The ongoing developments in Yemen provide an invaluable opportunity for both ISIS and al-Qaeda to expand in the coming period, especially after former president Ali Abdullah Saleh was killed. The wider chaos spreads, the better the chances for the two organizations to survive and sustain their activity. This is perhaps what encourages them to escalate attacks on the legitimate government forces, because a stable Yemen represents a threat to them. Al-Qaeda in particular would seek to expand its network of alliance with tribes, but both organizations would spread their ideology and recruit foreign fighters in a bid to strengthen their ranks in the coming period.
The fast-paced developments in Yemen, accelerated by the death of ex-president Saleh a few days after he broke up an alliance with the rebel Houthi group. Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi hailed Saleh’s death as a “historic, exceptional and great day in which the conspiracy of betrayal and treason failed.”
Soon after internationally recognized President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi called upon all Yemenis to rise and fight the “criminal and terrorist (Houthi) militia”, fighting intensified between the Houthis and forces loyal to the General People’s Congress in the capital Sanaa and spread to other governorates including Hajjah. Later on, some groups loyal to Saleh announced that they had joined the government forces, and the situation across the country looked, more than ever, like an open civil war.
Amid these dangerous developments, the question begs itself: What is the position of major terrorist organizations in Yemen, and how can they benefit from these developments in the coming period?
Thorny Situation
Both ISIS and al-Qaeda take an antagonistic position on the legitimate government and its armed forces as well as the rebel Houthi group.
Al-Qaeda carried out more attacks on the government forces than on the Houthi rebels. As part of its conventional activity, al-Qaeda attacked security checkpoints in the town of Shuqra, Abyan governorate on March 5, 2017, killing five soldiers, and a camp of the Hadrami Elite forces in Badha area of Doan district in Hadhramaut governorate in July killing two soldiers.
The organization also assassinated senior security officials. Al-Qaeda killed Colonel Nasser Saleh al-Ja’ari in July, Colonel Ali Badahya, the deputy chief of security in Doan district in September, only hours after assassinating Abdullah Barashid near the town of Labna in Doan.
ISIS too carried out similar but fewer attacks on government forces, rather than on the Houthis. In August 2017, it attacked cadets of the so-called al-Mihdar battalions of the volunteer Popular Resistance in Aden, and killed close to 60 and wounded more than 100 others. It also attacked a command center of the so-called Security Belt forces in downtown Aden on November 14, killing 9 and wounding 15 others.
Priority of Enmity
Although the two organizations attack the legitimate government forces and the Houthi rebels, their attacks on the latter appear to be a bid to throw up a smokescreen, despite the fact that their ideologies require otherwise, according to the famous rule of “prioritizing enmity”. According to this rule, those who embrace a different creed i.e. the so-called “deviant sects such as the Shia and the Rafidah (rejectionists or those who refused to recognize Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman as the legitimate successors of Prophet Mohammad). The prioritization reveals that the two organizations’ are capable of bypassing their ideology to serve purely organizational and material interests under broad religious slogans such as Jihad “Jihad in the Way of Allah”.
Lifeline
Considering the two organizations’ position towards the legitimate government forces, and their desire to take advantage of chaos in Yemen to further spread in the country, the current state of anarchy represents a lifeline for both of them. Therefore the potential strategy that the two organizations may pursue in the coming period can be outlined as follows:
1- Escalating attacks on the government forces. The ideological systems of the two organizations require them to focus on attacking the Houthis rather than on other parties especially amid the current developments that bolstered the Houthis’ influence across the country. However, they will not only continue to attack the legitimate government, but are also expected to escalate such attacks to create a state of chaos that enables them to spread and expand presence. That is, government forces that emerge victorious would pose a threat to their presence and very existence. Moreover, the Houthis’ presence on the ground would potentially give an opportunity to both organizations to expand and recruit Yemeni young people under the slogan of “the obligation to counter the danger posed by the Radidah in the country.”
2- Carrying out limited attacks on the Houthis. The two organizations are also likely to carry out attacks on the Houthi rebels in the coming period. Although potentially limited, and fewer than attacks targeting government forces, such attacks would be carried out to avoid losing their “popular incubator” already angered by the Houthi expansion and escalation. Another goal is to maintain their slogan of “the obligation of Jihad against Shia”, especially because they claim that they defend Sunnis. This would allow them to create an incubator to benefit from human resources and secure support from tribes as well as showing the Yemeni people that they are involved in countering the Shiite threat in the country.
3- Expanding Tribal Alliances. Al-Qaeda in particular is likely to expand its alliance with tribes and take advantage of tribal dissatisfaction with the Houthis, especially after ex-president Ali Abdullah Saleh was assassinated. The Houthis’ killing of Saleh exposed their ugly face and proved that they are capable of killing of whoever disagrees with them. Al-Qaeda is aware that such alliances with tribes can ensure major support against the legitimate government, the Arab Coalition, as well as US strikes, which were escalated recently. ISIS, whose ideology prevents it from forging such alliances, would offset this by seeking instead to spread, recruit more operatives and ensure presence in new areas, especially those whose local populace fear that the Houthis would expand to.
4- Expanding Dawa (religious proselytization) Activity. It is likely that both al-Qaeda and ISIS will take advantage of escalation by the Houthis to spread their ideology as much as possible, through traditional ways, or the more attractive social services, offering protection in their areas of influence for those who fear the Houthi expansion. Both use the Houthi threat also dubbed “the danger of the Rafidah) to recruit more Yemeni youth, although their escalating attacks on the legitimate government forces belonging to the Sunni branch reflects an obvious ideological contradiction and terrorist pragmatism.
5- Recruiting Foreign Fighters. The ongoing developments are likely to add a stark sectarian dimension to the crisis in Yemen. Both organizations would seek to depict the war in Yemen as a conflict between the Sunnis and the Shiites. This can allow the organizations to recruit foreign fighters, especially because the developments are likely to make the security situation in Yemen more volatile. As armed clashes between the Houthis and forces and tribes loyal to ex-president Saleh go on, it will be easier for the two organizations to achieve their goal and take advantage of the increasing phenomenon of roving fighters, who come from conflict zones after their organizations collapse and look for new zones to operate in.
A Terrorist Wave
That said, it can possibly be asserted that the coming period may offer a new opportunity for al-Qaeda and its rival ISIS to spread to new areas taking advantage of the deterioration of security situation. Accordingly, they would continue to carry out terrorist attacks against the legitimate government forces. However, potential attacks by al-Qaeda would be more fierce. This perhaps means that the country will likely witness a wave of terrorist attacks primarily targeting the Saudi-led Arab Coalition and the legitimate Yemeni government forces.
