsorship of political transition in Sudan on the condition that the interests of the military are not affected.
International pressure has led to Hamdok’s return to office as leader of the government on November 21, 2021, such a concession did not calm protesters angered by the army’s seizure of power. As a result, Hamdok resigned out of disappointment on January 2, 2022 after he failed to build consensus between protestors and the army generals and to reach an agreement with the military to form a new technocrat government. However, the question remains: Will Sudan’s alliance with Russia succeed in backing the military government amid the mounting domestic and international pressure?
