Through announcing that it had destroyed a nuclear facility in Deir Ezzor, Syria in September 2007, Israel wanted to send messages to both Iran and the United States. Most importantly is that Israel is determined to respond to Iran’s threats and especially its development of ballistic missiles used to threaten its foes and Tel Aviv in particular. Other such threats include Iran’s deployment of allied Shia militias near the Israeli border. Additionally, Israel’s announcement is aimed at putting pressure on the U.S. Administration to continue its efforts towards amending the nuclear deal, rectifying its loopholes. Moreover, Israel wants to assure Washington and Moscow that it will not hesitate to take unilateral measures to protect its security against Iran. 

Israel used to remain ambiguous about some military operations it conducts in other countries in the region. But it deliberately gave up this rule on March 21 to claim responsibility for the March 7, 2007 bombing a facility in al-Kibar, Deir Ezzor, Syria, which it believes was housing a nuclear reactor secretly developed by the Syrian regime.  

In fact, the significance of this measure lies in its timing: It cannot be viewed separately from the overall developments taking place in this region, including ongoing tensions between the United States and Iran over the nuclear deal, as well as the security and political arrangements being made currently inside Syria.

Direct threats

Intelligence minister Israel Katz said that the bombing of the reactor was a message to Iran that Israel would not allow it to obtain nuclear weaponry. But this does not negate the fact that this attack was aimed at warning not only Iran, but also several world powers involved in regional developments, that Tel Aviv will not hesitate to take action if it believes that such developments impose direct threats on its security and interests. 

In other words, the messages that Iran was keen to send out, through claiming responsibility for attacking the Syrian nuclear reactor, are not meant only for Iran, but also for the United States as well as Russia. 

Mounting Tensions

Israel has concerns over potential repercussion that the nuclear agreement between Iran and the 5+1 group of world powers, as well as Iran’s increasing activity in Syria. This activity became evident in Iran’s efforts to expand its military presence in Syria and create a strategic corridor to Lebanon through Iraqi and Syrian territories to continue providing support to its allies in the three countries. 

In Tel Aviv’s view, the nuclear deal will not block Iran’s efforts to acquire a nuclear bomb if it worked towards this option using, in particular, the technological and economic gains of the deal, in addition to a gradual alleviation of nuclear restrictions eight years after the signing of the deal. 

No doubt, Tel Aviv is concerned that Iran continues to develop its ballistic missile program. This was evidenced in statements delivered on March 7, by Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ aerospace division, who said that Iran is “among the top five countries in the fields of air defense.” Moreover, Tehran rejected all efforts made by European states, and France in particular, to dissuade from its current position and avoid a collapse of the nuclear deal after the United States issued several warnings in this context. 

Running in parallel to this were Iran’s plans to exploit its military presence in Syria to put pressure on Israel and make direct threats to launch strikes against it in response to Israeli military attacks due to the current disagreement about the nuclear deal. The deal may not be kept in place in the coming period, given reservations expressed by the U.S. Administration of President Donald Trump.

This became evident due to two developments. Firstly, a limited military confrontation broke out between Israel, on the one side, and Iran, the Syrian regime and Hezbollah on the other, on February 10, 2018 when an Israeli F-16 fighter jet was downed. The downing was, according to several views in Israel, was a deliberate action by Iran and its allies that was taken at this particular time most likely as part of preparations for a new stage of tension between the two sides that may start very soon.

The second development is that Iran deliberately sent a number of leaders and elements of allied militias to the Lebanon-Israel border, where they made direct threats against Israel. The threats mean that the role of these militias may not be confined to helping the Syrian regime to counter opposition forces and armed organizations, but can be expanded to include new missions, including targeting Israeli interests. 

This, perhaps, explains reasons behind visits made by Qais al-Khazali, leader of the Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia, and Hamza Abu al-Abbas, a commander of Liwa al-Baqir, to southern Lebanon, where they announced their full support to Hezbollah in any war with Israel that may break out in the coming period.

Enduring Pressures

Additionally, by lifting the veil of secrecy over the action it took ten years ago, Israel seeks to put pressure on the United States in a bid to achieve two goals. 

The first goal is to push the United States to insist on the need for introducing changes to the nuclear deal that can weaken the likelihood of Iran succeeding in reaching the stage of acquiring capabilities needed for making a nuclear bomb.

That is why Tel Aviv keeps a close watch on current vigorous efforts exerted by European states to avoid a collapse of the nuclear deal. These states seek to convince Iran and the United States of the possibility of singing a supplementary agreement to tackle issues of the current deal. That is why Tel Aviv believes that the implicit threats it made through its recent action can push European states to continue to put pressure to reach such an agreement that may help reduce its concerns over the potential trajectories of Iran’s nuclear program in the coming period. 

The second goal is to suggest that it will not wait to receive a green light before it conducts its military operations against any targets deemed as threats to its interests, especially in Syria. In Tel Aviv, there are views that the U.S. policy on Syria has not blocked Iran’s efforts to consolidate its military, political and economic influence in the country, and that this requires the United States to take action to reduce the severity of resulting potential dangers to its security. 

No doubt, In Israel’s view, Russia too is meant to be a recipient of that message, given the continued military and security coordination between Moscow and Tehran on Syrian territory, as well as Russia’s avoidance of taking part in any efforts aimed at weakening Iran’s military influence on the ground. This is especially so because Russia considers such influence as a mechanism to tilt the balance of power in Syria in favor of the Assad regime. This is in light of Russia’s keen interest in backing the regime either through aerial strikes against the opposition or using veto power to block any United Nations Security Council resolutions condemning the regime, while refraining from intervening using troops on the ground, which is a mission carried out directly by regular forces and allied militias. 

In conclusion, the move will mark a new stage of escalation in which involved parties would exchange warnings, perhaps pending strategic milestones that the region may witness after a May 12 deadline for Washington to decide whether to stay in, or walk out of the nuclear deal.