أخبار المركز
  • أحمد عليبة يكتب: (هاجس الموصل: لماذا يخشى العراق من التصعيد الحالي في سوريا؟)
  • محمود قاسم يكتب: (الاستدارة السريعة: ملامح المشهد القادم من التحولات السياسية الدرامية في كوريا الجنوبية)
  • السيد صدقي عابدين يكتب: (الصدامات المقبلة: مستقبل العلاقة بين السلطتين التنفيذية والتشريعية في كوريا الجنوبية)
  • د. أمل عبدالله الهدابي تكتب: (اليوم الوطني الـ53 للإمارات.. الانطلاق للمستقبل بقوة الاتحاد)
  • معالي نبيل فهمي يكتب: (التحرك العربي ضد الفوضى في المنطقة.. ما العمل؟)

Ongoing Escalation

Implications of Israel’s recent attack on Iranian missile facility

17 أكتوبر، 2021


Private Israeli intelligence and satellite image analysis firm ImageSat International, on September 30, released images showing damage at an Iranian missile production facility outside Tehran, following an explosion earlier in the week. The blast killed at least two people on site, completely destroyed a quarter of the building and caused additional damage on the roof along the entire structure.

Official responses

The sabotage operation comes amid escalating tensions between Israel and Iran. Both countries reacted differently, as per the following:

1- Iran’s denial: 

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), through the Iranian media, claimed, on September 26, that a fire broke out at the site, which it described as “research self-sufficiency center”, killing two workers because the fire went out of control.

The center is affiliated with the IRGC’s Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization, sanctioned by the United States Department of Treasury in 2017 over its involvement in researching and developing ballistic missiles.

2- Israeli hints: 

The Israeli media, including the Times of Israel and the Jerusalem Post, published the satellite images released by ImageSat International, shortly after the blast hit the facility. They published before and after images showing the damage caused to the Iranian facility. The Israeli media asserted that it was an IRGC secret missile base.

At the official level, Israel implicitly claimed responsibility for the attack. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly, on September 27, only a few days after the explosion, signaled that Israel is ready to act alone, if necessary, against threats posed by Iran.  

Implications of the Israeli attack 

1- Determination to destroy Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities: 

The incident is part of Israel’s plans to degrade Iran’s capabilities. Chief of Staff of Israel’s Defense Forces, Aviv Kochavi, on October 5, vowed that Tel Aviv will continue to conduct military operations to destroy Iran’s military capabilities, including its nuclear program in any arena and at any time. 

The attack, which is the first of its kind after conservative Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi took office, sends a message that Israel is determined to destroy Iran’s capabilities and does not worry about Raisi’s attempt to present himself as a hardline president who, unlike his predecessor Hassan Rouhani, will adopt escalatory measures. This will embarrass both Raisi and the IRGC.  

2- Determination to deter Iranian threats: 

The attack is part of Tel Aviv’s endeavor to settle scores with Iran and retaliate Iran’s attack on Israeli-operated oil tanker Mercer Street near Oman in July. Israel threatened a harsh response to the Iranian attack, which left two people dead.

Since taking office, Raisi introduced reforms in Iran’s security and intelligence agencies to address their failure to counter such operations. He appointed former commanders from the IRGC to these institutions. Esmail Khatib became Minister of Intelligence, while General Ahmad Vahidi became Minister of Interior. Raisi also appointed unknown hardliners to inject new blood in these agencies. These appointments, however, failed to prevent this kind of attacks on Iran and would fail to preempt any future ones.

3- Weaken Iran’s stand in Vienna nuclear talks: 

Israel is aware that Iran is pursuing an approach based on procrastination and foot-dragging over returning to the nuclear talks. Its aim is to buy time to enhance its missile and nuclear capabilities and strengthen its position in the negotiations.

That is why Israel is making intensified efforts with the US Administration to prevent Tehran from becoming a nuclear threshold state and at the same time to allow Washington to continue talks with Iran towards a nuclear agreement. Accordingly, Prime Minister Bennett visited Washington in August to coordinate these efforts. But secret meetings held between the US national security adviser and Israeli counterpart to discuss Iran’s threats were unveiled.

Evidently, an agreement appears to have been reached between the two sides whereby Israel would conduct sabotage operations greenlighted by the US to target Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities to pressure Iran into sitting at the negotiating table.

4- Another step towards closing in on Iran: 

The latest attack comes amid Israel’s efforts to surround Iran from all sides. Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, on September 30, visited Bahrain, mainly to discuss efforts to counter threats posed by Iran in the Arabian Gulf.

On its part, Iran believes that Israel pursues an active policy aimed at surrounding it by building bases in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region to conduct intelligence operations against Iran, and also by maintaining a foothold in Azerbaijan. That is what prompted Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, at a joint press conference with his Armenian counterpart, held on October 4, noted that Tehran has concerns over Israel’s presence in Azerbaijan.

Iran’s response options

1- Escalation: 

In this approach, Iran would retaliate to the latest attack by escalating against Israel through its proxy militant groups operating in Syria and Lebanon, or by attacking Israeli ships in the Arabian Gulf and Oman Sea. Iran might also carry out attacks against Israel’s interests in any part of the world. This was evident when Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s spokesman Matan Sidi, on October 4, accused Iran of orchestrating an attempted attack against Israeli business people living in Cyprus. 

This approach is likely because unlike Rouhani’s government, Raisi’s government, which is dominated by the Pasdaran, wants to take a tough stand against recurrent attacks targeting Iran’s capabilities so as not to show its weakness to the Iranians. Moreover, Iran continues to vow to take revenge for the killing of former commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani, and its top nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh.

2- Pacification: 

In this approach, and despite its foot-dragging over returning to the nuclear talks in Vienna, Iran would have no other option than coming to the negotiating table. Accordingly, its procrastination is only aimed to minimize concessions it will have to make. 

Iran is aware of the fact that opening a new front in the conflict with Israel will prompt Washington’s to increase its support to Israel, which eventually would lead to more sabotage strikes against Iranian activities. That is why Iran would avoid responding to Israel, and Raisi would even resume talks with the United States in return for Israel stopping sabotage operations against Iran.

To conclude, Iran’s taking up either one of these two options is still under careful assessment because of the exceptional situation that Iran is going through. Not retaliating Israeli recurrent assaults would embarrass Raisi, the supreme leader Ali Khamenei and the IRGC. However, Iran’s retaliation would attract stronger international pressure on itself, just like its attack on Mercer Street did, while also prompting more sabotage attacks on its missile and nuclear facilities.