Since their emergence in Somalia in October 2015, ISIS- affiliated terrorist groups have sought to expand their influence, but have not yet been able to do so. They are still in a vulnerable situation that has not been able to contain Its repercussions, which limit its ability to rival Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (HSM), especially in terms of deployment and operational activity. Accordingly, many estimates suggest that it may rely on sleeper cells or scattered formations to carry out small-scale attacks, on the hope that Somalia would turn, at a later stage, to hotbed of the main organization that sustained heavy defeats in Iraq and Syria in recent months. The strategic position of Somalia near global transport lines may lure the organization to exploit it to threaten the interests of international powers.

Early Conflict

These groups began to emerge in Somalia in October 2015, when Abdel Qader Momen, a former cadre of al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, along with 20 of his followers, paid allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Although the main organization in Iraq and Syria did not declare Somalia’s branch as one of its external “emirates”, which implies that branch is still weak, al-Mujahideen movement saw in such presence a threat to its influence. This because the emergence of these groups coincided with the expansion of ISIS in the Sahel-Sahara region at the expense other al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, to such a degree that threaten its survival, before it could regain its influence.

Over the last period, the international community has shown increased concern over the presence of such groups in Somalia. This was evident in the drone strikes launched by the U.S. on November 4, as well as the UN report on November 8, issuing warnings that Abdelkader group managed to increase its members from a few dozen to 200 persons.

Certainly, these developments indicate that the international powers and organizations have proactively moved to counter the possible transformation of Somalia into a breeding ground for the new terrorist organization, after losing most of its strongholds in Iraq and Syria. These developments prompted the international community to warn against the dangers of ISIS spread in Somalia and take actions to counter it, through pre-emptive military strikes against the bastions of its affiliated groups.

This has compounded the pressure on these groups, especially as they fail to develop their military and organizational capabilities, or to launch high-profile attacks and suicide operations, or recruit a large number of terrorist elements. This is turn has affected their operational activity, as their members are still between 200 and 250 persons, impeding their control over vast swathes of land, such as al-Mujahideen. Their control over Qandala, a coastal village, lasted only a month, after the government forces ousted their elements at the end of December 2016.

Multiple Factors

The diminished capacity of these groups to expand their activity within Somalia can be ascribed to several factors, as follows:

1- Poor funding: These groups failed to secure multiple sources of funding for their activities, as their economic resources are confine to old traditional sources, such as voluntary contributions and donations. Moreover, they did not engage in commercial activities similar to other terrorist organizations, and did not control large swathes of land to enable them to impose taxes, as was the case with the main organization in Iraq and Syria.

2- Mujahideen’s pressures: al-Mujahideen movement views the emergence of pro-ISIS groups in Somalia as a threat to its influence, especially given ISIS’s ongoing attempts to be at the forefront of terrorist organizations wherever it exists. This led al-Mujahideen to take actions to wipe out those groups, or at least curtail its activities, threatening to kill all those who split and join ISIS and began to chase those who moved to mountainous areas to avoid further attacks.

3- Decline of the main organization: This has numerous consequences on sub-organizations, which lost one of their main sources of funding, in such a way that may lead many of its elements to defect and join rival terrorist organizations, chiefly al-Qaeda and its offshoots.

4- Limited footprint: Most of the groups that declared their allegiance to ISIS are concentrated in Al Medo mountain range north-eastern Somalia, after the government forces and al-Mujahideen movement drove them out of the areas they tried to control. This led to a decline in the ability of these groups to establish ISIS- affiliated “emirate”, prevented them from recruiting more terrorist elements, especially since there is a positive correlation between expansion, proliferation and expanded recruitment.

5- Lack of alliances: These groups were unable to establish a network of alliances with other terrorist organizations due to their intellectual orientations, which helped al-Mujahideen movement to force their elements out of some areas. Moreover, their capacity was significantly degraded as a result of the military strikes by the U.S and government forces.

In light of the above mentioned, it can be argued that pro-ISIS groups in Somalia are still vulnerable due to several organizational and economic factors. Yet, this does not negate the fact that they may pose strong threats to the security and stability of Somalia during the next period. This would happen if some leaders and cadres of the main organization moved to Somalia, if they managed to secure alternative sources of funding or recruit more terrorist elements who adopt ISIS’ ideology.