Iran has shown a particular interest in improving its bilateral relations with Turkey, mainly at the economic level. This was evident in the visit of Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani, to Turkey, on December 20, to participate in the fifth session of the Supreme Council for Strategic Relations between the two countries, accompanied by a mostly economic delegation. Tehran believes that there are several factors, related to developments in the regional and international arenas over the past period, which can help achieve this goal, namely increasing the volume of trade between both countries to USD 30 billion. However, Iran’s betting on the Turkish role seems to have limits due to the ever-changing and unstable nature of Turkish policy, which casts doubts over the possibility of reaching such level of rapprochement.

Numerous Factors  

Iran believes that there are several factors that could enhance the prospects for developing bilateral cooperation with Turkey during the coming period. Tehran further thinks that this will help it withstand the repercussions of US sanctions and mounting disagreements with many international and regional powers over its role and nuclear and missile programs. The most significant of these developments are as follows:

1- Shifts in the Turkish stance toward the Assad regime: Tehran believes that the change in the balance of military powers in Syria in favour of the Syrian regime and its allies over the past period has pushed many states to alter their position towards dealing with the fait accompli. This may help reduce the severity of the differences between them on the controversial issues.

In this regard, Turkey is one of the key countries that began to signal that it could make changes in its stance on the Syrian crisis, especially in its relations with the Syrian regime. This was evident in the statements made by Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, on December 16, saying that “if it is democratic election, and if it is a credible one then everybody should consider (working with him).” This statement signals a shift from the previous Turkish policy, which has backed armed and terrorist organizations in Syria to enhance the chances of ousting the regime.

Accordingly, Tehran considers its involvement in greater bilateral relations with Turkey could spur the latter to show more “positive” signals about its relations with the Syrian regime. Iran may step in to persuade it of the need to make a change in this context and may further try to mediate between the parties.

In its view, Tehran believes this could help normalize relations between the Assad regime and international and regional powers, to usher in a new phase in Syria, following the new shift in the balance of the military power.

2- Turkish rejection of US sanctions: Turkey’s rejection to abide by the US sanctions on Iran, chiefly regarding oil imports and banking transactions, is of a particular interest to Iran. While these imports remain minimal, they ultimately embolden Iran to adopt a hardline-stance on the US sanctions and refuse to make concessions that could help to narrow the differences between the two parties.

To Iran, strengthening bilateral relations and reaching USD 30 billion in bilateral trade could bolster its ability to reduce the fallout from the US sanctions, after expiry of the six-month grace period given by the US administration to eight importing countries of Iranian oil, including Turkey.

3- Shared issues: The other common issues among the two parties are becoming increasingly important, against the backdrop of regional developments. Such issues include the ongoing support of the two parties to Qatar in the light of the remarkable convergence in the policies of the three countries and the attitude towards the political movements of the Kurds, particularly in Iraq and Syria, as well as border security cooperation.

Persistent Suspicion 

However, the Iranian betting on Turkey looks to be limited by the uncertainties expressed by many analysts in Tehran, not to mention that emerging regional developments may bring in different variables that affect the previous factors for convergence.

As for the bilateral cooperation, reaching a level of USD 30 billion in trade seems to hit hurdles. Perhaps it could be argued that this goal was the main rubric of all the visits conducted by Presidents Rouhani and Erdogan over the past years, and has not been achieved, suggesting that economic cooperation between the two parties has limits.

This means that the Turkish stance on the US sanctions on Iran will not constitute a fundamental variable that could help the latter endure the repercussions, especially as it relies on other countries such as China, India, and Russia.

Iran may not rule out that its relations with Turkey become the focus of discussions between the latter and the US, through which Ankara will seek to exploit what could be termed the “Iranian bargaining chip” in its bargaining with Washington over other controversial issues, especially the Syrian Kurds.

The Turkish policy is evident in numerous issues; Turkey is seeking to extract many gains from the US in the current period, such as the suspension of military support for Syrian Kurdish militias and extradition of the Turkish preacher, Fethullah Gulen.

Moreover, the recent US decision to withdraw its forces from Syria, which was announced on December 19, coinciding with Rouhani’s visit to Turkey, could bring about shifts in the trajectories of the Syrian conflict. Such shifts may not necessarily be positive to the Iranian-Turkish understandings in Syria in accordance with the Astana talks, in which the two countries are participating alongside Russia.

In addition, Iran may come to see the US decision as a result of a deal between Washington and Ankara on several issues, which may pave the way for a new Turkish intervention in Syria, that will not be to Tehran’s liking.

In short, a remarkable rapprochement between Iran and Turkey will unlikely succeed in reducing the differences and mistrust between the two countries in the coming period, given that the regional developments may stand in the way of achieving the desired goal.